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Abstract 
 The purpose of this study was to survey country club professionals’ importance 
perceptions of food defense and the frequency with which preventive practices were 
implemented in their clubs to prevent bioterrorism. Gaps between importance perceptions and 
practice frequency were compared with concern of food terrorism and practice frequency 
implementation. Perceived self-efficacy measures and perceived barriers were compared with 
motivations to develop a food defense management plan and practice frequency implementation. 
Importance perceptions and practice frequencies were studied to ascertain if there were 
differences among operational factors. Club professionals with smaller gaps implemented 
preventive practices more frequently. Club professionals with higher self-efficacy levels were 
more motivated to develop food defense management plans and implemented preventive 
practices more frequently. Club professionals with higher barriers were less motivated to develop 
food defense management plans and implemented preventive practices less frequently.  
The field study component investigated food security practices in private country clubs. 
Club manager interviews and observations of operational practices were conducted. Most club 
managers stated that they did not think their clubs were at risk of a bioterrorist attack. Cost and 
lack of need were identified as barriers towards implementing a food defense management plan. 
Club employees were perceived to be more likely to initiate a bioterrorism attack than non-
employees. Background checks and good employment practices were perceived as effective in 
increasing food security in clubs. Most clubs did not monitor arrivals and over half did not 
secure their chemicals. Based on the results of the field study, the researcher recommended 
several actions that could improve food security in country clubs including installing video 
surveillance and developing disaster management plans that include food defense. 
Recommendations for future research included continued examination of club managers’ self-
efficacy perceptions towards biosecurity and identifying barriers to food defense implementation 
in other retail foodservice segments. 
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CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 
Overview of Bioterrorism 
The turn of the millennium not only ushered in a new century, but also new concerns 
about the way we view threats to the safety and security of the food supply in the United States 
(U.S.). Following the terrorist attacks on New York City and the Pentagon in 2001, funding for 
counterterrorism was increased and as a result, the safety and security of the food supply 
received increased attention and priority (Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005). Historically, food safety in 
the U.S. has focused primarily on unintentional and accidental contamination of food and water. 
The food and water supply can be threatened in several ways: (1) food safety and sanitation, (2) 
food ingredients (imported food, genetically modified organisms, allergenic foods) or (3) 
disasters. Food ingredient issues are monitored and well-controlled by government agencies. 
Food safety and sanitation within foodservice operations are also regulated and inspected by 
governmental officials. Unfortunately, foodservice operators, the foodservice industry, and the 
U.S. government are not thoroughly prepared for threats in the form of disasters. These disasters 
can be classified as natural (such as fire, flood, tornado, earthquake, hurricane, or volcanic 
activity) or intentional (such as terrorism) (Bryant, McEntire, & Newsome, 2005; Hollingsworth, 
2002; Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005) .  
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) defines bioterrorism as the 
“intentional use of biological or chemical agents for the purpose of causing harm” (United States 
Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service, 2004). Food biosecurity is defined by the 
USDA as the “protection of food from bioterrorism” (United States Department of Agriculture 
Food and Nutrition Service, 2004). Security in restaurants and other foodservice operations 
previously meant keeping customers safe from violent or criminal acts (National Restaurant 
Association Educational Foundation, 2003). However, in the national context of heightened 
awareness of terrorist activity in the U.S., food security is now defined by the National 
Restaurant Association (NRA) as “preventing or eliminating the deliberate contamination of 
food” (National Restaurant Association Educational Foundation, 2003). Furthermore, the term 
“food biosecurity” may also be referred to as “food security” by some governmental agencies 
(United States Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service, 2004). It is also important 
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to make the distinction between food safety and food security. Food safety refers to food that 
may be accidentally contaminated, whereas food security addresses the purposeful contamination 
of food intended to harm people and disrupt society (National Restaurant Association 
Educational Foundation, 2003).  
Opportunities for bioterrorist activities exist along the food supply chain, from 
agricultural production to consumption of food, commonly referred as “farm to fork” or “farm to 
table” (Dictionary.com's 21st Century Lexicon, 2010). Examples of food biosecurity research 
include: food production and processing (Bledsoe & Rasco, 2002; Bledsoe & Rasco, 2003; 
Brandt, Sanderson, DeGroot, Thomson, & Hollis, 2008), modeling of the food supply (Wein & 
Liu, 2005), (Arnon et al., 2001), threats to U.S. agriculture (Crutchley, 2007; Franz, 2005; 
Sanderson & Gnad, 2002), law enforcement (Knowles et al., 2005), and school and hospital 
foodservice (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007a; Yoon & Shanklin, 2007b; Yoon & Shanklin, 2007c).  
Food security threats may affect any portion of the food supply chain and may be 
centered upon certain foods, production processes, or businesses producing food products 
(National Restaurant Association Educational Foundation, 2003). Individuals who intentionally 
commit criminal acts by contaminating or harming food products may be referred to as 
aggressors (AIB International, 2006). Aggressors can be: protestors (those who bring attention 
to their causes), subversives (saboteurs and spies), disgruntled insiders (unhappy employees), 
criminals (individuals purposely causing harm), and terrorists (well-organized groups with 
political or other agendas) (AIB International, 2006). For the purposes of this study, aggressors 
will be referred to as terrorists, bioterrorists, or food bioterrorists. Bioterrorists who may 
knowingly contaminate food may also include: business competitors, people posing as 
customers, vendors, “copycat” individuals, and anyone with an agenda or cause (National 
Restaurant Association Educational Foundation, 2003). Motivations of terrorists can include: 
political/ideological, creating chaos, revenge/retribution, financial benefit, thrill-seeking, 
notoriety, attention/publicity, humor/prank, and obtaining a competitive advantage (AIB 
International, 2006).  
There has been significant bioterrorism research conducted of the production and 
transportation of food, but research regarding the preparedness of the commercial foodservice 
segment is minimal at best (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007c). Food bioterrorism research within the 
foodservice industry must not be ignored. Governmental agencies, such as the Centers for 
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Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA), have recommended foodservice professionals monitor the 
security of the food supply from production to consumption (farm to fork) (Peregrin, 2002).  
Past examples of food bioterrorism illustrate the need for proactive and preventive food 
defense practices. In 1984, the Rajneeshee religious cult attempted to alter the results of an 
Oregon county election. An estimated 751 people were affected when cult members 
contaminated local restaurants’ salad bars with Salmonella Typhimurium (AIB International, 
2006). In 1996, twelve laboratory employees of a Texas hospital were intentionally infected with 
pastries containing a rare diarrhea-causing strain of Shigella dysenteriae. Although there were no 
fatalities, four employees required hospitalization and five other employees were treated in the 
hospital emergency room. A co-worker was identified as the person responsible for intentionally 
infecting fellow laboratory employees with Shigella. This individual was found guilty on five 
felony assault charges and sentenced to twenty years in prison (Carus, 2002). In January 2003, 
148 people in Michigan became ill after consuming ground beef purchased at a supermarket. 
After a lengthy investigation, it was determined that a disgruntled supermarket employee had 
intentionally contaminated 200 pounds of ground beef with insecticide (CDC, 2003). In August 
2009 at a Mexican restaurant in Lenexa, Kansas, 48 people became ill after consuming salsa that 
was intentionally contaminated with Methomyl, a highly-toxic pesticide used for fruit, vegetable, 
and field crops. One current and one former employee (a husband and wife duo) of the restaurant 
were both charged with conspiracy to tamper with a consumer product, citing revenge against the 
restaurant owner (a family relative of the couple) as motivation (United States Department of 
Justice, 2010).    
Foodservice operators must be informed of the potential risks and threats posed by 
bioterrorism as they are the final control point on the food supply chain. Developing a food 
security management plan that specifies how to implement preventive practices should be the 
most direct and efficacious method to minimize the threat of bioterrorism to a foodservice 
operation (Bledsoe & Rasco, 2002; United States Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition 
Service, 2004).  
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The Foodservice Industry 
The preparation and consumption of wholesome food, either at home or away from 
home, is essential to human survival. Forty-nine cents of every food dollar is spent away from 
home in the U.S, in a restaurant or another establishment serving food (National Restaurant 
Association, 2010). Professional preparation and service of food and beverages to others 
(hereafter referred to as foodservice) is an important and vital part of daily life, with the 
restaurant industry serving an estimated 130 million people daily in 2010 (National Restaurant 
Association, 2010).  The restaurant industry will serve an estimated 70 billion meals and snacks 
in 2010, employ a projected 12.7 million people (9% of the U.S. workforce), and generate an 
estimated $580 billion in revenues (National Restaurant Association, 2010). 
Foodservice operations are ubiquitous in the U.S., offering people a place to socialize 
with one another, to restore their energy levels, and to relax (Walker, 2009).  Foodservice 
operations are commonly classified into two segments: commercial or onsite (noncommercial) 
foodservices (Spears & Gregoire, 2007). Onsite foodservice operations include: hospitals, 
schools, child care, senior care, military, correctional, and employee feeding (Spears & Gregoire, 
2007). Commercial foodservice includes convenience stores and many types of restaurants, 
including: fast food, full-service, casual and fine dining, hotel and motel, and airport restaurants. 
Restaurants may also be located in museums, aboard cruise ships, in zoos and museums, at 
sporting arenas and events, and in private country clubs.  
Private Country Clubs 
In 2008, there were about 6,000 private country clubs in North America. These clubs 
represented extensive financial assets, employed thousands of individuals, and provided an 
economic impact in the billions of dollars annually (Walker, 2009). Country clubs are exclusive 
and cater to the affluent, with initiation fees charged to new members as high as $250,000 
(Walker, 2009). All country clubs provide some form of food and beverage service, which is 
important for creating positive impressions in the minds of club members and their guests 
(Perdue, 2007). Country clubs employ many foodservice workers and hire seasonal employees to 
meet peak demands in a club’s business, such as the busy summer and holiday seasons. Turnover 
among foodservice workers can reach approximately 300%, thus background checks are 
considered cost-prohibitive by many club managers (Aziz, Goldman, & Olsen, 2007). Because 
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country clubs are often exclusive and cater to wealthy and influential members of society, they 
could be selected as potential targets by would-be terrorists (Ehrlich & Liu, 2002). A bioterrorist 
attack upon a country club’s food supply could be carried out by a foodservice employee or 
someone who has access to the operation with the potential to harm hundreds of club members, 
their families, and their guests.      
Statement of Problem 
Foodservice professionals need to be aware of the risks of food bioterrorism as they are 
responsible for managing the final control point in the food supply chain. Most foodservice 
operations have crisis management plans in place to deal with natural disasters and workplace 
emergencies. Unfortunately, these crisis management plans do not properly address how to 
manage intentional contamination of an operation’s food or water supply. All foodservice 
operations are recommended to secure their food supplies, and particularly those that serve high-
risk individuals, such as children, seniors, and patients (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007c). Foodservice 
operators need to update their crisis management plans to protect their customers and employees 
from the possibility of bioterrorism (Bledsoe & Rasco, 2002; Bruemmer, 2003; United States 
Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service, 2004; Yoon & Shanklin, 2007a). 
Developing a food defense management plan that specifies how to implement preventive 
practices should be the most direct and efficacious method to minimize the threat of bioterrorism 
to a foodservice operation (Bledsoe & Rasco, 2002; United States Department of Agriculture 
Food and Nutrition Service, 2004). 
U.S. governmental agencies and some foodservice operations (e.g. public school 
foodservice) are aware of the importance of preventive practices taken against bioterrorism 
(United States Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service, 2004). Past research has 
studied bioterrorism perceptions and preventative practices in school foodservice and hospital 
foodservice operations (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007a; Yoon & Shanklin, 2007b; Yoon & Shanklin, 
2007c). However, very little is currently known about club professionals’ perceptions of the 
importance of these preventive practices and the frequency with which these preventive practices 
are used in country club foodservice operations. Club professionals’ perceived self-efficacy is 
their belief in their own capabilities to plan and implement necessary actions to effectively deal 
with events in their country club and should be explored. Club professionals’ perceived barriers 
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to implementing a biosecurity plan and implementing preventive practices should also be 
studied. 
Purpose and Objectives 
This operational research investigated club professionals’ perceptions of the risk of 
bioterrorism to foodservice in their country clubs and the frequency with which specific practices 
to prevent bioterrorism were implemented. Perceptions of importance, frequency of practice of 
specific preventative measures, gaps between perceived importance and specific practice 
frequencies, perceived self-efficacy to develop a food security management plan, perceived self-
efficacy to implement preventive practices, perceived barriers to develop a food security 
management plan, and perceived barriers to implement preventive practices were measured in 
county club foodservice establishments.  
The primary purpose of this study was to examine country club professionals’ importance 
perceptions of securing their foodservice operations against a food terrorism attack and the 
perceived preventative practices that could be implemented to counter such an attack. Gaps 
between importance perceptions and the frequency of perceived preventative practices were 
examined to determine if there was a relationship with club professionals’ concern about food 
terrorism and how often preventive practices were implemented in their clubs. Perceived self-
efficacy measures and perceived barriers were studied to assess if there was a relationship with 
club professionals’ motivation to develop a food defense management plan and the frequency to 
which preventive practices were implemented in private country clubs. Demographic 
characteristics were compared with importance perceptions and frequency of practices. 
The specific objectives of this operational research were:  
1. to identify club professionals’ perceptions of the importance of food defense and food 
security in their private country clubs; 
2. to determine club professionals’ self-reported preventive practices used to counter food 
bioterrorism in their club; 
3. to measure the gap between club professionals’ perceptions of importance of food 
defense and food security in their country club and their self-reported preventive 
practices used to counter food bioterrorism in their club; 
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4. to observe the frequency of preventive practices used to counter food bioterrorism in 
selected country clubs; 
5. to measure the gap between club professionals’ perceptions of importance of food 
defense and food security in their country club and the observed frequency of preventive 
measures against food terrorism practiced in country clubs; 
6. to assess club professionals’ perceived self-efficacy to develop a management plan 
related to food defense; 
7. to assess club professionals’ perceived self-efficacy to implement preventive practices in 
country clubs; 
8. to assess club professionals’ perceived barriers to develop a management plan related to 
food defense; and 
9. to assess club professionals’ perceived barriers to implement preventive practices in 
country clubs. 
10. to compare demographic characteristics and importance and frequency of practices. 
Research Questions and Propositions 
The research questions guiding this dissertation were as follows: 
1. What are club professionals’ perceptions of the importance of facility security in their 
country clubs?  
2. What are club professionals’ perceptions of the importance of utility security in their 
country clubs?  
3. What are club professionals’ perceptions of the importance of employee management in 
their country clubs?  
4. What are club professionals’ perceptions of the importance of communication in their 
country clubs?  
5. What are club professionals’ perceptions of the importance of food handling in their 
country clubs?  
6. What are club professionals’ perceptions of the importance of chemical use and storage 
in their country clubs?  
7. To what frequency are the items mentioned in research questions 1 – 6 practiced in these 
country clubs as reported by the club professionals?  
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8. To what frequency are the items mentioned in research questions 1 – 6 practiced in these 
country clubs as directly observed through an onsite visit in these country clubs?  
9. Are club managers’ levels of concern about biosecurity in their operations affected by the 
gaps between importance and the frequency of practice in research questions 1 – 6?    
10. What level of perceived self efficacy do club professionals possess to develop a 
management plan related to food defense? 
11. What level of perceived self efficacy do club professionals possess to implement 
preventive practices to deal with items mentioned in research questions 1 – 6? 
12. What perceived barriers exist that could prevent club professionals from developing a 
food defense management plan?  
13. What perceived barriers exist that could prevent club professionals from implementing 
preventive practices to deal with items mentioned in research questions 1 – 6? 
14. What differences among demographic characteristics exist in comparison with 
importance and frequency of practices? 
The gap between the perception of the importance of preventive practices and actual 
practice frequency was evaluated to see if risk perception was affected by the size of the gap. By 
using the size of gaps, the study elucidates which preventive measures should receive more 
attention in training materials or bulletins. When club professionals are more concerned about 
food bioterrorism and biosecurity, a smaller gap between importance perception and practice 
frequency should occur because club professionals are then more likely to perform the 
preventive practices frequently. Gap analysis was used in two prior food biosecurity research 
studies measuring importance perceptions and practice frequencies (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007a; 
Yoon & Shanklin, 2007b).  
Club professionals’ self-efficacy is their belief in their own capabilities to plan and 
implement necessary actions to effectively deal with events in their country club. Club 
professionals with higher levels of perceived self-efficacy should be more motivated to develop 
food defense management plans and implement preventive practices in their country clubs than 
club professionals with lower levels of perceived self-efficacy. Conversely, club professionals 
with higher numbers of perceived barriers should be less motivated to develop food defense 
management plans and implement preventive practices in their country clubs than club 
professionals with lower numbers of perceived barriers. 
 9
Based on this reasoning, six research propositions were investigated: 
Proposition 1: Club professionals with smaller gaps between importance perception and 
practice frequency are more concerned about food terrorism and biosecurity than 
operators with larger gaps. 
Proposition 2: Club professionals with smaller gaps between importance perception and 
practice frequency implement preventive practices more frequently than operators with 
larger gaps. 
Proposition 3: Club professionals with higher levels of perceived self-efficacy are more 
motivated to develop a food defense management plan in their country clubs than club 
professionals with lower levels of perceived self-efficacy.  
Proposition 4: Club professionals with higher levels of perceived self-efficacy implement 
preventive practices more frequently than club professionals with lower levels of 
perceived self-efficacy. 
Proposition 5: Club professionals with higher numbers of perceived barriers are less 
motivated to develop a food defense management plan in their country clubs than club 
professionals with lower numbers of perceived barriers. 
Proposition 6: Club professionals with higher numbers of perceived barriers implement 
preventive practices less frequently than club professionals with lower numbers of 
perceived barriers. 
Significance of the Study 
Research pertaining to the readiness of foodservice operations to protect themselves 
against food bioterrorism is limited; previous research focused on food bioterrorism in school 
and hospital foodservices (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007c). More research in the commercial 
foodservice segment (including country clubs) is needed to expand the knowledge base and to 
explore strategies in protecting customers of foodservice establishments.   
In 2008, there were over 14,000 private clubs in North America (6,000 of which are 
country clubs) that employed thousands and had an annual economic impact in the billions of 
dollars (Walker, 2009). All country clubs serve food and beverages which could potentially be 
used to deliver biological, chemical, or physical agents and harm club members (Perdue, 2007). 
An assessment of the perceived risks of food bioterrorism, the practices in place to counter 
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bioterrorism, and the motivations to establish and implement a food defense management plan 
within country clubs serves to benefit club members and their families, their guests, and the 
employees of country clubs.  
In addition to building upon the existing body of literature regarding food defense in 
foodservice operations, country club specific data was gathered. No research was found that 
investigated bioterrorism in country clubs. Results from this study could be used to help protect 
patrons of country clubs and to better plan for important club events, where heightened security 
may be needed. Information gathered can be used to update or modify existing crisis 
management plans and improve country clubs’ ability to respond to traumatic events. Results of 
this study could be used to recommend bioterrorism-specific items for country clubs to include 
while revising plans and procedures for communicating with emergency responders and the 
media. In addition, information can be compared with former food defense research studies in 
hospitals and school foodservice and analyzed for commonalities that could be generalized to 
other foodservice operations. Items common in all foodservice operations, such as deliveries, 
vendors, employee training, facility security, storage, and food production procedures, can all be 
better studied for universal improvements in food security.  
Definition of Terms 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC): The Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention is the main agency for managing public health in the U.S. CDC’s primary 
mission is to protect the health of all people through promotion, prevention, and preparedness. 
CDC also manages terrorism and emergency response preparedness (CDC, 2008b).  
Food Biosecurity (aka Food Defense or Food Security): Food biosecurity includes all 
policies, procedures, and activities used to ensure that food is safe from bioterrorism (United 
States Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service, 2004).  
Bioterrorism: Bioterrorism involves using dangerous biological agents or chemicals to 
purposely inflict damage upon society (United States Department of Agriculture Food and 
Nutrition Service, 2004).  
Food Bioterrorism (aka Food Terrorism): Food bioterrorism is the use of physical, 
chemical, radionuclear, or biological substances to deliberately contaminate food to harm people 
and disrupt communities (WHO, 2002). 
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Food Biosecurity Management Plan (aka Food Defense Management Plan or Food 
Security Management Plan): A food biosecurity management plan helps foodservice operators 
strategize to counter the threat of food bioterrorism to their operation. It contains the written 
policies and procedures that help to decrease the risk of contaminated food served in a 
foodservice operation harming others (United States Department of Agriculture Food and 
Nutrition Service, 2004). 
Biological Agents (used in Bioterrorism): Examples of biological agents that could be 
used in bioterrorism include: Anthrax, Bubonic Plague, Cholera, Salmonella, Typhoid, Shigella, 
Listeria, Botulism, Staphylococcus, Smallpox, Ricin, Aflatoxins. Bacteria, toxins, viruses, 
parasites, etc. are examples of biological agents that can be delivered in the form of liquids, 
aerosals, or solids (Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005). 
Chemical Agents (used in Bioterrorism): Examples of chemical agents that could be 
used in bioterrorism include: chemical warfare agents (nerve, blister, blood, and choking agents) 
and toxic industrial chemicals (pesticides, rodenticides, and heavy metals). These can be 
delivered as airborne droplets, liquids, aerosals, or solids (Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005).  
Physical Agents (used in Bioterrorism): Physical materials that could cause harm if 
ingested such as bone slivers, glass fragments, and metal filings (Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005). 
Radiological Agents (used in Bioterrorism): Radioactive elements that can be delivered 
in liquid or solid form (Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005). 
General Manager (GM) of a Private Club: A GM of a private club is hired by a club’s 
board of directors and is in charge of club operations and upholding policies established by the 
board. In addition, the GM is responsible for the financial health of the club and for ensuring 
quality control in providing services and facilities to club members. The GM also prepare the 
club’s annual budget, oversees all club renovations, and supervises all department heads and club 
professionals (Perdue, 2007). 
Private Club: A private club is an exclusive organization comprised of selected 
individuals (club members) with some kind of common bond (backgrounds, experiences, 
professions, interests, etc.). Furthermore, a private club also refers to the physical location in 
which the club members gather to socialize or enjoy recreational activities. Typically, an 
individual must be approved for membership to a private club and upon approval, an initiation 
fee is required. Although there are many types of private clubs, food and beverage service is 
 12
almost certainly offered at all private clubs. Once approved, members usually pay monthly 
membership dues and/or must meet monthly spending requirements (usually on food and 
beverages). Private clubs cater to affluent and influential individuals, their families, and their 
guests. A private club may be viewed as an exclusive group of wealthy and powerful individuals 
and thus may attract unwanted attention from non-members (Perdue, 2007). 
Self-Efficacy: Self-efficacy is an individual’s belief in their own abilities to plan and 
carry out necessary actions to effectively deal with events as they occur (Bandura, 1995).   
Operations Research: Operations (or operational) research is also known as 
management science and uses quantitative methods to find solutions to difficult problems. For 
this study, operational research will be used to examine bioterrorism risks to country club 
operations and the systems in place to defend those operations against bioterrorism (Wikipedia, 
2009b). 
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CHAPTER 2 - Literature Review 
Food Terrorism, Food Biosecurity, and Bioterrorism 
Although it is difficult to pinpoint exactly when terrorism started, terrorism is believed to 
have originated around 2,000 years ago. The main driving force behind historical terrorism was 
religion, which began in the first century A.D. and has continued to some degree into the modern 
day (Center for Defense Information, 2003).  The word “terrorism” itself was derived from the 
French word “terrorisme” during the Reign of Terror (regime de la terreur) in the French 
Revolution from 1793-1794 (Center for Defense Information, 2003; Harper, November, 2001). 
Approximately 40,000 people were executed by guillotine while the regime de la terreur was 
used as an official instrument of the state to protect and consolidate the powers of the newly-
formed French government. However, this led to backlash and further bloodshed, and the word 
“terrorize” (to coerce or deter by terror) took on a negative meaning when it was first recorded as 
such in English in 1823. Acts which could be regarded as terrorist activities were first recorded 
in the United States during the Civil War. In addition, Anarchist-related terrorism was active 
throughout the 1880s in the U.S. and continued into the 20th Century with organized groups such 
as the Ku Klux Klan (Center for Defense Information, 2003; Harper, November, 2001). 
Modern terrorism generally employs the use of weapons, with (in descending popularity) 
the use of such items as bombs, guns, knives and other bladed weapons, remote control bombs, 
fire, chemical and biological weapons, and unknown or unspecified weapons (Bogen & Jones, 
2006). Worldwide terrorism resulted in 86,568 casualties and 25,408 deaths from 1968 to 2004 
in 19,828 documented terrorist events and 7,401 adverse events. Bogen and Jones (2006) 
projected that these numbers will increase in the future, with an upward trend in the number of 
deaths, injuries, and terrorist events. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) defines terrorism as “the use of 
force or violence against persons or property in violation of the criminal laws of the United 
States for purposes of intimidation, coercion, or ransom” (FEMA, 2006). According to FEMA 
(2006), terrorists use threats to strike fear into society, attempt to convince citizens that the 
government is unable to control terrorism, and draw attention to terrorists’ causes. Types of 
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terrorist acts may include bombings and bomb scares; the use of biological, chemical, nuclear 
and radiological weapons; cyber attacks; kidnappings; hijackings; assassinations and terrorist 
threats (FEMA, 2006). Targets at-risk for terrorist attacks include airports, military facilities, 
high-profile landmarks, water and food supplies, corporate centers, utilities, and large cities. In 
addition, terrorists may choose to send chemical or biological materials as well as explosives 
through mail delivery systems, creating fear and uncertainty in the process (FEMA, 2006).   
Bombs and explosive devices are the most commonly used weapons by terrorists (Bogen 
& Jones, 2006; FEMA, 2006). With information readily available in books and from other 
sources, coupled with easy access to materials commonly found in hardware and variety stores, 
explosive devices can be easily constructed. Furthermore, explosive devices are portable and 
may be transported using a variety of vehicles, including human beings. The ease of detonation 
from remote control or by suicide bombers is appealing to terrorists. The damage from these 
explosive devices can effectively destroy social, political, religious, and financial institutions. In 
addition to buildings, terrorist attacks have occurred on city streets and in public places, which 
has resulted in thousands of people killed or injured worldwide (FEMA, 2006). 
The Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks against high-profile U.S. landmarks on September 11, 
2001 were witnessed by a worldwide television audience. These attacks used commercial 
passenger jets as explosive devices, and grimly demonstrated how terrorism could effectively 
strike fear within society. The attacks upon the World Trade Center in New York City, the 
Pentagon in Washington D.C., and the hijacked American Airlines Flight 77 claimed 3,056 lives, 
with a combined 100% fatality rate (Bogen & Jones, 2006). Following September 11th, letters 
containing anthrax spores were mailed to multiple news media offices and two U.S. Senators. 
This resulted in 17 Americans becoming ill and five died, becoming the worst case of biological 
terrorism in U.S. history (FBI, 2008). Despite these acts of bioterrorism being limited to a few 
selected targets, millions of U.S. citizens became uneasy with the simple act of opening the mail, 
a potentially dangerous undertaking (Hall, Norwood, Ursano, & Fullerton, 2003).  
Since 2001, governmental agencies and international organizations have substantially 
increased their efforts to address bioterrorism. According to the World Health Organization, 
governments and companies cannot ignore the potential for biological attacks upon their 
organizations (WHO, 2002). Taking intelligent precautions, along with effective surveillance and 
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response capability, are the best first lines of defense to counter bioterrorism and food safety 
emergencies (WHO, 2002). 
Motivation of Terrorists 
Individuals using food as a vehicle for terrorist activities likely have multiple motivations 
for doing so. Intentional contamination of the food chain could potentially have significant 
social, political, economic, and public health consequences (Crutchley, 2007). Perpetrators of 
food terrorism may come from groups that initially have some degree of support from the public.  
However, trends indicate that terrorists generally come from disenfranchised groups and they 
may not perceive facts as important in dissuading their terrorist activities (Rasco & Bledsoe, 
2005). Terrorists' motivation can be political, economic, or malicious mischief. Many individuals 
initiating food terrorism may have initially been good-intentioned activists whose actions have 
gone bad from various causes, such as environmental, consumer protection, animal rights 
movements, or political anarchists (Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005). 
Other motivations of activists include those who fear social progress, innovation, or 
technology. Mainstream activist groups dedicated to peaceful and reasonable means of operation 
may unknowingly (or anonymously) harbor members who unofficially form “spin-off” terrorist 
cells. Religious groups may also spawn loosely-organized, anonymous networks in order to 
promote various political causes. The main and common issue with the aforementioned groups is 
money. What appear to be normal operating funds coming from legitimate organizations may be 
diverted for the purposes of undertaking terrorist/extremist activities (Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005).  
According to Stern (1999), conflicting ideologies between civilizations provides the 
primary reason for people to join organizations such as Al-Qaeda. Rasco and Bledsoe (2005) 
argue that those in the U.S. are unfortunately “naïve in assuming that all rational people share 
beliefs regarding the relative importance of rights and responsibilities between citizens and the 
state, the extent of governmental liberty and scope of governmental authority, and the equality of 
individuals regardless of gender, race, ethnic origin, or religious belief.” Terrorist groups driven 
by religious motivations have become more prevalent and threaten Western society by using 
more sophisticated methods, which may include biological and chemical agents (Stern, 1999). 
Rasco and Bledsoe (2005) noted that the terrorist threat against food production, processing, and 
research is increasing. 
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Terrorists in the U.S. may also be motivated to some extent by the free society in which 
they operate (Franz, 2005). The ease of carrying out a terrorist attack upon the food chain itself 
may also be a motivation. Ranching and farming in the United States are typified by open access 
to expanses of land lacking security (Franz, 2005). An agroterrorist attack upon the United 
States’ unprotected heartland, a “soft” target so called for the ease of carrying out an attack, 
could significantly affect many elements of American life (Schmitt, 2007). Furthermore, large 
numbers of animals contained within a feedlot where security is minimal may also be a 
motivating factor for potential bioterrorists (Brandt et al., 2008). 
Repercussions from Bioterrorism Attacks 
To understand the potential impacts of intentionally contaminated food, one can observe 
the effects of unintentional foodborne illness upon the public due to poor food safety practices, 
both domestically and internationally. Between 1973 and 1999 in the U.S., a reported total of 
15,831 foodborne illness outbreaks resulted in 447,483 cases of foodborne illness, 20,119 
hospitalizations, and 457 fatalities (United States General Accounting Office, 2003). In 2008, 
40,000 infants became ill and 13,000 infants were hospitalized with kidney problems from 
melamine-contaminated dairy products in China (FoodHACCP.com, 2008). In 1994, 224,000 
people were infected with Salmonella Enteritidis from consuming tainted ice cream in the U.S. 
In 1991, nearly 300,000 people in China suffered an outbreak of hepatitis A due to contaminated 
clams; this may be the largest foodborne illness event in history (WHO, 2002). The Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimated that foodborne illnesses cause “approximately 
76 million illnesses, 325,000 hospitalizations, and 5,000 deaths in the United States each year. 
Known pathogens account for an estimated 14 million illnesses, 60,000 hospitalizations, and 
1,800 deaths…while unknown agents account for the remaining 62 million illnesses, 265,000 
hospitalizations, and 3,200 deaths” (Mead et al., 1999).  
The effect of foodborne illness upon public health services can be taxing, whether 
unintentional or not. Many countries simply do not have the resources to address the 
consequences during or after large-scale emergencies. Furthermore, a lack of readiness, coupled 
with potential difficulties in identifying uncommon pathogens, could yield inaccurate diagnoses. 
This would have a significant and adverse effect upon a public health organization to effectively 
respond to a large food sabotage event (WHO, 2002). 
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Terrorists may use bioterrorism to destabilize society and may have many motives for 
doing so. The goal of terrorism for the purpose of social and political disruption is to create an 
atmosphere of public fear and anxiety. This, in turn, may lead to a decreased confidence in the 
government, which may or may not result in political destabilization. If used in conjunction with 
attacks upon economic interests, the political effects can be magnified, especially during food 
shortages (WHO, 2002). 
Prior to September 11th and the anthrax attacks, public health leaders and government 
agencies had not incorporated mental health management strategies as components of terrorism 
response plans (Becker, 2001; Hall, 2002). Since that time, predicting and understanding the 
behavioral and psychological repercussions from a terrorist attack has become an important task 
involving the U.S. healthcare system and government leaders (Hall et al., 2003). 
Biological and Chemical Agents used in Bioterrorism  
Bioterrorism as defined by the USDA is “the intentional use of biological and chemical 
agents for the purpose of causing harm” (United States Department of Agriculture Food and 
Nutrition Service, 2004). Bioterrorism utilizes biological or etiological toxins, agents, and 
diseases in the process of carrying out a terrorist act. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
has indicated that common household items can be utilized to create weapons that could 
contaminate food with biological or chemical agents. The manufacture of ricin, cyanide, and the 
cultivation of cultures such as Salmonella sp. and Clostridium botulinum toxin is possible by 
individuals with limited skill or training (CDC, 2008a; Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005).  
According to Rasco and Bledsoe (2005), the ability to effectively contaminate food using 
biological and chemical agents depends upon several factors, including: 
1. The potential impact upon plant, animal, or human health, 
2. The type of the food material to be contaminated, 
3. The ease of detection of contamination when discernable changes in flavor, 
appearance, or odor of the given food have occurred, 
4. The entry point when contamination is introduced into a given food supply, 
5. The opportunity for widespread contamination, and  
6. The level of fear that people perceive in relation to the toxic agent or food itself 
(Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005).    
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Table 1: Categorical Definitions and Examples of Bioterrorism Agents and Diseases (A, B, and C) by the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention. 
Category A definition: 
The U.S. public health system and primary 
healthcare providers must be prepared to 
address various biological agents, including 
pathogens that are rarely seen in the United 
States. High-priority agents include 
organisms that pose a risk to national 
security because they 
• can be easily disseminated or 
transmitted from person to person; 
• result in high mortality rates and 
have the potential for major public 
health impact; 
• might cause public panic and social 
disruption; and 
• require special action for public 
health preparedness. 
Agents/Diseases 
Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis) 
Botulism (Clostridium botulinum toxin) 
Plague (Yersinia pestis) 
Smallpox (Variola major) 
Category B definition: 
Second highest priority agents include 
those that 
• are moderately easy to 
disseminate; 
• result in moderate morbidity rates 
and low mortality rates; and 
• require specific enhancements of 
CDC's diagnostic capacity and 
enhanced disease surveillance. 
Agents/Diseases 
Brucellosis (Brucella species) 
Epsilon toxin of Clostridium 
perfringens 
Food safety threats (e.g., Salmonella 
species, Escherichia coli O157:H7, 
Shigella) 
Glanders (Burkholderia mallei) 
Melioidosis (Burkholderia 
pseudomallei) 
Category C definition: 
Third highest priority agents include 
emerging pathogens that could be 
engineered for mass dissemination in the 
future because of 
• availability; 
• ease of production and 
dissemination; and 
• potential for high morbidity and 
mortality rates and major health 
impact. 
Agents/Diseases 
Emerging infectious diseases such as 
Nipah virus and hantavirus 
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Tularemia (Francisella tularensis) 
Viral hemorrhagic fevers (filoviruses 
[e.g., Ebola, Marburg] and arenaviruses 
[e.g., Lassa, Machupo]) 
 
Psittacosis (Chlamydia psittaci) 
Q fever (Coxiella burnetii) 
Ricin toxin from Ricinus communis 
(castor beans) 
Staphylococcal enterotoxin B 
Typhus fever (Rickettsia prowazekii) 
Viral encephalitis (alphaviruses [e.g., 
Venezuelan equine encephalitis, 
eastern equine encephalitis, western 
equine encephalitis]) 
Water safety threats (e.g., Vibrio 
cholerae, Cryptosporidium parvum) 
 
Note that the entire content of this table was directly quoted from: http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.asp 
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Biological agents are either living microbes that cause infectious disease or the toxins 
created by microorganisms. Both microbes and toxins are capable of causing death or serious 
illness, and are highly specific for their targets (plants, animals, and people) (Rasco & Bledsoe, 
2005). Biological agents are susceptible to issues regarding their controllability, including 
environmental conditions (air flow, temperature, and pH), the viability of each given strain, and 
secondary transmission of the biological agent to non-desirable targets (collateral damage).  
Toxins, similar in nature to chemical agents, are capable of causing severe damage upon 
delivery. Biological toxins are extremely potent and are capable of death or damage at levels as 
miniscule as one to ten parts in one quadrillion. Furthermore, certain agents such as Clostridium 
botulinum and Bacillus anthracis may undergo sporification (spore formation), making them 
resistant to destruction and capable of persisting for extended periods of time in a variety of 
environments (Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005). 
Living agents, generally microbes, are slower-acting than biological toxins or chemical 
agents. Infection occurs when microbes directly produce disease within the targeted host. 
Intoxication occurs when microbes grow within the targeted host and the toxins produced by the 
microbes causes debilitation. In both cases, microbes must endure digestion or inhalation and 
then survive until reaching the desired tissue, growing to numbers capable of causing illness or 
toxin production. Microbes (e.g. Staphylococcus aureus) can also grow within food, producing 
toxins that, when consumed, cause intoxication (Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005). 
Depending upon the microorganism or toxin used, the effects of disease or intoxication 
can take anywhere from 30 minutes to several weeks to cause infection or intoxication. A delay 
between administering a biological agent until the first onset of symptoms might actually be 
desirable to perpetrators, giving them time to flee and confusing investigators of intentional food 
contamination incidents. In addition, symptoms of foodborne intoxication and infection can be 
misdiagnosed, especially if an uncommon microbe, fungus, or biological toxin is used or the 
time of initial contact is unknown or falsely reported (Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005). 
Those intent upon spreading disease can use virtually any naturally-occurring pathogens 
as agents of intentional contamination (Berns, Atlas, Cassell, & Shoemaker, 1998). Bioterrorism 
agents and diseases have been categorized by the CDC into three categories (A, B, and C), based 
upon how easily they may be spread and the severity of illness and morbidity of which they 
cause. Detailed information regarding the three categories is shown in Table 1 (CDC, 2008a). 
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Of primary concern is the Category A agent, Clostridium botulinum, the organism 
responsible for the most toxic compound produced by a biological system. One pure ounce of 
Clostridium botulinum toxin could potentially kill 200 million people (Fung & Goetsch, 2004). 
In 1991, the country of Iraq stated that they possessed 19,000 liters of botulinum toxin, which 
was calculated to be three times the amount needed to kill every human being on earth (Rasco & 
Bledsoe, 2005).  
Bacillus anthracis, the microorganism that causes the Anthrax disease, is extremely 
stable and is 85% lethal if an infective dose (8,000-50,000 spores) is inhaled. Besides inhalation, 
Bacillus anthracis may also be ingested (25%-60% lethal) or transmitted through the skin (20% 
lethal), which can cause a wide variety of severe symptoms including fever, respiratory failure, 
lesions, abdominal pain, and meningitis. It has been estimated that in an urban population of 5 
million inhabitants, 50 kg of anthrax spores released via aircraft (airborne dispersion) would kill 
approximately 100,000 people and sicken 250,000 more. If that amount were increased to 100 
kg, 130,000 to 3 million deaths would occur, putting it on the same lethality level as that of a 
hydrogen bomb (Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005). 
Smallpox is a contagious disease caused by the variola virus, with a fatality rate of up to 
30%. Symptoms of smallpox disease include body aches, high fever, and vomiting. Rashes 
develop, which spread and become pus-filled blisters and raised bumps that crust, scab, and flake 
off in approximately three weeks, causing pitted scars. Just one confirmed case of smallpox is 
sufficient reason to declare a public health emergency. Smallpox is normally spread from person 
to person through face to face contact. However, smallpox is quite fragile and when administered 
via airborne dispersion, 90% of the smallpox die within 24 hours, with an even higher death rate 
in the presence of ultraviolet light (CDC, 2007b). Although smallpox was declared to be 
eradicated from the planet in 1980, there is still concern that smallpox may still exist and be able 
to be used as a bioweapon (CDC, 2002). In 2002, the Advisory Committee on Immunization 
Practices (ACIP) and the National Vaccine Advisory Committee (NVAC), both of whom advise 
and give recommendations to the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the 
CDC, reviewed recommendations for smallpox vaccinations. As a result of their joint efforts, the 
U.S. now has enough smallpox vaccine to vaccinate every one of its citizens (CDC, 2007d).  
Plague, an infectious disease of humans and animals responsible for the death of millions 
in Europe during the Middle Ages, is caused by the Yersinia pestis bacteria generally transmitted 
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by fleas, and delivered by rodents (CDC, 2007a). Plague takes three forms: pneumonic, bubonic, 
and septicemic and has a 50%-90% mortality rate (15% if treated) (CDC, 2005b). Symptoms 
include high fever, toxemia, respiratory failure, malaise, gangrene, necrosis, and tender lymph 
nodes (Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005). A World Health Organization (WHO) study in 1970 found that 
if 50 kg of Yersinia pestis were released as an aerosol over a population of 5 million people, 
150,000 persons would contract pneumonic plague and 36,000 of those individuals would be 
expected to die (Inglesby, Dennis, & Henderson, 2000). 
Tularemia, caused by the microorganism, Francisella tularensis, produces chills, 
respiratory problems, cough, muscle ache, exhaustion, and swollen glands. During World War II, 
tularemia was studied by Japanese germ warfare scientists and may have been used in Manchuria 
as a biological weapon. During the same time period in Eastern Europe, tularemia outbreaks 
among tens of thousands of German and Soviet soldiers were suggested to be intentional by Ken 
Alibeck, a former biological weapons agent from the Soviet Union (Dennis et al., 2001). Aerosol 
delivery systems for tularemia were developed in the U.S. during the 1950s and 1960s and were 
stored with the intention of military use. Although information regarding use of tularemia as a 
biological weapon in recent times is lacking, the threat cannot be dismissed. Economic estimates 
of an aerosol attack upon a population of 100,000 people exceed $5 billion (Rasco & Bledsoe, 
2005). 
Hemorrhagic viruses are of concern as potential biological agents. These highly 
infectious viruses can be easily dispersed via aerosols and are highly contagious. In addition, 
these viruses have very low infective doses with high morbidity and mortality. Perhaps the most 
well-known of these viruses, Ebola, is 50%-90% lethal if not treated. Other examples of 
hemorrhagic viruses include filioviruses, Marburg, and arenaviruses such as Lassa and Machupo. 
The U.S. and the former USSR both developed hemorrhagic biological weapons and North 
Korea is rumored to have yellow fever-based weapons (Borio et al., 2002; Rasco & Bledsoe, 
2005). 
CDC Category B definitions represent bioterrorism agents and diseases with relatively 
lower morbidity and mortality rates which are less easily disseminated from person to person. Of 
particular notoriety is the ricin toxin, which can be rather simply extracted from the castor bean 
(Ricinius communis), for which there is no antidote. Furthermore, ricin toxin is extremely potent,  
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Table 2: Categories of Potential Chemical Agents by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
Biotoxins (poisons that come from plants or animals) Abrin; Brevetoxin; Colchicine; Digitalis; Nicotine; Ricin; 
Saxitoxin; Strychnine; Tetrodotoxin; Trichothecene 
 
Blister Agents/Vesicants (chemicals that severely blister the 
eyes, respiratory tract, and skin on contact) 
Distilled mustard (HD); Mustard/lewisite (HL); Mustard/T; 
Nitrogen mustard (HN-1, HN-2, HN-3); Sesqui mustard; Sulfur 
mustard (H) (mustard gas); Lewisite (L, L-1, L-2, L-3); 
Mustard/lewisite (HL); Phosgene oxime (CX) 
 
Blood Agents (poisons that affect the body by being absorbed 
into the blood) 
Arsine (SA); Carbon Monoxide; Cyanogen chloride (CK); 
Hydrogen cyanide (AC); Potassium cyanide (KCN); Sodium 
cyanide (NaCN); Sodium monofluoroacetate (compound 1080) 
 
Caustics/Acids (chemicals that burn or corrode people's skin, 
eyes, and mucus membranes on contact) 
 
Hydrofluoric acid (hydrogen fluoride) 
 
Choking/Lung/Pulmonary Agents (chemicals that cause severe 
irritation or swelling of the respiratory tract [lining of the nose, 
throat, and lungs]) 
Ammonia; Bromine (CA); Chlorine (CL); Hydrogen chloride; 
Methyl bromide; Methyl isocyanate; Osmium tetroxide; 
Diphosgene (DP); Phosgene (CG); Phosphine; Phosphorus, 
elemental, white or yellow; Sulfuryl fluoride 
Incapacitating Agents (drugs that make people unable to think 
clearly or cause altered state of consciousness/unconsciousness)  
BZ; Fentanyls & other opioids 
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Long-Acting Anticoagulants (poisons that prevent blood from 
clotting properly, which can lead to uncontrolled bleeding) 
 
Super warfarin 
Metals (agents that consist of metallic poisons) 
 
Arsenic; Barium; Mercury; Thallium 
Nerve Agents (highly poisonous chemicals that work by 
preventing the nervous system from working properly) 
 
Sarin (GB); Soman (GD); Tabun (GA); V agents; VX 
Organic Solvents (agents that damage the tissues of living things 
by dissolving fats and oils) 
 
Benzene 
Riot Control Agents/Tear Gas (highly irritating agents normally 
used by law enforcement for crowd control or by individuals for 
protection [for example, mace]) 
 
Bromobenzylcyanide (CA); Chloroacetophenone (CN); 
Chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS); Chloropicrin (PS); 
Dibenzoxazepine (CR) 
Toxic Alcohols (poisonous alcohols that can damage the heart, 
kidneys, and nervous system) 
 
Ethylene glycol 
Vomiting Agents (chemicals that cause nausea and vomiting) 
 
Adamsite (DM) 
Source: Rasco and Bledsoe (2005)  
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can be inhaled or ingested, and remains stable for several hours, making it a good candidate for 
bioterrorism (Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005). 
CDC Category C definitions represent emerging pathogens that could be used in a 
bioterrorist attack due to their ease of production, availability, and likelihood of high morbidity 
and mortality rates. This includes emerging infectious diseases such as Nipah virus and 
hantavirus. 
Another pathogen of concern is the H5N1 strain of the avian influenza A (bird flu) virus, 
transmitted from birds to humans. Avian influenza is an infectious disease, carried by birds and 
caused by type A strains of the influenza virus (CDC, 2007c; WHO, 2009). Many wild birds 
naturally carry the viral strains and normally do not suffer sickness or harm from them, but 
domestic birds (turkeys, chickens, and ducks) may become very sick after coming into contact 
with infected wild birds (CDC, 2007c; WHO, 2009). Avian influenza viruses cause two main 
forms of the disease, one mild form and another one that is rare and highly pathogenic (CDC, 
2007c). The avian influenza virus is generally found in birds, but humans can contract the virus 
after exposure to infected birds, especially in poultry farms and live markets (WHO, 2009). 
Three strains of the influenza A virus (H7N3, H7N7, and H9N2) are known to infect humans, 
generally with mild symptoms, but the H5N1 strain is a highly pathogenic form of the influenza 
A virus, causing severe disease and death (WHO, 2009). Since 2003, the H5N1 strain has been 
confirmed in 423 human cases causing 233 deaths in 15 countries ranging from Nigeria to 
Vietnam (WHO, 2009).  
Chemical agents can also be utilized for bioterrorist activities with the purpose of causing 
harm, as shown in Table 2. The use of chemicals with the intent to poison others is an ancient 
technique, dating back thousands of years. In 331 B.C., following the suspicious deaths of many 
leading Roman citizens, a slave girl approached the magistrate and, in exchange for immunity 
from prosecution, revealed that cause of the deaths in question was due to intentional poisoning. 
As a result, twenty Roman women were put on trial for “brewing noxious concoctions”. When 
the defendants denied any allegations of wrongdoing and instead claimed to have been creating 
substances with “curative properties”, the court challenged the women to drink their creations to 
prove their claim of innocence. The defendants agreed and ingested the substances, which 
effectively killed them (Bauman, 1992). 
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Chemicals are “ready-made” and do not need to be cultivated or extracted as do 
biological toxins (Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005). Hazardous chemicals can be manufactured from 
easily obtained items, such as household cleaners, and released intentionally in a terrorist attack 
(CDC, 2005a). Furthermore, some of the chemical agents are not overly-difficult for motivated 
individuals or groups to manufacture (National Research Council, 2002). Because chemicals are 
widespread and used throughout society, access to chemical sources should be secured to protect 
citizens from those who could use them to cause intentional harm (United States Department of 
Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service, 2004). Periodic review of procedures for access, 
handling, and storage procedures of hazardous materials in the workplace is recommended. This 
includes acids, solvents, cleaning materials, pesticides, paints, bases, water treatment and other 
chemicals (Bledsoe & Rasco, 2002).  
There are potentially hundreds of chemical agents that could be used in a bioterrorist 
attack. Chemical agents have long been used in warfare. For example, chlorine was used as a 
choking agent in World War I.  Chemical weapons were also used by Saddam Hussein in the 
first Gulf War during the 1990s and in the Iran-Iraq war (Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005). Pertaining to 
food, however, it is more likely that agricultural or industrial chemicals would be used rather 
than military-developed chemicals. Steven Musser of the Center for Food Safety and Applied 
Nutrition, Food and Drug Administration (CFSAN/FDA) has commented that even though the 
list of hundred of potential chemical agents could be reduced to 12-15, there is no “guarantee” 
that would-be terrorists would use any of those agents (Bryant et al., 2005). 
Quantification and Mitigation of Terrorist Attacks 
The CARVER plus shock method is a tool that can be used in the food sector to 
proactively determine weaknesses in a food system or an infrastructure to a terrorist attack. It 
permits the user to assume the attacker’s role through identification of vulnerable and desirable 
targets (nodes) within the food system to attack. Through undertaking this assessment of the 
most vulnerable points/nodes in an operation’s infrastructure, managers will be able to realign 
their resources to protect these vulnerable points (USDA-FSIS, 2007).  
CARVER is an acronym for the six attributes used to evaluate the attractiveness of a 
target given node for attack: 
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Criticality - measure of public health and economic impacts of an attack 
Accessibility – ability to physically access and egress from target 
Recuperability – ability of system to recover from an attack 
Vulnerability – ease of accomplishing an attack 
Effect – amount of direct loss from an attack as measured by loss in production 
Recognizability – ease of identifying target.  
In addition, the modified CARVER tool can be used to evaluate a seventh attribute, the 
combined health, economic, and psychological impacts of an attack, or the shock attributes of a 
target. Each attribute is rating on a scale of 1 – 10 and calculated for an overall rating for each 
node evaluated. Nodes with the highest ratings have the greatest potential vulnerability and 
should be the focus for developing preventive measures against bioterrorism (USDA-FSIS, 
2007). 
 Application of the CARVER plus shock tool to conduct vulnerability assessments has 
been used to assess 36 parts of the agriculture and food industry, including commodities through 
the Strategic Partnership Program Agroterrorism (SPPA) initiative (Food and Drug 
Administration, 2009). The SPPA was a program that included agencies from Federal and State 
government and volunteers from the private sector (U.S. Department of Health & Human 
Services, 2008). In each assessment, SPPA participants identified areas that were of primary 
concern in the flow of food through each operation. Measures to protect food and steps to 
mitigate bioterrorism were identified during each assessment. Strategies to address potential 
vulnerabilities in food defense were also addressed, including research gaps and needs (FDA, 
2008b). 
A terrorist attack can severely impact a nation by harmfully interrupting the critical 
systems of its infrastructure (Hall et al., 2003). More specifically, an attack on the food supply 
would have significant psychological, economic, political, and physical consequences 
(Bruemmer, 2003). The impact of unintentional contamination of food can greatly impede 
recovery of an organization’s market share and reputation (Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005). The USDA 
has estimated foodborne illness to cost the U.S. between $7 billion and $37 billion annually, due 
to unintentional inadequate food safety practices (United States General Accounting Office, 
2003). Intentional sabotage of food can put industries (such as foodservice) out of business, 
while disrupting trade and having long-term economic ramifications (WHO, 2002). Deliberate 
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cyanide contamination of Chilean grapes in 1989 triggered a recall of Chilean fruits from Canada 
and the U.S. This incident resulted in many bankruptcies and several hundred million dollars in 
lost revenues and damages (WHO, 2002). In July 2003, an aggressor laced potato chips and 
sardines with cyanide in a South African supermarket chain, affecting several people who 
purchased and later consumed the food items. The aggressor then tried to extort $500,000 from 
the supermarket company, creating a sensation in the media and making front-page headlines 
(AIB International, 2006).  
Quantification of the impact of bioterrorism in restaurant/foodservice settings have been 
conducted using CARVER plus shock evaluations in two of the 36 SPAA assessments: a school 
central kitchens in North Carolina, and a sports stadium in Manhattan, Kansas (U.S. Department 
of Health & Human Services, 2008). SPAA assessments of restaurant/foodservice establishments 
identified weaknesses that could be exploited by the use of contaminated food products, 
negatively affecting public health and/or resulting in the loss of human life. Although significant 
economic damage could result from food bioterrorism in these foodservice operations, public 
shock and health concerns were generally deemed to be of more serious concern. A bioterrorism 
attack upon children attending school or college students enjoying a football game would 
seriously disrupt the local community and attract significant media attention (shock value). 
Vulnerabilities identified within these operations included situations in which food was in direct 
human contact immediately before service to the consumer. In addition, publicly accessible 
foods (such as bulk condiment dispensers) were of particular concern as they offer unlimited 
public access and could be contaminated by anyone (FDA, 2008b). 
The ALERT initiative, sponsored by the FDA, CDC, and USDA, is applicable to all areas 
along the farm-to-table food chain, including foodservice (FDA, 2009). It is intended to raise 
awareness among state and local governments as well as industry and business professionals 
regarding food security. ALERT is an acronym that stands for five points to address the risk of 
bioterrorism in a food operation: 
Assuring the supplies and ingredients used come from safe and secure sources. 
Looking after the security of ingredient and products used in your facility. 
Employees’ comings and goings within your facility. 
Reports about the security of your products while under your control. 
Threat notification – what to do and whom to notify if there is an issue at your facility. 
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Although the ALERT initiative does not quantify the degree of risk like CARVER plus 
shock, it is still a useful tool to educate and promote discussion regarding mitigation strategies to 
improve food security in any operation producing or handling food (FDA, 2009). In a Food 
Defense Surveillance Assignment (FDSA) field activity, several FDA and USDA operational 
divisions partnered with the Food Emergency Response Network (FERN) Laboratories and local 
and state regulatory agencies. Their goal was to increase food defense awareness through the use 
of ALERT messages along the food chain, while conducting routine food safety inspections. 
School central kitchens, retail foodservice establishments, distributors and food manufacturers 
were inspected and employees were actively involved in discussions intended to increase food 
defense awareness using ALERT training. It was found that 59% of the firms that participated in 
the FDSA field activity were found to be receptive to the ALERT message and 55% of those 
conducting food safety inspections planned to continue sharing ALERT messages regarding food 
defense (FDA, 2007). 
The Special Event Food Defense Assignment (SEFDA) was a joint effort between the 
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN), the Office of Regulatory Affairs (ORA) 
state and local regulatory agencies, as well as FERN Laboratories. SEFDA was conducted in 
May 2008 and focused upon preparing for food security during Democratic and Republican 
conventions. A trial run was conducted in retail foodservice establishments with the intention of 
creating a food security template for use during special events. SEFDA Food safety inspections 
were conducted in foodservice establishments and samples were sent to laboratories for analysis. 
The goals of this study were to increase food defense preparedness in the food industry, 
demonstrate a system of preventative measures that could be used for special events, integrate 
food defense activities at the federal, state, and local levels, conduct training to help improve 
communication with the Department of Defense (DoD), and identify gaps and increase 
preparedness in the food defense system for special events. SEFDA activities included: 124 food 
safety inspections of retail foodservice establishments, communication and dissemination of 
ALERT messages, completing and returning traceback information for given foods and 
beverages, and collecting 364 samples and returning them to FERN laboratories. Items identified 
needing improvement were standardization of the traceback forms, better clarification of roles in 
the assignment, and confusion with the collection and shipment of samples (FDA, 2008a).  
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Governmental Agencies Responsible for Dealing with Bioterrorism 
Many governmental agencies and government partnerships are responsible for 
responding to bioterrorism in the U.S. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security issued the 
National Response Framework (NRF), which “defines the principles, roles, and structures that 
organize how we respond as a nation”. The NRF is a document that provides a unified national 
response to emergencies and disasters, including chemical, biological, or radiological weapons of 
mass destruction. The NRF replaced the (former) National Response Plan on March 22, 2008 
and “establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response” 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008).  
The Strategic Partnership Program Agroterrorism (SPPA) Initiative is a partnership of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA), and the USDA to “help secure the nation's food supply” (FDA, 
2005). The objectives of the SPPA Initiative are to identify vulnerabilities, indicators, and 
warnings that could lead to a terrorist attack; develop mitigation strategies to prevent an attack; 
gather information to enhance existing government and industry tools; validate government food 
and agriculture assessments; provide reports regarding all of the aforementioned; and to 
strengthen relationships among the Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies and the 
food and agriculture industry (FDA, 2005).  
The Biosecurity Research Institute (BRI) at Kansas State University (KSU) is the sole 
U.S. training and research facility that can facilitate food safety, plant pathology, veterinary 
medicine, and molecular biology research together under the same roof (Kansas State University, 
2006). This offers a unified interdisciplinary setting in which to study risks to the U.S. food 
supply (Kansas State University, 2008). In addition, KSU was selected by the DHS as the 
preferred site for the National Bio and Agro-defense Facility -- NBAF. Once completed, the 
NBAF will become the most state of the art biocontainment facility in the world, designed to 
carry out important research pertaining to agriculture and the food supply chain. The NBAF will 
contain Biosafety Level - 4 (BL-4) laboratories that are necessary for studying agricultural 
diseases that could have serious public health ramifications (Jaax & Jaax, 2008). 
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) assists state and local public 
health systems, provides support for existing biosurveillance programs, and funds medical 
research that combats potential agents used for bioterrorism. HHS funds product development 
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and medical research through the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), 
which is part of the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The NIAID develops medical tools to 
identify and respond to the consequences of bioterrorist attacks (NIAID, 2007). 
Following the terrorist events of September 11th, 2001, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) has identified the security of the U.S. drinking water and wastewater 
infrastructures to be a top priority. The EPA has taken decisive actions to monitor and decrease 
vulnerabilities from possible terrorist attacks; to plan, practice and respond to terror incidents and 
emergencies; and to develop new methods to identify and monitor contaminants and thwart 
potential breaches of security (EPA, 2007).  
CDC helps prepare people for emerging health threats, including bioterrorist attacks. The 
Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response (COTPER) helps 
prepare the U.S. to effectively respond to significant threats to public health by offering 
coordination, support, and strategic direction for terrorism preparedness and response activities 
of the CDC. CDC supports local, state, and national activities to help prevent disasters, improve 
public health during a disaster, and help with restoration and recovery after a disaster has 
occurred (CDC, 2007d). 
The USDA Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) conducts vulnerability assessments on 
egg, meat, and poultry products to better prepare for and prevent a potential bioterrorist attack on 
these food systems. Within FSIS, the Office of Food Defense and Emergency Response 
(OFDER) oversees homeland security issues and works collaboratively with FDA, DHS, the 
USDA Homeland Security Office and additional food-related State and Federal agencies, and 
industry (USDA/FSIS, 2008SIS 2008).  
The USDA Food and Nutrition Service (USDA/FNS) considers food security and safety 
to be important components of its nutrition assistance programs. The USDA/FNS takes a 
proactive stance on food defense and has developed training manuals and a biosecurity checklist 
for school foodservice programs to protect the safety and security of school children and adults 
in public schools. These resources provide recommendations for school foodservice directors to 
implement preventative measures in order to protect their operations from bioterrorism. Areas 
covered in the biosecurity checklist include: receiving/inspection of food, storage of food and 
chemicals, food preparation, chemical handling, foodservice equipment concerns, personnel 
issues, facility security, utility security, training needs, crisis handling, communication, and 
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maintenance of the school’s biosecurity plan (United States Department of Agriculture Food and 
Nutrition Service, 2004).   
 The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) is a nonpartisan, independent 
agency that serves Congress. The GAO is often referred to as the "congressional watchdog," 
because it advises Congress how taxpayer dollars are spent by the federal government. In 
addition to auditing federal funds, investigating allegations of wrongdoings, and reporting on the 
effectiveness of government programs, the GAO can also perform policy analyses and issue 
opinions and legal decisions (United States General Accounting Office, 2008b).  
In a press release dated November 6, 2008, the GAO identified thirteen urgent issues 
facing the incoming 44th U.S. President, amongst which was food safety (GAO Office of Public 
Affairs, 2008). On their newly-established 2009 Congressional and Presidential Transition 
website, the GAO elaborated, stating that the “fragmented nature of the federal food oversight 
system” inhibits the U.S. government’s ability to monitor the safety and preserve the integrity of 
the food supply. The GAO stated that although the USDA expended most of the federal funds 
allocated for food safety inspection, the USDA only regulates 20% of the U.S. food supply. The 
FDA regulates 80% percent of the U.S. food supply, but it expends only 24 percent of federal 
food safety inspection allocations. The GAO recognized the FDA claims that due to limited 
funding and increasing responsibilities (including counterterrorism activities), the FDA is 
challenged in carrying out its responsibilities of ensuring the safety and security of the U.S. food 
supply (United States General Accounting Office, 2008a). 
The FDA is the U.S. federal agency that is responsible for regulating biological products, 
cosmetics, drugs, foods, medical devices, radiation-emitting electronic products, and veterinary 
products. The FDA is “responsible for ensuring that foods are safe, wholesome and sanitary” and 
monitors the safety of all food products (except meat and poultry), labeling of foods, and bottled 
water sold in the U.S. marketplace (FDA, 2008d).  
As a response to the events of September 11, 2001, the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (henceforth referred to as the Bioterrorism 
Act of 2002) was signed into law by President George W. Bush on June 12, 2002.  The 
Bioterrorism Act of 2002 had a significant impact on the U.S. food industry and granted 
extensive responsibilities to the FDA to protect the safety and security of the U.S. food and drug 
supply (United States Food and Drug Administration, 2002). The Bioterrorism Act of 2002 
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allowed the FDA to require any facility (domestic or international) that manufactures, packs, 
holds, or processes food for U.S. consumption to be registered. The FDA also has the authority 
to detain any food found during an inspection that may be potentially harmful to humans or 
animals (United States Food and Drug Administration, 2002).  Project Bioshield, signed into law 
by President George W. Bush on July 21, 2004, improved medical procedures to better protect 
the U.S. from chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) attacks (The White House, 
2008). This act gave the FDA authority “to make promising drugs, biologics, diagnostics, or 
devices quickly available in emergencies” (Meadows, 2004).  
The priority the U.S. government places on the safety and security of the U.S. food 
supply is demonstrated in its continuing funding of the FDA budget requests. The FDA, whose 
core mission is “promoting and protecting public health”, reported a $42.2 million budget 
request for 2009 (representing a total investment of $662 million) to fund the Food Protection 
Plan. The requested funds will allow the FDA to protect the U.S. food supply and strengthen 
food safety by “preventing foodborne illness outbreaks, intervening when food defense or food 
safety vulnerabilities emerge, and rapidly responding to food defense and food safety threats” 
(FDA, 2008c). In addition, the overall amount requested by the FDA for food defense for fiscal 
year (FY) 2009 is $213 million, a $43 million increase from 2007 and a $198 million increase 
from 2001, the first year the FDA request for bioterrorism funding was granted (U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services, 2008). 
Previous Bioterrorism Research Conducted in Foodservice  
“Farm to fork” is the commonly-used term describing the “human food chain from 
agricultural production to consumption” (Dictionary.com's 21st Century Lexicon, 2010). 
Foodservice establishments represent the last link on the food chain (the “fork”) where food is 
prepared before final service to customers. There has been significant bioterrorism research 
conducted of the production and transportation of food, but research regarding the preparedness 
of the commercial foodservice segment is minimal at best (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007c). Previous 
bioterrorism research was conducted in school and hospital foodservice operations (Yoon & 
Shanklin, 2007a; Yoon & Shanklin, 2007b; Yoon & Shanklin, 2007c). Yoon and Shanklin 
(2007) studied food and nutrition professionals’ perceived importance, frequency of preventative 
measures, and self-efficacy in developing a food defense management plan. Foodservice 
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operators who indicated more concern and caution towards threats of food bioterrorism more 
often performed preventive practices than foodservice operations that were less concerned and 
less cautious about food terrorism (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007c). Among preventative practices, 
foodservice operators considered chemical use and storage practices to be of the greatest concern 
for protection from bioterrorism and these practices were also the most frequently implemented 
in their operation (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007a). Yoon and Shanklin’s research concluded that 
increased awareness of foodservice operators and implementing preventive practices against 
bioterrorism can enhance levels of food defense in foodservice operations (Yoon & Shanklin, 
2007b). It is reasonable to assume that these conclusions could apply to other foodservice 
operations, besides schools and hospitals. For this reason, private country clubs were selected for 
future foodservice research in food bioterrorism. 
Roles/responsibilities of Club Managers and other foodservice professionals 
Clubs are exclusive and typically only invite affluent and influential individuals (along 
with their families) to join their membership (Walker, 2009). Examples of people frequenting 
private clubs (members, their guests, or non-members) include: prominent citizens, business 
executives, celebrities, and government officials.  
Nearly all U.S. private clubs have food and beverage facilities and serve food procured 
and prepared from the U.S. food supply (Walker, 2009). The safety and security of food served 
in private clubs ultimately resides with the club’s general manager, who is directly responsible 
for supervising all club professionals and department heads (Perdue, 2007).   
Private clubs, which typically exclude non-affluent individuals from their membership 
roles, unintentionally project an image of wealth and privilege to non-members. Because private 
clubs are exclusive and cater to affluent, powerful and influential individuals, they could be 
considered as potential targets to would-be terrorists. Club members consider their club as an 
extension of their business and home and will use its facilities for both business and leisure 
(Angelo & Vladimir, 2004). The service of food and beverages is generally at the center of all 
club events.  
To facilitate these events, private clubs employ foodservice workers and banquet servers. 
These positions may have up to a 285% annual turnover rate, due to significant numbers of 
seasonal employees hired to meet peak demands (Aziz et al., 2007) . English is a second 
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language for many foodservice employees and communication difficulties can occur between 
managers and non-English speaking employees. This can complicate attempts at conducting 
background checks or verification of job references. Background checks can be easily run on 
every line-level employee, including temporary employees who may be hired for busy times of 
the year, however this may be cost prohibitive to the club.  
Food prepared in large quantities is easy to contaminate, thus banquets held at private 
clubs may present a terrorist (possibly an employee of the operation) the opportunity to harm 200 
people or more at a time. One disgruntled employee could intentionally contaminate food or 
beverages served to members and cause extensive harm to club members, their guests, and club 
employees. Food production equipment that combines large batches of food ingredients together, 
such as a floor mixer, offer a would-be terrorist an ideal opportunity for contamination. 
Additionally, equipment located in low-traffic or out of the way areas, such as an icemaker in a 
side room, could provide opportunities for intentional contamination with little chance of being 
detected.  
After the physical damage from an initial bioterrorism attack, the psychological effects 
and shock value lingers, often causing more problems for a private club. A perceived violation of 
safety and security with something as personal as food (which they trust the club to be safe to put 
in their bodies) may result in members resigning from the private club, even if they themselves 
were not directly affected. 
Overview of Private Clubs 
Origins and Background of Private Clubs 
Private clubs are places where people of shared interests can congregate and socialize 
(Angelo & Vladimir, 2004). These interests can be professional, social, fraternal, or recreational. 
Private clubs have been a gathering place for wealthy citizens since ancient times (Perdue, 2007). 
Roman baths could be considered as one of the first documented examples of private clubs. 
These baths were designed for a specific group of people for the purpose of socializing with one 
another (Angelo & Vladimir, 2004). Likewise, in medieval Europe, craft and merchant guilds 
could also be considered in some ways to be private clubs, as they catered to the needs of an 
exclusive group of individuals (Perdue, 2007).  
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With the importation of coffee into England during the mid- 1700s, coffeehouses (the 
precursors of city clubs) were established at three major English universities: All Souls, 
Cambridge, and Oxford (Perdue, 2007). London city clubs offered an exclusive, cultivated 
atmosphere where members could browse the club library and socialize with one another 
(Perdue, 2007). The Royal and Ancient Golf Club of St. Andrews, Scotland, founded in 1754, is 
renowned for being the birthplace of golf and is considered to be the very first country club 
(Perdue, 2007). English social clubs and Scottish golf clubs such as St. Andrews, are the direct 
predecessors of U.S. country clubs and city clubs (Perdue, 2007)   
Historically, private club membership was exclusive and a privilege of the affluent and 
powerful, with established etiquette and certain expectations of social conventions (Walker, 
2009). Individuals wishing to join a private club typically required strong support from existing 
club members to even be considered for club membership and, if considered, then underwent a 
rigid screening process (Perdue, 2007). Due to the rigorous membership requirements, private 
clubs were effectively able to deny admittance to those individuals who lacked the wealth or 
desired qualities of the club’s existing members (Walker, 2009). 
The first city clubs in the U.S. were patterned after the English social clubs and were 
founded in the Colonies during the 1700s. These clubs were male-only social clubs, which 
gathered in taverns or lodges for the purpose of socialization and consumption of alcohol 
(Perdue, 2007). During the mid 1800s, construction of formal U.S. city clubs began. Examples 
included the Somerset Club in Boston (established [est.] in 1842), the Wilmington Club in 
Delaware (est. 1859), and the San Francisco Commercial Club (est. 1851) (Angelo & Vladimir, 
2004). Other U.S. city clubs built during the nineteenth century include Honolulu’s Pacific Club 
(est. 1851), both the Olympic Club (est. 1860) and the Pacific-Union Club (est. 1889) in San 
Francisco, and the Union League in Philadelphia (est. 1862) (Perdue, 2007). 
The Country Club, located in Brookline, Massachusetts (MA), was founded as an 
equestrian and social club in 1882 (with golf introduced in 1893) and is generally regarded as the 
first country club in the U.S. (Angelo & Vladimir, 2004) (The Country Club, 2009). Like The 
Royal and Ancient Golf Club of St. Andrews, Scotland, The Country Club in Brookline, MA 
was established as a gathering place for the social elite and hub for business, especially on the 
golf course (Walker, 2009).  
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Table 3: Types of Private Clubs 
Athletic Athletic clubs vary greatly in their offerings and locations, from The New York Athletic Club, located in a building 
in midtown Manhattan, to athletic clubs that offer golf and that are similar to country clubs (Angelo & Vladimir, 
2004; Perdue, 2007).  
City City clubs are usually located in a building or a suburban office complex and are the second most common type of 
private club behind country clubs, with over 2,000 U.S. clubs currently in operation (Perdue, 2007). On average, the 
city club initiation fee in $4,294, with $207 in monthly dues from 1,631 members (Perdue, 2007). Although city 
clubs may vary greatly in amenities, food and beverage service is almost always offered and a manager on hand is 
needed to direct the club operations (Angelo & Vladimir, 2004).  
Country Country clubs typically have a main clubhouse and enough land for one or more golf courses as well as other sports 
facilities, such as tennis courts and swimming pools (Perdue, 2007). There are an estimated 6,000 – 7,000 country 
clubs in the United States, the most common type of private club. The average monthly dues for a country club are 
$430, with an average of 847 members and an average initiation fee of $33,757 (Perdue, 2007).  
Corporate Corporate (or proprietary) clubs are operated for-profit and owned by a corporation or one or more individuals. 
Memberships offered by corporate clubs do not include ownership or equity sharing and members have limited or no 
voice in corporate club operations (Perdue, 2007).  
Developer- 
Owned 
Developer-owned clubs are private clubs built by developers with the intention of adding value and enhancing the 
desirability of housing developments. Often, developers are not interested in the long-term ownership of these clubs 
and instead wish to sell them to a corporation (becoming a corporate club) or the residents of the surrounding 
housing developments via equity conversion programs (becoming a member-owned club) (Perdue, 2007). 
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Dining Dining clubs multiplied rapidly in the 1960s and were originally offered by building owners to entice companies to 
lease office space. Dining clubs may offer lunch only (luncheon clubs), or lunch and dinner. Some dining clubs offer 
private luncheons during the day and then open to the public in the evening for dinner and cocktail service after 
work. Most dining clubs close relatively early in the evening if lodging facilities are not readily available (Angelo & 
Vladimir, 2004).  
Fraternal Fraternal clubs foster strong bonds of fellowship amongst their members and include organizations such as the 
Shriners, Elks, and Veteran’s of Foreign Wars (VFW) (Walker, 2009). Fraternal clubs often sponsor charitable 
organizations and causes such as the Shriners Hospitals for Children (Shriners International Headquarters, 2010). 
Typically the facilities of fraternal clubs are not as fancy as most private clubs, but many of them offer banquet 
rooms, beverage service, overnight accommodations and meeting rooms (Angelo & Vladimir, 2004; Walker, 2009). 
Professional managers are required to run fraternal clubs (Angelo & Vladimir, 2004). 
Military Each branch of the military operates military clubs, which were traditionally managed in-house by military 
personnel. However, through military restructuring, this has changed and now most military club events and day-to-
day activities are either contracted out or managed by civilians (Perdue, 2007). Many military clubs resemble city 
clubs, but may offer more elaborate and extensive services and facilities for enlisted personnel and officers such as 
social programs, recreational facilities, and lodging (Angelo & Vladimir, 2004). As military funding is currently 
being allocated for combat-related use, military clubs are now expected to break even or be profitable (Perdue, 2007).
Professional Professional clubs offer social and dining activities for individuals sharing the same profession. Examples of 
professional clubs include the Friar’s Club (for actors) and the National Arts Club (for patrons and artists from all 
fields), both located in New York City, as well as the Press Club (for journalists) in Washington D.C. (Angelo & 
Vladimir, 2004).  
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Proprietary Also known as corporate clubs (see definition above). 
Social Social clubs in the U.S. were originally based upon the men’s social clubs of London (Angelo & Vladimir, 2004). 
Social clubs are places where members can enjoy each other’s company (Walker, 2009). In some social clubs it is 
considered to be a faux pas to discuss business amongst club members, even being incorporated into the 
Shakespearean-inspired motto of San Francisco’s Bohemian Club, "weaving spiders come not here," warning against 
conducting business deals while on the premises (Wikipedia, 2008).  
Tennis Tennis clubs are chartered around the popular game of tennis, offering tennis courts and tennis-related services and 
facilities to their members. Tennis clubs may also have additional athletic facilities, banquet rooms for member use, 
and a clubhouse with food and beverage service (Perdue, 2007).  
University University clubs are private clubs for the alumni, faculty, staff, and friends of a university (Perdue, 2007).   
Yacht Yacht clubs are typically accessible by boat, located on large bodies of water. They cater to people who either own 
boats or enjoy boating activities and may have marina facilities available for their members. Yacht clubs have a 
clubhouse that offers food and beverages and may also include athletic facilities (Perdue, 2007). 
 44
From the mid 1800s up until the 1940s, U.S. city and country clubs exclusively catered to 
the most affluent and powerful individuals in society and were not within the grasp of most 
Americans (Perdue, 2007). During World War II, hundreds of thousands of U.S. servicemen 
were introduced to golf during their stay on military bases, which subsequently led to a great 
demand for public golf courses and golf facilities in the U.S. upon veterans returning home 
following the war (Perdue, 2007). This demand resulted in the rapid construction of country 
clubs from the 1960s through the 1980s, providing the opportunity of country club membership 
to a much greater number of Americans than before World War II (Perdue, 2007). In 2008, there 
were about 14,000 private clubs located in North America (comprised of both city and country 
clubs) with approximately 6,000 of those clubs being country clubs (Walker, 2009). Private clubs 
possess extensive resources (including land, equipment, and buildings), employ thousands of 
individuals, and manage financial assets, all of which have an economic impact in the billions of 
dollars annually (Walker, 2009). 
Types of Private Clubs 
Clubs are difficult to categorize due to the wide variation in clubs’ size, location, type, 
rules and services offered (Angelo & Vladimir, 2004). In addition, clubs may be categorized in 
more than one way (for example, a dining club is also usually a city club as well) (Perdue, 2007). 
Generally, the majority of most American private clubs can be classified as city clubs or country 
clubs, with the remaining establishments classified as “other private clubs” (Angelo & Vladimir, 
2004). The various types of private clubs are shown in Table 3. 
Security Issues Associated with Private Clubs 
General Managers of private clubs are recommended to have emergency preparedness 
procedures in place to protect the safety and health of their members (Club Managers 
Association of America, 2002). A written Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP) is the primary 
document used to ensure continued and effective operations of private clubs during and 
following a disaster (Club Managers Association of America, 2002). Contained within the 
Disaster Recovery Plan is an Emergency Evacuation Plan (EEP), consisting of the following 
items: evacuation, facility protection, emergency equipment (inspection, maintenance, and 
readiness), public relations, employee welfare, fire fighting, first aid/CPR, utility controls, 
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pollution/decontamination, communication, transportation, recordkeeping, and drills (Club 
Managers Association of America, 2002). 
In addition to Disaster Recovery Plans and Emergency Evacuation Plans, club managers 
are recommended to form a Crisis Management Team (CMT) and discuss the issues that could 
conceivably cause problems for their club. This may include the following possible crises: 
vandalism, member/employee injury, employee found with serious disease, golf course grass 
disease, bomb threat, loss of electricity/water, chemical spill, untimely death of staff 
member/director, terrorism, flood, fire, gas leak, earthquake, hurricane, tornado (Club Managers 
Association of America, 2002). The safety and security of private clubs in regards to terrorism 
preparedness should be of as much concern to both members and employees as other items in a 
Disaster Recovery Plan.  
The events of September 11, 2001 changed worldwide perceptions of terrorist threats to 
safety and security and the costs associated with the terrorist attacks, which can amount to 
hundreds of billions of dollars. Statistical odds of 1 in 9.3 million for Americans being the target 
of a terrorist attack may seem favorable, but if an attack occurs, the results could be deadly and 
final (Flinn, 2003). After September 11th, insurers faced a host of claims from individuals, 
businesses, and building owners in terms of property and casualty, health care costs, workers’ 
compensation, and the prospect of rising premiums that might force the insured to find new 
alternatives. Insurance companies began putting terrorism exclusions in their policies or charging 
exorbitant rates to cover the perceived risks of terrorism following the events of September 11th 
(Club Managers Association of America, 2002). 
Terrorist incidents in the United States may not be as dramatic as the scenes from 2001 
that unfolded to the entire world from New York City, yet terrorism still persists. In October 
2002, two men carried out the Beltway Sniper Attacks, killing ten people around the Baltimore-
Washington Metropolitan Area (Castaneda, 2007). In 2005, an engineering student blew himself 
up during a football game at the University of Oklahoma by detonating a backpack bomb only 
200 yards from OU's stadium (Brady, 2009). In 2006, a man was stopped by federal agents 
before he could carry out a planned “violent jihad” grenade attack in an Illinois shopping mall 
(NBC News, 2006).  In 2009, an 88-year-old white supremacist opened fire in the Washington, 
D.C. Holocaust Memorial Museum, killing a security guard (CNN, 2009). The events of 
September 11, 2001, focused the nation’s and the world’s attention on terrorism and the threat of 
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future terrorist acts. While the use of “weapons of mass destruction” by international terrorist 
organizations remains a potential threat, limited or individual attacks using common foodborne 
bacterial or zoonotic agents (to contaminate food systems or the public at large) will be more 
likely (Bledsoe & Rasco, 2002). This observation was echoed by the former Secretary of Health 
and Human Services Tommy Thompson. In his resignation speech, Mr. Thompson declared, “I, 
for the life of me, cannot understand why the terrorists have not, you know, attacked our food 
supply because it is so easy to do” (Branigin, Allen, & Mintz, 2004). 
Summary 
Food security threats by terrorists have been predicted to be probable in the future and are 
easy to carry out. Motivations of food terrorists are varied but the final result is the intentional 
harm of humans using food as the delivery medium for biological, physical, or chemical 
contaminants.  Retail foodservice is an indispensable part of life in America, where half of the 
food sold is prepared by others. The economic impact of the foodservice industry is enormous, 
and most hospitality organizations, including private clubs, have some sort of foodservice and 
beverage service offered to their customers. Employee turnover in foodservice operations can 
exceed 300% and employee background checks are not always conducted. Seasonal foodservice 
employees in club operations mean that workers come and go year-round. Clubs are exclusive 
and cater to the wealthy, making them a potential target for those who want to attack the wealthy 
and powerful using food terrorism. Many pathogens and easily obtainable chemicals exist that 
could be used for a terrorist attack. Although significant bioterrorism research has been done 
regarding the production and distribution of food, very little bioterrorism research has been 
conducted in retail foodservice and no research on bioterrorism has been conducted in private 
clubs. Many governmental agencies recommend creating a food defense management plan to 
counter the risk of bioterrorism. Previous research has shown that increased awareness of 
foodservice operators and implementing preventive practices to address bioterrorism can 
increase levels of food defense in foodservice operations. 
Based upon the lack of research in private clubs regarding bioterrorism, the 
recommendations of past researchers and government reports to implement preventative 
practices within foodservice operations, the unique private and privileged nature of private clubs, 
and the ubiquitous nature of the foodservice industry for employees and customers alike, and the 
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economic ramifications surrounding private clubs, foodservice, and terrorism, this study tested 
the following propositions by conducting food bioterrorism research study in private country 
clubs: 
Proposition 1: Club professionals with smaller gaps between importance perception and 
practice frequency are more concerned about food terrorism and biosecurity than 
operators with larger gaps. 
Proposition 2: Club professionals with smaller gaps between importance perception and 
practice frequency implement preventive practices more frequently than operators with 
larger gaps. 
Proposition 3: Club professionals with higher levels of perceived self-efficacy are more 
motivated to develop a food defense management plan in their country clubs than club 
professionals with lower levels of perceived self-efficacy.  
Proposition 4: Club professionals with higher levels of perceived self-efficacy implement 
preventive practices more frequently than club professionals with lower levels of 
perceived self-efficacy. 
Proposition 5: Club professionals with higher numbers of perceived barriers are less 
motivated to develop a food defense management plan in their country clubs than club 
professionals with lower numbers of perceived barriers. 
Proposition 6: Club professionals with higher numbers of perceived barriers implement 
preventive practices less frequently than club professionals with lower numbers of 
perceived barriers. 
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CHAPTER 3 - Methodology 
Population and Sample 
The population for this study was all country club professionals listed in the Club 
Manager’s Association of America (CMAA) member directory and whose operation was located 
in the United States. Membership information in the CMAA directory was segmented by type of 
clubs, including country clubs. The study population for this study was CMAA members 
employed in private country clubs. As of February 2010, a total population of 3,924 club 
professionals was listed in the CMAA member directory, comprising every type of club segment 
within CMAA. The country club segment of the CMAA member directory listed 2,354 club 
professionals or approximately 60% of the total CMAA membership. Following pilot testing, 
2,119 CMAA country club professionals remained as the sample used for the quantitative 
component of this research. According to Dillman, a population size of 2,119 with a +/- 5.68% 
sampling error for a 50/50 split requires a sample size of 261 usable responses (Dillman, 2000). 
In addition to the national survey respondents, a convenience sample of 25 country club 
operations within a 500-mile radius of Manhattan, Kansas was used to collect field data (on-site 
interviews of club professionals and observations of club operations). The food and beverage 
operations of country clubs in the Midwest located in Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska 
were observed. Country club managers were contacted via telephone without prior notification to 
explain the purpose and goals of the study. They were asked to participate in a personal 
interview and to allow the researcher to observe the food and beverage operations and the club’s 
premises.  
Overview of Data Collection 
Measurement items were initially developed from two different sources: previous 
literature and focus groups with academic and industry experts. Pilot testing of the survey 
instrument determined which items needed modification or clarification before final data  
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collection. Data analysis was completed to answer the research questions. Figure 1 illustrates the 
research process used for this operational research study.  
Research Compliance 
The research protocol was reviewed and approved by Kansas State University 
Institutional Review Board as documented by the approval letter in Appendix A. Permission was 
obtained to adapt survey instruments used in prior biosecurity research and is documented in 
Appendix B.  
Figure 1 - Research Steps 
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Elicitation Study 
The purpose of an elicitation study (or focus group) is to gather qualitative data from a 
group of people regarding a particular idea, concept, product, or service (Wikipedia, 2009a). 
Interactive group discussions can help to stimulate participant’s memories, experiences, and 
ideas which can generate valuable insights into the items being discussed. Individuals familiar 
with foodservice, bioterrorism, and private club management participated in an elicitation study 
which helped to develop the study’s survey and field study instruments. Participants included 
Kansas State University faculty and graduate students from the Department of Hospitality 
Management and Dietetics, faculty from the Kansas State University Food Science Institute, a 
country club manager, and three chefs with extensive experience in foodservice operations 
(including country clubs). Focus group participants were given an overview of food security, 
food bioterrorism, and country club operations and were informed of the purpose of the study. 
Survey instruments adapted from prior food defense research surveys of food and beverage 
operations were presented to the focus group for critique and constructive feedback. During the 
elicitation study, the semantics and wording of questions for the survey instrument were 
scrutinized and some questions pertaining to past research were modified or discarded. Revisions 
were made to the survey instrument based upon the focus group responses. This included 
identifying terminology familiar to club managers (e.g. using “security” instead of “biosecurity” 
when describing food defense practices). Other revisions included removing questions that 
pertained solely to school foodservice and aligning questions to measure operating practices and 
procedures within club operations. A pre-pilot version of the survey was sent to focus group 
participants and other individuals (see pilot study and refinement) for final inspection before the 
survey was administered for pilot testing.  
Development of Survey Instrument 
The questionnaire was adapted from existing surveys that were used to conduct prior 
research in food defense and bioterrorism in school foodservice and healthcare. Because these 
existing surveys were tested for validity and reliability before data collection, they served as a 
strong model for the survey instrument (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007a; Yoon & Shanklin, 2007b; 
Yoon & Shanklin, 2007c). The survey instrument was modified using feedback from the 
elicitation study and the pre-pilot testing by elicitation study members and other individuals. The 
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modified survey instrument measured items regarding club professionals’ perceptions of 
bioterrorism and preventative practices used in their respective clubs to counter bioterrorism.  
Factors regarding club managers’ opinions toward food biosecurity explored in the study 
included: concern of club managers regarding biosecurity, perceived self-efficacy to 
implementing food defense practices, and perceived barriers to implementing food defense 
practices. Factors regarding club managers’ importance perceptions and perceived frequency of 
practices performed in their clubs related to chemical use and storage, employee management, 
facility security, food handling, and utility security. Demographic variables about the country 
clubs included: number of club memberships, number of foodservice employees, number of 
employees working per shift, and individuals responsible for implementing and monitoring food 
security. Demographic variables of club professionals who completed the survey included: 
position title, length of employment in current position, years employed in foodservice and club 
management, age, education level, sex, and club foodservice operating budget. The survey 
instrument administered is presented in Appendix C.  
Development of Field Study Instruments 
Open-ended interview questions were developed from the literature review and ideas 
generated in an elicitation study that identified items to use in a separate survey research project. 
Interview questions were used to further explore club professionals’ perceptions regarding food 
defense in their operation. The interview questions included knowledge of food security 
resources, resources needed for food defense, training needs, and policies and procedures in club 
operations. The interview questions are summarized in Appendix D.  
Observation instruments were adapted from the literature review and existing observation 
instruments that were developed to conduct food defense and bioterrorism research in school 
foodservice. The observation instrument’s initial framework was modified with ideas discussed 
in the separate survey elicitation study in order to adequately measure preventative practices 
used to counter bioterrorism in country clubs. The instrument included a place to record 
observations for the following locations: areas outside each country club, clubhouse receiving 
areas, clubhouse storage areas, clubhouse foodservice / food preparation areas, chemical storage 
areas, foodservice equipment, foodservice personnel, utility security, and general clubhouse 
security items. The observation instrument is presented in Appendix E.  
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Pilot Study & Refinement 
 Permission was obtained from CMAA to use their member directory to contact club 
professionals associated with country clubs. E-mail invitations were sent to 235 randomly 
selected CMAA country club professionals explaining the purpose of the study and encouraging 
them to click on a link to an online survey. Those who were invited to participate in the pilot 
study were not used again in the following main survey data collection.  
The pilot test yielded 10 returned or undeliverable survey invitations and 25 responses (5 
of which were unusable), for a total of 20 usable responses (an 8.51% response rate). A 
reliability check was performed upon the collected data using Cronbach’s alpha (α = .94), which 
satisfied the desired value of α ≥ .90 for reliability (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Based on the 
results of the pilot study, the survey was revised and a final version of the questionnaire was 
developed and distributed to the remaining 2,119 club professionals in the country club sample.  
Field study instruments (interview guide and observation form) were pilot tested in one 
country club in Kansas. Feedback from the club manager during the pilot test helped to establish 
the interview format and how to ask the questions clearly and concisely. Changes made to the 
observation instrument included omitting “n/a” (not applicable) from the “observed” category to 
avoid confusion with “yes/no” columns and omitting cash handling as private clubs typically 
operate with minimal cash exchange between staff and club members. 
Data Collection 
Survey Instrument 
Surveys were administered online via a dedicated e-mail link to each respondent linking 
to the Kansas State University survey system. No identifying information was asked and survey 
respondents were kept completely anonymous. Some researchers report that persons who 
respond to surveys answer questions differently than those who do not (Dillman, 2000). Efforts 
were taken to minimize survey non-response bias through effective online design and follow-up 
reminders. Because online surveys typically have low response rates, support from CMAA was 
requested and granted for use in the contact e-mail to respondents in an attempt to increase the 
participation rate. In addition, a chance to win a gift card redeemable for purchases in CMAA’s 
bookstore was offered to club professionals as an incentive to complete the online surveys. 
Multiple attempts were made to contact non-respondents in order to delimit non-response bias. 
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Two reminder e-mails were sent to members who had not responded to the survey (for a total of 
three e-mails), after which the survey offering was closed.  
The field data was collected in 25 country clubs. The purpose of the field study was to 
understand club managers’ opinions and thoughts about food security (via interviews) and to 
directly observe country clubs’ operational practices. Both items were used to gather baseline 
data and to help make determinations of country clubs’ readiness to secure their operations 
against food bioterrorism.  
Interviews 
Club managers were interviewed in all 25 country clubs included in the data analysis. 
Prior to visiting each club, the investigator sent club managers an e-mail containing a set of 
Internet links (URLs) to background literature regarding food security. This provided club 
managers with some background information about food security and was intended to help 
facilitate discussion. However, upon visiting the clubs it became clear that the majority of club 
managers had not reviewed the material in advance. Only two out of 25 club managers 
interviewed were aware of the National Restaurant Association’s publication “Food Security – 
An Introduction” (National Restaurant Association Educational Foundation, 2003). One club 
manager was aware of other resources pertaining to food security. Six club managers had heard 
about the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (the 
Bioterrorism Act), but did not know how it affected them.  
In four of the 25 interviews, additional club professionals were invited to participate (per 
the club manager’s discretion in all interviews). This included executive chefs, food and 
beverage directors, and assistant club managers. Probing, open-ended exploratory questions were 
used to obtain data related to club managers/professionals’ perceptions of bioterrorism. 
Interviews ranged in length from 20 minutes to one hour and all interviews followed the same set 
of probing open-ended questions. Interview data were coded to remove links to those being 
interviewed to ensure anonymity of responses and to maintain confidentiality of participants and 
their operations. Following the completion of the study, a debriefing form containing a summary 
of the major findings of the research study and confirmation of confidentiality of responses was 
offered to all study participants. Country club professionals interviewed were also offered a list 
of resources to address concerns shared during interviews. 
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Observations 
The observations of food security practices focused on the clubhouse or wherever the 
majority of food production occurred in all clubs. Observations focused on food defense 
practices, not individuals being observed; no individuals were identified when recording 
observation data. Data were aggregated so that specific locations observed remained anonymous. 
Any observations that revealed risks to an operation (such as a breach in food safety, an 
operational problem, or a food security risk) were communicated to the club professional during 
the on-site observation. 
Data Analysis 
Survey Instrument 
Survey data were analyzed with the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 
version 17.0 (SPSS Inc., 2008). Significance levels were set at p ≤ .05 for all data unless 
otherwise noted. Cronbach’s alpha was used to assess the reliability of scale items in the survey 
questionnaire. Statistical processes applied to data included independent t-tests, one-way analysis 
of variance (ANOVA), chi-square testing, and cluster analysis.  
Responses of club managers’ opinions about food security were sorted into three groups: 
concern (8 items), self-efficacy (7 items), and barriers (4 items). Three ungrouped items asked 
club managers’ opinions of the state of their clubs’ security (1 item) and reasons for 
implementing food defense management plans (2 items). Each opinion item was rated on a 1–5 
Likert-type scale with 1 being “strongly disagree”, 2 being “somewhat disagree”, 3 being 
“neutral”, 4 being “somewhat agree”, and 5 being “strongly agree”.  
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed to assess the validity of importance 
perception factors used in previous surveys to address the study’s propositions.  Following CFA, 
the two questions comprising the communications factor from a previous study were merged into 
employee management and facility security. A total of five importance perception factors were 
confirmed, including chemical use and storage (5 items), employee management (7 items), 
facility security (8 items), food handling (10 items), and utility security (5 items).  
Each importance perception item corresponded with a practice frequency item for use in 
gap analysis. For this reason, practice frequency items were sorted exactly as importance 
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perception items were, into the same five factors (chemical use and storage, employee 
management, facility security, food handling, and utility security).  
Corresponding items used in gap analysis consisted of two parts, a statement (importance 
perception item) and a question (practice frequency item) that were worded very similarly. The 
statement asked the club manager how important a food security practice was and the question 
asked how often they performed this practice in their club. Each importance perception statement 
(e.g. “storing hazardous chemicals in a locked storage area”) was rated on a 1–5 Likert-type 
scale with 1 being “very unimportant”, 2 being “somewhat important”, 3 being “neutral”, 4 being 
“somewhat important”, and 5 being “very important”. Each corresponding practice frequency 
question (e.g. “our country club stores hazardous chemicals in a locked storage area”) was rated 
on a 1–5 Likert-type scale with 1 being “never”, 2 being “seldom”, 3 being “some of the time”, 4 
being “most of the time”, and 5 being “all the time”. The gaps for all 35 corresponding food 
security practices were calculated by subtracting the practice frequency score from the 
importance score. The mean gaps were calculated for statements/questions in each factor and 
averaged.  
Cluster analysis using Ward’s method with squared Euclidean distance was used to group 
respondents into high and low groups for self-efficacy, barriers and width of gap scores between 
importance perceptions and practice frequencies. Independent samples t-tests or one-way 
ANOVA were used to detect significant differences between groups. Levene's Test for Equality 
of Variances was conducted to see if the groups had approximately equal variance on the 
dependent variables used to test research propositions. Tukey's HSD Post Hoc Test was 
conducted for significant ANOVA values to identify which means were significantly different 
from one another.  
Field Study 
Interview data were compiled and sorted by categories per the interview question. Data 
were also sorted by themes; factors included importance perceptions, perceived self-efficacy, 
barriers, and attitudes. Observation items were recorded as “yes”, “no”, or “not applicable”. 
Observation data were analyzed with the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 
version 17.0 (SPSS Inc., 2008). Frequencies and percentages were calculated for observation 
items. 
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CHAPTER 4 - Manuscript 1 
FOOD DEFENSE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN PRIVATE COUNTRY CLUBS  
Abstract 
The primary purpose of this study was to examine country club professionals’ importance 
perceptions of securing their foodservice operations against a food terrorism attack and the 
perceived preventative practices that could be implemented to counter such an attack. Gaps 
between importance perceptions and the frequency of perceived preventative practices were 
examined to determine if there was a relationship with club professionals’ concern about food 
terrorism and how often preventive practices were implemented in their clubs. Perceived self-
efficacy measures and perceived barriers were studied to assess if there was a relationship with 
club professionals’ motivation to develop a food defense management plan and the frequency to 
which preventive practices were implemented in private country clubs. Demographic 
characteristics were compared with importance perceptions and frequency of practices. 
 Importance perceptions and preventive practice frequencies were examined to ascertain 
if there were any significant differences among various operational factors. Gap scores were 
calculated by subtracting the practice frequency score from the importance score. The mean gap 
scores were positive, meaning that on average, club managers rated importance perceptions 
higher than practice frequency. Cluster analysis using Ward’s method with squared Euclidean 
distance was used to group respondents into high and low groups for self-efficacy, barriers and 
width of gap scores between importance perceptions and practice frequencies. Independent 
samples t-tests and one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) were used to determine differences 
between groups. Club professionals with smaller gaps implemented preventive practices more 
frequently than those with larger gaps. Club professionals with higher levels of self-efficacy 
were more motivated to develop a food defense management plan and implemented preventive 
practices more frequently than those with lower levels of self-efficacy. Those with higher 
perceived barriers were less motivated to develop a food defense management plan and 
implemented preventive practices less frequently than those with lower perceived barriers. This 
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study concluded that increasing the perceived importance and awareness of food security issues 
and implementing preventive practices can help a country club become more secure against food 
terrorism. 
Introduction 
Food Bioterrorism in the United States 
The turn of the millennium not only ushered in a new century, but also new concerns 
about the way we view threats to the safety and security of the food supply in the United States 
(U.S.). Following the terrorism attacks on New York City and the Pentagon in 2001, funding for 
counterterrorism was increased and as a result, the safety and security of the food supply 
received increased attention and priority (Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005). Historically, food safety in 
the U.S. has focused primarily on unintentional and accidental contamination of food and water. 
Unfortunately, foodservice operators, the foodservice industry, and the U.S. government are not 
thoroughly prepared for threats in the form of intentional disasters (such as terrorism) (Bryant et 
al., 2005; Hollingsworth, 2002; Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005) .  
Opportunities for bioterrorist activities exist along the food supply chain, from 
agricultural production to consumption of food, commonly referred as “farm to fork” or “farm to 
table” (Dictionary.com's 21st Century Lexicon, 2010). Food security threats may affect any 
portion of the food supply chain and may be centered upon certain foods, production processes, 
or businesses producing food products (National Restaurant Association Educational Foundation, 
2003). For the purpose of this study, individuals who intentionally commit criminal acts by 
contaminating or harming food products will be referred to as terrorists, bioterrorists, or food 
bioterrorists. Motivations of terrorists can include: political/ideological, creating chaos, 
revenge/retribution, financial benefit, thrill-seeking, notoriety, attention/publicity, humor/prank, 
and obtaining a competitive advantage (AIB International, 2006).  
Research regarding the preparedness of the commercial foodservice segment to address 
food bioterrorism issues is minimal at best (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007c). Governmental agencies, 
such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), have recommended 
foodservice professionals monitor the security of the food supply from production to 
 68
consumption (farm to fork) (Peregrin, 2002). Food bioterrorism research within the foodservice 
industry must not be ignored. 
Past examples of food bioterrorism illustrate the need for proactive and preventive food 
defense practices. In 1996, twelve laboratory employees of a Texas hospital were intentionally 
infected with pastries containing a rare diarrhea-causing strain of Shigella dysenteriae. In 
January 2003, 148 people in Michigan became ill after consuming ground beef intentionally 
contaminated with insecticide purchased at a supermarket (CDC, 2003). In August 2009 at a 
Kansas restaurant, 48 people became ill after consuming salsa that was intentionally 
contaminated with Methomyl, a highly-toxic pesticide used for fruit, vegetable, and field crops 
(United States Department of Justice, 2010).    
Foodservice operators must be informed of the potential risks and threats posed by 
bioterrorism as they are the final control point on the food supply chain. Developing a food 
defense management plan that specifies how to implement preventive practices should be the 
most direct and efficacious method to minimize the threat of bioterrorism to a foodservice 
operation (Bledsoe & Rasco, 2002; United States Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition 
Service, 2004).  
The Foodservice Industry 
The preparation and consumption of wholesome food, either at home or away from 
home, is essential to human survival. Forty-nine cents of every dollar is spent away from home 
in the U.S. in a restaurant or another establishment serving food (National Restaurant 
Association, 2010). The restaurant industry will serve an estimated 70 billion meal and snacks in 
2010, employ a projected 12.7 million people (9% of the U.S. workforce), and generate an 
estimated $580 billion in revenues (National Restaurant Association, 2010). 
Foodservice operations are ubiquitous in the U.S., offering people a place to socialize 
with one another, to restore their energy levels, and to relax (Walker, 2009).  Commercial 
foodservice includes convenience stores and many types of restaurants, including: fast food, full-
service, casual, fine dining, hotel/motel, and airport restaurants. Commercial foodservice 
operations may also be located in museums, aboard cruise ships, in zoos and museums, at 
sporting arenas and events, and in private country clubs.  
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Private Country Clubs 
In 2008, there were about 6,000 private country clubs in North America. These clubs 
represented extensive financial assets, employed thousands of individuals, and provided an 
economic impact in the billions of dollars annually (Walker, 2009). Country clubs are exclusive 
and cater to the affluent, with initiation fees charged to new members as high as $250,000 
(Walker, 2009). All country clubs provide some form of food and beverage service, which is 
important for creating positive impressions in the minds of club members and their guests 
(Perdue, 2007). Country clubs employ many foodservice workers and hire seasonal employees to 
meet peak demands in a club’s business, such as the busy summer and holiday seasons. Turnover 
among foodservice workers can reach approximately 300%, thus background checks are 
considered cost-prohibitive by many club managers (Aziz et al., 2007). Because country clubs 
are often exclusive and cater to wealthy and influential members of society, they could be 
selected as potential targets by would-be terrorists. A bioterrorist attack upon a country club’s 
food supply could be carried out by a foodservice employee or someone who has access to the 
operation with the potential to harm hundreds of club members, their families, and their guests.      
Statement of Problem 
Foodservice professionals need to be aware of the risks of food bioterrorism as they are 
responsible for managing the final control point in the food supply chain. Most foodservice 
operations have crisis management plans in place to deal with natural disasters and workplace 
emergencies. Unfortunately, these crisis management plans do not properly address how to 
manage intentional contamination of an operation’s food or water supply. All foodservice 
operations are recommended to secure their food supplies, and particularly those that serve high-
risk individuals, such as children, seniors, and patients (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007c). Foodservice 
operators need to update their crisis management plans to protect their customers and employees 
from the possibility of bioterrorism (Bledsoe & Rasco, 2002; Bruemmer, 2003; United States 
Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service, 2004; Yoon & Shanklin, 2007a)  
Past research has studied bioterrorism perceptions and preventative practices in school 
foodservice and hospital foodservice operations (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007a; Yoon & Shanklin, 
2007b; Yoon & Shanklin, 2007c). However, very little is currently known about club 
professionals’ perceptions of the importance of these preventive practices and the frequency 
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these preventive practices are used in country club foodservice operations. Club professionals’ 
perceived self-efficacy is their belief in their own capabilities to plan and implement necessary 
actions to effectively deal with events in their country club and should be explored. Club 
professionals’ perceived barriers to implementing a biosecurity plan and implementing 
preventive practices also should be studied. 
This study examined country club professionals’ importance perceptions of securing their 
foodservice operations against a food terrorism attack and the perceived preventative practices 
that could be implemented to counter such an attack. Gaps between importance perceptions and 
the frequency of perceived preventative practices were examined to ascertain if there was a 
relationship with club professionals’ concern about food terrorism and how often preventive 
practices were implemented in their clubs. Perceived self-efficacy measures and perceived 
barriers were studied to assess if there was a relationship with club professionals’ motivation to 
develop a food defense management plan and the frequency that preventive practices were 
implemented in their clubs. 
Literature Review 
Food Terrorism, Food Biosecurity, and Bioterrorism 
Although it is difficult to pinpoint exactly when terrorism started, the origins of terrorism 
are believed to have begun around 2,000 years ago. Acts which could be regarded as terrorist 
activities were first recorded in the United States during the Civil War. Anarchist-related 
terrorism was active throughout the 1880s in the U.S. and continued into the 20th Century with 
organized groups such as the Ku Klux Klan (Center for Defense Information, 2003; Harper, 
November, 2001). 
Modern terrorism generally employs the use of weapons, with (in descending popularity) 
the use of such items as bombs, guns, knives and other bladed weapons, remote control bombs, 
fire, chemical and biological weapons, and unknown or unspecified weapons (Bogen & Jones, 
2006). Worldwide terrorism resulted in 86,568 casualties and 25,408 deaths from 1968 to 2004 
in 19,828 documented terrorist events and 7,401 adverse events. Bogen and Jones (2006) 
projected that these numbers will increase in the future, with an upward trend in number of 
deaths, injuries, and terrorist events. 
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The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) defines terrorism as “the use of 
force or violence against persons or property in violation of the criminal laws of the United 
States for purposes of intimidation, coercion, or ransom”. According to FEMA (2006), terrorists 
use threats to strike fear into society, attempt to convince citizens that the government is unable 
to control terrorism, and to draw attention to terrorists’ causes. Types of terrorist acts may 
include bombings and bomb scares and the use of biological, chemical, nuclear and radiological 
weapons (FEMA, 2006).   
Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks against high-profile U.S. landmarks on September 11, 2001 
were witnessed by a worldwide television audience. The attacks upon the World Trade Center in 
New York City, the Pentagon in Washington D.C., and the hijacked American Airlines Flight 77 
claimed 3,056 lives (Bogen & Jones, 2006). These attacks used commercial passenger jets as 
explosive devices, and grimly demonstrated how terrorism could effectively strike fear within 
society. Following September 11th, letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to multiple 
news media offices and two U.S. Senators. This resulted in the deaths of 17 Americans, 
becoming the worst case of biological terrorism in U.S. history (FBI, 2008). Despite these acts of 
bioterrorism being limited to a few selected targets, millions of U.S. citizens became uneasy with 
the simple act of opening the mail, a potentially dangerous undertaking (Hall et al., 2003).  
Since 2001, governmental agencies and international organizations have substantially 
increased their efforts to address bioterrorism. According to the World Health Organization 
(2002), governments and companies cannot ignore the potential for biological attacks upon their 
organizations. Taking intelligent precautions, along with effective surveillance and response 
capability, are the best first lines of defense to counter bioterrorism and food safety emergencies 
(WHO, 2002). 
Motivation of Terrorists 
Individuals using food as a vehicle for terrorist activities likely have multiple motivations 
for doing so. Intentional contamination of the food chain could potentially have significant 
social, political, economic, and public health consequences (Crutchley, 2007). Terrorists' 
motivation can be political, economic, or malicious mischief. Many individuals initiating food 
terrorism may have initially been good-intentioned activists whose actions have gone bad from 
various causes, such as environmental, consumer protection, animal rights movements, or 
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political anarchists (Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005). Other motivations of activists include those who 
fear social progress, innovation, or technology.  
According to Stern (1999), conflicting ideologies between civilizations provides the 
primary reason for people to join organizations such as Al-Qaeda. Rasco and Bledsoe (2005) 
argue that those in the U.S. are unfortunately “naïve in assuming that all rational people share 
beliefs regarding the relative importance of rights and responsibilities between citizens and the 
state, the extent of governmental liberty and scope of governmental authority, and the equality of 
individuals regardless of gender, race, ethnic origin, or religious belief”. Terrorist groups driven 
by religious motivations have become more prevalent and threaten Western society by using 
more sophisticated methods, which may include biological and chemical agents (Stern, 1999). 
Rasco and Bledsoe noted that the terrorist threat against food production, processing, and 
research is increasing (2005). 
Repercussions from Bioterrorism Attacks 
To understand the potential impacts of intentionally contaminated food, one can observe 
the effects of unintentional foodborne illness upon the public due to poor food safety practices, 
both domestically and internationally. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
estimated that foodborne illnesses cause “approximately 76 million illnesses, 325,000 
hospitalizations, and 5,000 deaths in the United States each year. Known pathogens account for 
an estimated 14 million illnesses, 60,000 hospitalizations, and 1,800 deaths….while unknown 
agents account for the remaining 62 million illnesses, 265,000 hospitalizations, and 3,200 
deaths” (Mead et al., 1999).  
The effect of foodborne illness upon public health services can be taxing, whether 
unintentional or not. Many countries simply do not have the resources to address the 
consequences during or after large-scale emergencies. Furthermore, a lack of readiness, coupled 
with potential difficulties in identifying uncommon pathogens could yield inaccurate diagnoses. 
This would have a significant and adverse effect upon a public health organization to effectively 
respond to a large food sabotage event (WHO, 2002). 
Terrorists may use bioterrorism to destabilize society and may have many motives for 
doing so. The goal of terrorism for the purpose of social and political disruption is to create an 
atmosphere of public fear and anxiety. This, in turn, may lead to a decreased confidence in the 
government, which may or may not result in political destabilization. If used in conjunction with 
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attacks upon economic interests, the political effects can be magnified, especially in the presence 
of food shortages (WHO, 2002). 
Prior to September 11th and the anthrax attacks, public health leaders and government 
agencies had not incorporated mental health management strategies as components of terrorism 
response plans (Becker, 2001; Hall, 2002). Since that time, predicting and understanding the 
behavioral and psychological repercussions from a terrorist attack has become an important task 
involving the U.S. healthcare system and government leaders (Hall et al., 2003). 
Biological and Chemical Agents used in Bioterrorism  
Bioterrorism as defined by the USDA is “the intentional use of biological and chemical 
agents for the purpose of causing harm” (United States Department of Agriculture Food and 
Nutrition Service, 2004). Bioterrorism utilizes biological or etiological toxins, agents, and 
diseases in the process of carrying out a terrorist act. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
has indicated that common household items can be utilized to create weapons that could 
contaminate food with biological or chemical agents. (CDC, 2008a; Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005).  
Biological agents are either living microbes that cause infectious disease or the toxins 
created by microorganisms. Both microbes and toxins are capable of causing death or serious 
illness, and are highly specific for their targets (plants, animals, and people) (Rasco & Bledsoe, 
2005). Biological agents are susceptible to issues regarding their controllability, including 
environmental conditions (air flow, temperature, and pH), the viability of each given strain, and 
secondary transmission of the biological agent to non-desirable targets (collateral damage).  
Toxins, similar in nature to chemical agents, are capable of causing severe damage upon 
delivery. Biological toxins are extremely potent and are capable of death or damage at levels as 
miniscule as one to ten parts in one quadrillion. Furthermore, certain agents such as Clostridium 
botulinum and Bacillus anthracis may undergo sporification (spore formation), making them 
resistant to destruction and capable of persisting for extended periods of time in a variety of 
environments (Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005). 
Depending upon the microorganism or toxin used, the effects of disease or intoxication 
can take anywhere from 30 minutes to several weeks to cause infection or intoxication. A delay 
between administering a biological agent until the first onset of symptoms might actually be 
desirable to perpetrators, giving them time to flee and confusing investigators of intentional food 
contamination incidents. In addition, symptoms of foodborne intoxication and infection can be 
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misdiagnosed, especially if an uncommon microbe, fungus, or biological toxin is used or the 
time of initial contact is unknown or falsely reported (Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005). 
Those intent upon spreading disease can use virtually any naturally-occurring pathogens 
as agents of intentional contamination (Berns et al., 1998). Bioterrorism agents and diseases have 
been categorized by the CDC into three descending categories of priority (A, B, and C), based 
upon how easily they may be spread and the severity of illness and morbidity of which they 
cause (CDC, 2008a). 
Category A agents include Clostridium botulinum, Bacillus anthracis, and smallpox. 
These agents have high mortality rates, are easily transmittable, and have the potential to 
severely impact public health. Of primary concern is Clostridium botulinum, the organism 
responsible for the most toxic compound produced by a biological system. One pure ounce of 
Clostridium botulinum toxin could potentially kill 200 million people (Fung & Goetsch, 2004). 
In 1991, the country of Iraq stated that they possessed 19,000 liters of botulinum toxin, which 
was calculated to be three times the amount needed to kill every human being on earth (Rasco & 
Bledsoe, 2005). Bacillus anthracis, the microorganism that causes the anthrax disease, is 
extremely stable and is 85% lethal if an infective dose (8,000-50,000 spores) is inhaled. It has 
been estimated that in an urban population of 5 million inhabitants, 50 kg of anthrax spores 
released via aircraft (airborne dispersion) would kill approximately 100,000 people and sicken 
250,000 more (Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005). Smallpox is a contagious disease caused by the variola 
virus, with a fatality rate of up to 30%. Symptoms of smallpox disease include body aches, high 
fever, and vomiting. Rashes develop, which spread and become pus-filled blisters and raised 
bumps that crust, scab, and flake off in approximately three weeks, causing pitted scars. Just one 
confirmed case of smallpox is sufficient reason to declare a public health emergency (CDC, 
2007b). Although smallpox was declared to be eradicated from the planet in 1980, there is still 
concern that smallpox may still exist and be able to be used as a bioweapon (CDC, 2002). 
CDC Category B definitions represent bioterrorism agents and diseases with relatively 
lower morbidity and mortality rates than Category A agents that are less easily disseminated 
from person to person. Of particular notoriety is the ricin toxin, which can be rather simply 
extracted from the castor bean (Ricinius communis), for which there is no antidote. Furthermore, 
ricin toxin is extremely potent, can be inhaled or ingested, and remains stable for several hours, 
making it a good candidate for bioterrorism (Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005). 
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CDC Category C definitions represent emerging pathogens that could be used in a 
bioterrorist attack due to their ease of production, availability, and likelihood of high morbidity 
and mortality rates. This includes emerging infectious diseases such as Nipah virus and 
hantavirus. 
Chemical agents can also be utilized for bioterrorist activities with the purpose of causing 
harm. The use of chemicals with the intent to poison others is an ancient technique, dating back 
thousands of years. In 331 B.C., following the suspicious deaths of many leading Roman 
citizens, a slave girl approached the magistrate and, in exchange for immunity from prosecution, 
revealed that cause of the deaths in question was due to intentional poisoning. As a result, twenty 
Roman women were put on trial for “brewing noxious concoctions”. When the defendants 
denied any allegations of wrongdoing and instead claimed to have been creating substances with 
“curative properties”, the court challenged the women to drink their creations to prove their 
claim of innocence. The defendants agreed and ingested the substances, which effectively killed 
them (Bauman, 1992).  
Chemicals are “ready-made” and do not need to be cultivated or extracted as do 
biological toxins (Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005). Hazardous chemicals can be manufactured from 
easily obtained items, such as household cleaners, and released intentionally in a terrorist attack 
(CDC, 2005a). Furthermore, some of the chemical agents are not overly-difficult for motivated 
individuals or groups to manufacture (National Research Council, 2002). Because chemicals are 
widespread and used throughout society, access to chemical sources should be secured to protect 
citizens from those who could use them to cause intentional harm (United States Department of 
Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service, 2004). Periodic review of procedures for access, 
handling, and storage procedures of hazardous materials in the workplace is recommended. This 
includes acids, solvents, cleaning materials, pesticides, paints, bases, water treatment and other 
chemicals (Bledsoe & Rasco, 2002).  
There are potentially hundred of chemical agents that could be used in a bioterrorist 
attack. Chemical agents have long been used in warfare. For example, chlorine was used as a 
choking agent in World War I.  Chemical weapons were also used by Saddam Hussein in the 
first Gulf War during the 1990s and in the Iran-Iraq war (Rasco & Bledsoe, 2005). Pertaining to 
food, however, it is more likely that agricultural or industrial chemicals would be used rather 
than military-developed chemicals. Steven Musser of the Center for Food Safety and Applied 
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Nutrition, Food and Drug Administration (CFSAN/FDA) has commented that even though the 
list of hundred of potential chemical agents could be reduced to 12-15, there is no “guarantee” 
that would-be terrorists would use any of those agents (Bryant et al., 2005). 
Previous Bioterrorism Research Conducted in Foodservice  
“Farm to fork” is the commonly-used term describing the “human food chain from 
agricultural production to consumption” (Dictionary.com's 21st Century Lexicon, 2010). 
Foodservice establishments represent the last link on the food chain (the “fork”) where food is 
prepared before final service to customers. There has been significant bioterrorism research 
conducted of the production and transportation of food, but research regarding the preparedness 
of the commercial foodservice segment is minimal at best (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007c). Previous 
bioterrorism research was conducted in school and hospital foodservice operations in the U.S. 
(Yoon & Shanklin, 2007a; Yoon & Shanklin, 2007b; Yoon & Shanklin, 2007c). Yoon and 
Shanklin (2007) studied food and nutrition professionals’ perceived importance, frequency of 
preventative measures, and self-efficacy in developing a food defense management plan. 
Foodservice operators who indicated more concern and caution towards threats of food 
bioterrorism more often performed preventive practices than foodservice operators who were 
less concerned and less cautious about food terrorism (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007c). Among 
preventative practices, foodservice operators considered chemical use and storage practices to be 
of the greatest concern for protection from bioterrorism and these practices were also the most 
frequently implemented in their operation (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007a). Yoon and Shanklin’s 
research concluded that increased awareness of foodservice operators and implementing 
preventive practices against bioterrorism can enhance levels of food defense in foodservice 
operations (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007b). It is reasonable to assume that these conclusions could 
apply to other foodservice operations, besides schools and hospitals. For this reason, private 
country clubs were selected for future foodservice research in food bioterrorism. 
Roles/Responsibilities of Club Managers and Other Foodservice Professionals 
Clubs are exclusive and typically only invite affluent and influential individuals (along 
with their families) to join their membership (Walker, 2009). Examples of people frequenting 
private clubs (members, their guests, or non-members) include: prominent citizens, business 
executives, celebrities, and government officials.  
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Nearly all U.S. private clubs have food and beverage facilities and serve food procured 
and prepared from the U.S. food supply (Walker, 2009). The safety and security of food served 
in private clubs ultimately resides with the club’s general manager who is directly responsible for 
supervising all club professionals and department heads (Perdue, 2007).   
Private clubs, which typically exclude non-affluent individuals from their membership 
roles, unintentionally project an image of wealth and privilege to non-members. Because private 
clubs are exclusive and cater to affluent, powerful and influential individuals, they could be 
considered as potential targets to would-be terrorists. Club members consider their club as an 
extension of their business and home and will use its facilities for both business and leisure 
(Angelo & Vladimir, 2004). The service of food and beverages is generally at the center of all 
club events.  
To facilitate these events, private clubs employ foodservice workers and banquet servers. 
These positions may have up to a 285% annual turnover rate, due to significant numbers of 
seasonal employees hired to meet peak demands (Aziz et al., 2007) . English is a second 
language for many foodservice employees and communication difficulties can occur between 
managers and non-English speaking employees. This can complicate attempts at conducting 
background checks or verification of job references. Background checks can be easily run on 
every line-level employee, including temporary employees who may be hired for busy times of 
the year, however this may be cost prohibitive to the club.  
Food prepared in large quantities is easy to contaminate, thus banquets held at private 
clubs may present a terrorist (possibly an employee of the operation) the opportunity to harm 200 
people or more at a time. One disgruntled employee could intentionally contaminate food or 
beverages served to members and cause extensive harm to club members, their guests, and club 
employees. Food production equipment that combines large batches of food ingredients together, 
such as a floor mixer, offer a would-be terrorist an ideal opportunity for contamination (United 
States Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service, 2004). Additionally, equipment 
located in low-traffic or out of the way areas, such as an icemaker in a side room, could provide 
opportunities for intentional contamination with little chance of being detected.  
After the physical damage from an initial bioterrorism attack, the psychological effects 
and shock value lingers, potentially causing more problems for a private club (USDA-FSIS & 
FDA, 2007). A perceived violation of safety and security with something as personal as food 
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(which they trust the club to be safe to put in their bodies) may result in members resigning from 
the private club, even if they themselves were not directly affected. 
Security Issues Associated with Private Clubs 
General Managers of private clubs are recommended to have emergency preparedness 
procedures in place to protect the safety and health of their members (Club Managers 
Association of America, 2002). A written Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP) is the primary 
document used to ensure continued and effective operations of private clubs during and 
following a disaster (Club Managers Association of America, 2002). Contained within the 
Disaster Recovery Plan is an Emergency Evacuation Plan (EEP), consisting of the following 
items: evacuation, facility protection, emergency equipment (inspection, maintenance, and 
readiness), public relations, employee welfare, fire fighting, first aid/CPR, utility controls, 
pollution/decontamination, communication, transportation, recordkeeping, and drills (Club 
Managers Association of America, 2002). 
In addition to Disaster Recovery Plans and Emergency Evacuation Plans, club managers 
are recommended to form a Crisis Management Team (CMT) and discuss the issues that could 
conceivably cause problems for their club. This may include the following possible crises: 
vandalism, member/employee injury, employee found with serious disease, golf course grass 
disease, bomb threat, loss of electricity/water, chemical spill, untimely death of staff 
member/director, terrorism, flood, fire, gas leak, earthquake, hurricane, tornado (Club Managers 
Association of America, 2002). The safety and security of private clubs in regards to terrorism 
preparedness should be of as much concern to both members and employees as other items in a 
Disaster Recovery Plan.  
The events of September 11, 2001 changed worldwide perceptions of terrorist threats to 
safety and security and the costs associated with the terrorist attacks, which can amount to 
hundreds of billions of dollars. Statistical odds of 1 in 9.3 million for Americans being the target 
of a terrorist attack may seem favorable, but if an attack occurs, the results could be deadly and 
final (Flinn, 2003). After September 11th, insurers faced a host of claims from individuals, 
businesses, and building owners in terms of property and casualty, health care costs, workers’ 
compensation, and the prospect of rising premiums that might force the insured to find new 
alternatives. Insurance companies began putting terrorism exclusions in their policies or charging 
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exorbitant rates to cover the perceived risks of terrorism following the events of September 11th 
(Club Managers Association of America, 2002). 
While the use of “weapons of mass destruction” by international terrorist organizations 
remains a potential threat, limited or individual attacks using common foodborne bacterial or 
zoonotic agents (to contaminate food systems or the public at large) will be more likely (Bledsoe 
& Rasco, 2002). This observation was echoed by the former Secretary of Health and Human 
Services Tommy Thompson. In his resignation speech, Mr. Thompson declared, “I, for the life of 
me, cannot understand why the terrorists have not, you know, attacked our food supply because 
it is so easy to do” (Branigin et al., 2004). 
Summary 
Food security threats by terrorists have been predicted to be probable in the future and are 
easy to carry out. Motivations of food terrorists are varied but the final result is the intentional 
harm of humans using food as the delivery medium for biological, physical, or chemical 
contaminants.  Retail foodservice is an indispensable part of life in America, where half of the 
food sold is prepared by others. The economic impact of the foodservice industry is enormous, 
and most hospitality organizations, including private clubs, have some sort of foodservice and 
beverage service offered to their customers. Employee turnover in foodservice operations can 
exceed 300% and employee background checks are not always conducted. Seasonal foodservice 
employees in club operations mean that workers come and go year-round. Clubs are exclusive 
and cater to the wealthy, making them a potential target for those who want to attack the wealthy 
and powerful using food terrorism. Many pathogens and easily obtainable chemicals exist that 
could be used for a terrorist attack. Although significant bioterrorism research has been done 
regarding the production and distribution of food, very little bioterrorism research has been 
conducted in retail foodservice and no research on bioterrorism has been conducted in private 
clubs. Many governmental agencies recommend creating a food defense management plan to 
counter the risk of bioterrorism. Previous research has shown that increased awareness of 
foodservice operators and implementing preventive practices to address bioterrorism can 
increase levels of food defense in foodservice operations. 
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Purpose and Research Questions 
The primary purpose of this study was to examine country club professionals’ importance 
perceptions of securing their foodservice operations against a food terrorism attack and the 
perceived preventative practices that could be implemented to counter such an attack. Gaps 
between importance perceptions and the frequency of perceived preventative practices were 
examined to determine if there was a relationship with club professionals’ concern about food 
terrorism and how often preventive practices were implemented in their clubs. Perceived self-
efficacy measures and perceived barriers were studied to assess if there was a relationship with 
club professionals’ motivation to develop a food defense management plan and the frequency to 
which preventive practices were implemented in private country clubs. Demographic 
characteristics were compared with importance perceptions and frequency of practices. 
Based upon the lack of research in private clubs regarding bioterrorism, the 
recommendations of past researchers and government reports to implement preventative 
practices within foodservice operations, the unique private and privileged nature of private clubs, 
and the ubiquitous nature of the foodservice industry for employees and customers alike, and the 
economic ramifications surrounding private clubs, foodservice, and terrorism, this study 
explored the following research questions and propositions related to food bioterrorism in private 
country clubs:  
Research Questions and Propositions 
The research questions guiding this dissertation were as follows: 
1. What are club professionals’ perceptions of the importance of facility security in their 
country clubs?  
2. What are club professionals’ perceptions of the importance of utility security in their 
country clubs?  
3. What are club professionals’ perceptions of the importance of employee management in 
their country clubs?  
4. What are club professionals’ perceptions of the importance of communication in their 
country clubs?  
5. What are club professionals’ perceptions of the importance of food handling in their 
country clubs?  
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6. What are club professionals’ perceptions of the importance of chemical use and storage 
in their country clubs?  
7. To what frequency are the items mentioned in research questions 1 – 6 practiced in these 
country clubs as reported by the club professionals?  
8. To what frequency are the items mentioned in research questions 1 – 6 practiced in these 
country clubs as directly observed through an onsite visit in these country clubs?  
9. Are club managers’ levels of concern about biosecurity in their operations affected by the 
gaps between importance and the frequency of practice in research questions 1 – 6?    
10. What level of perceived self efficacy do club professionals possess to develop a 
management plan related to food defense? 
11. What level of perceived self efficacy do club professionals possess to implement 
preventive practices to deal with items mentioned in research questions 1 – 6? 
12. What perceived barriers exist that could prevent club professionals from developing a 
food defense management plan?  
13. What perceived barriers exist that could prevent club professionals from implementing 
preventive practices to deal with items mentioned in research questions 1 – 6? 
14. What differences among demographic characteristics exist in comparison with 
importance and frequency of practices? 
The gap between the perception of the importance of preventive practices and actual 
practice frequency was evaluated to see if risk perception was affected by the size of the gap. By 
using the size of gaps, the study elucidates which preventive measures should receive more 
attention in training materials or bulletins. When club professionals are more concerned about 
food bioterrorism and biosecurity, a smaller gap between importance perception and practice 
frequency should occur because club professionals are then more likely to perform the 
preventive practices frequently.  
 Club professionals’ self-efficacy is their belief in their own capabilities to plan and 
implement necessary actions to effectively deal with events in their country club. Club 
professionals with higher levels of perceived self-efficacy should be more motivated to develop 
food defense management plans and should implement preventative practices more often in their 
country clubs than club professionals with lower levels of perceived self-efficacy. Conversely, 
club professionals with higher numbers of perceived barriers should be less motivated to develop 
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food defense management plans and should implement preventive practices less frequently in 
their country clubs than club professionals with lower numbers of perceived barriers. 
Based on this reasoning, six research propositions were investigated: 
Proposition 1: Club professionals with smaller gaps between importance perception and 
practice frequency are more concerned about food terrorism and biosecurity than 
operators with larger gaps. 
Proposition 2: Club professionals with smaller gaps between importance perception and 
practice frequency implement preventive practices more frequently than operators with 
larger gaps. 
Proposition 3: Club professionals with higher levels of perceived self-efficacy are more 
motivated to develop a food defense management plan in their country clubs than club 
professionals with lower levels of perceived self-efficacy.  
Proposition 4: Club professionals with higher levels of perceived self-efficacy implement 
preventive practices more frequently than club professionals with lower levels of 
perceived self-efficacy. 
Proposition 5: Club professionals with higher numbers of perceived barriers are less 
motivated to develop a food defense management plan in their country clubs than club 
professionals with lower numbers of perceived barriers. 
Proposition 6: Club professionals with higher numbers of perceived barriers implement 
preventive practices less frequently than club professionals with lower numbers of 
perceived barriers. 
Methodology 
Population and Sample 
The population for this study was all country club professionals listed in the Club 
Manager’s Association of America (CMAA) member directory and whose operation was located 
in the United States. Membership information in the CMAA directory was segmented by type of 
clubs, including country clubs. The study population for this study was CMAA members 
employed in private country clubs. As of February 2010, a total population of 3,924 club 
professionals was listed in the CMAA member directory, comprising every type of club segment 
within CMAA. The country club segment of the CMAA member directory listed 2,354 club 
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professionals or approximately 60% of the total CMAA membership. Following pilot testing, 
2,119 CMAA country club professionals remained as the sample used for the study’s main data 
collection. According to Dillman, a population size of 2,119 with a +/- 5.68% sampling error for 
a 50/50 split requires a sample size of 261 usable responses (Dillman, 2000).  
Overview of Data Collection 
Figure 2 illustrates the research process used for this operational research study. 
Measurement items were initially developed from two different sources: previous literature and 
focus groups with academic and industry experts. Pilot testing of the survey instrument 
determined what items needed modification or clarification before final data collection. Data 
analysis was completed to answer the research questions. 
 
Research Compliance 
The research protocol was reviewed and approved by Kansas State University 
Institutional Review Board as documented by the approval letter in Appendix A. Permission was 
obtained to adapt survey instruments used in prior biosecurity research and is documented in 
Appendix B.  
Elicitation Study 
The purpose of an elicitation study (or focus group) is to gather qualitative data from a 
group of people regarding a particular idea, concept, product, or service (Wikipedia, 2009a). 
Interactive group discussions can help to stimulate participant’s memories, experiences, and 
ideas which can generate valuable insights into the items being discussed. Individuals familiar 
with foodservice, bioterrorism, and private club management participated in an elicitation study 
which helped to develop the study’s survey and field study instruments. Participants included 
Kansas State University faculty and graduate students from the Department of Hospitality 
Management and Dietetics, faculty from the Kansas State University Food Science Institute, a 
country club manager, and three chefs with extensive experience in foodservice operations 
(including country clubs). Focus group participants were given an overview of food security, 
food bioterrorism, and country club operations and were informed of the purpose of the study. 
Survey instruments adapted from prior food defense research surveys were presented to the focus 
group for critique and constructive feedback. Revisions were made to the survey instrument 
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based upon the focus group responses. This included identifying terminology familiar to club 
managers (e.g. using “security” instead of “biosecurity” when describing food defense practices). 
Other revisions included removing questions that pertained solely to school foodservice and 
aligning questions to measure operating practices and procedures within club operations. A pre-
pilot version of the survey was sent to focus group participants and other individuals (see pilot 
study and refinement) for final inspection before the survey was administered for pilot testing.  
Development of Survey Instrument 
The questionnaire was adapted from existing surveys that were used to conduct prior 
research in food defense and bioterrorism in school foodservice and healthcare. Because these 
existing surveys were tested for validity and reliability before data collection, they served as a 
strong model for the survey instrument (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007a; Yoon & Shanklin, 2007b; 
Yoon & Shanklin, 2007c). The survey instrument was modified using feedback from the 
elicitation study and the pre-pilot testing by elicitation study members and other individuals. The 
modified survey instrument measured items regarding club professionals’ perceptions of 
bioterrorism and preventative practices used in their respective clubs to counter bioterrorism.  
Factors regarding club managers’ opinions toward food biosecurity explored in the study 
included: concern of club managers regarding biosecurity, perceived self-efficacy to 
implementing food defense practices, and perceived barriers to implementing food defense 
practices. Factors regarding club managers’ importance perceptions and perceived frequency of 
practices performed in their clubs related to chemical use and storage, employee management, 
facility security, food handling, and utility security. Demographic variables about the country 
clubs included: number of club memberships, number of foodservice employees, number of 
employees working per shift, and individuals responsible for implementing and monitoring food 
security. Demographic variables of club professionals completing survey measure included: 
position title, length of employment in current position, years employed in foodservice and club 
management, age, education level, sex, and club foodservice operating budget. The survey 
instrument administered is presented in Appendix C.  
Pilot Study & Refinement 
 Permission was obtained from CMAA to use their member directory to contact club 
professionals associated with country clubs. E-mail invitations were sent to 235 randomly 
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selected CMAA country club professionals explaining the purpose of the study and encouraging 
them to click on a link to an online survey. Those who were invited to participate in the pilot 
study were not used again in the following main survey data collection.  
The pilot test yielded 10 returned or undeliverable survey invitations and 25 responses (5 
of which were unusable), for a total of 20 usable responses (an 8.51% response rate). A 
reliability check was performed upon the collected data using Cronbach’s alpha (α = .94), which 
satisfied the desired value of α ≥ .90 for reliability (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Based on the 
results of the pilot study, the survey was revised and a final version of the questionnaire was 
developed and distributed to the remaining 2,119 club professionals in the country club sample.  
Data Collection 
Surveys were administered online via a dedicated e-mail link to each respondent linking 
to the Kansas State University survey system. No identifying information was asked and survey 
respondents were kept completely anonymous. Some researchers report that persons who 
respond to surveys answer questions differently than those who do not (Dillman, 2000). Efforts 
were taken to minimize survey non-response bias through effective online design and follow-up 
reminders. Because online surveys typically have low response rates, support from CMAA was 
requested and granted for use in the contact e-mail to respondents in an attempt to increase the 
participation rate. In addition, a chance to win a gift card redeemable for purchases in CMAA’s 
bookstore was offered to club professionals as an incentive to complete the online surveys. 
Multiple attempts were made to contact non-respondents in order to delimit non-response bias. 
Two reminder e-mails were sent to members who had not responded to the survey (for a total of 
three e-mails), after which the survey offering was closed.  
Data Analysis 
Survey data were analyzed with the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 
version 17.0 (SPSS Inc., 2008). Significance levels were set at p ≤ .05 for all data unless 
otherwise noted. Cronbach’s alpha was used to assess the reliability of scale items in the survey 
questionnaire. Statistical processes applied to data included independent t-tests, one-way analysis 
of variance (ANOVA), chi-square testing, and cluster analysis.  
Responses of club managers’ opinions about food security were sorted into three groups: 
concern (8 items), self-efficacy (7 items), and barriers (4 items). Three independent items asked 
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club managers’ opinions of the state of their clubs’ security (1 item), reasons for implementing 
food security management plans (2 items), and are detailed in the study’s discussion. Each 
opinion item was rated on a 1–5 Likert-type scale with 1 being “strongly disagree”, 2 being 
“somewhat disagree”, 3 being “neutral”, 4 being “somewhat agree”, and 5 being “strongly 
agree”.  
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed to assess the validity of importance 
perception factors used in previous surveys to address the study’s propositions.  Following CFA, 
the two questions comprising the communications factor from a previous study were merged into 
employee management and facility security. A total of five importance perception factors were 
confirmed, including chemical use and storage (5 items), employee management (7 items), 
facility security (8 items), food handling (10 items), and utility security (5 items) for a total of 35 
items.  
Each importance perception item corresponded with a practice frequency item for use in 
gap analysis. For this reason, practice frequency items were sorted exactly as importance 
perception items were, into the same five factors (chemical use and storage, employee 
management, facility security, food handling, and utility security).  
Corresponding items used in gap analysis consisted of two parts, a statement (importance 
perception item) and a question (practice frequency item) that were worded very similarly. The 
statement asked the club manager how important a food security practice was and the question 
asked how often they performed this practice in their club. Each importance perception statement 
(e.g. “storing hazardous chemicals in a locked storage area”) was rated on a 1–5 Likert-type 
scale with 1 being “very unimportant”, 2 being “somewhat important”, 3 being “neutral”, 4 being 
“somewhat important”, and 5 being “very important”. Each corresponding practice frequency 
question (e.g. “our country club stores hazardous chemicals in a locked storage area”) was rated 
on a 1–5 Likert-type scale with 1 being “never”, 2 being “seldom”, 3 being “some of the time”, 4 
being “most of the time”, and 5 being “all the time”. The gaps for all 35 corresponding food 
security practices were calculated by subtracting the practice frequency score from the 
importance score. The mean gaps were calculated for statements/questions in each factor and 
averaged.  
Cluster analysis using Ward’s method with squared Euclidean distance was used to group 
respondents into high and low groups for self-efficacy, barriers and width of gap scores between  
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Table 4: Demographic Characteristics of Club Managers Responding to Food Biosecurity Survey (n=261)  
Characteristic n %a Characteristic n %a
Age   Number of years employed in current position   
     Less than 20 years old 0 0      0 - 5 years 145 55.6
     20 – 29 years 16 6.1      6 - 10 years 71 27.2
     30 – 39 years 40      15.3      11 - 15 years 18 6.9
     40 – 49 years  88 33.7      16 - 20 years 11 4.2
     50 – 59 years 89 34.1      21 - 25 years 6 2.3
     60 years or older 20 7.7      26 - 30 years 4 1.5
           Greater than 30 years 4 1.5
Sex  
     Male 227 87.0 Number of years employed in foodservice 
     Female 31 11.9      0 - 5 years 12 4.6
      6 - 10 years 19 7.3
Education      11 - 15 years 26 10.0
     High school 7 2.7      16 - 20 years 41 15.7
     Some college 48 18.4      21 - 25 years 45 17.2
     Associate, 2-year, or Vocational 49 18.8      26 - 30 years 58 22.2
     Bachelor’s degree 134 51.3      Greater than 30 years 58 22.2
     Graduate degree (Masters, Doctoral) 21 8.0  
Number of years employed in club mgmt 
  
      0 - 5 years 30 11.5
Annual foodservice operating budget      6 - 10 years 43 16.5
    Less than $2,000,000 per year 129 49.4      11 - 15 years 53 20.3
     $2,000,000 - $5,000,000 per year 109 41.8      16 - 20 years 46 17.6
     Greater than $5,000,000 per year 13 5.0      21 - 25 years 48 18.4
     Don't know or prefer not to respond 8 3.1      26 - 30 years 21 8.0
        Greater than 30 years 18 6.9
  
aResponses may not equal 100% due to non-response to a question. 
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Table 5: Comparison of Full-time/Part-time/Temporary Foodservice Employees  in Country Clubs Whose Managers 
Responded to Food Security Surveya (n=261) 
 
Number of employees 
 
 
Full-time Part-time Temporary 
0 – 10 employees 67 (25.7%) 88 (33.7%) 147 (56.3%) 
11 – 25 employees 92 (35.3%) 101 (38.7%) 63 (24.1%) 
26 – 50 employees 73 (28.0%) 50 (19.2%) 34 (13.0%) 
51 – 75 employees 16 (6.1%) 13 (5.0%) 7 (2.7%) 
76 – 100 employees 5 (1.9%) 4 (1.5%) 3 (1.2%) 
101 – 125 employees 3 (1.1%) 2 (0.8%) 0 (0.0%) 
126 – 150 employees 3 (1.1%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
No Response 2 (0.8%) 3 (1.1%) 7 (2.7%) 
 
a Question(s) asked of respondents: “How many full-time/part-time/temporary foodservice employees are on your payroll?” 
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importance perceptions and practice frequencies. Independent samples t-tests or one-way 
ANOVA were used to detect significant differences between groups. Levene's Test for Equality 
of Variances was conducted to see if the groups had approximately equal variance on the 
dependent variables used to test research propositions. Tukey's HSD Post Hoc Test was 
conducted for significant ANOVA values to identify which means were significantly different 
from one another. 
Independent variables used to answer research questions, test propositions, and examine 
demographic characteristics included gap scores, self-efficacy, barriers, number of club 
members, status of crisis management  plan in club, and club operating budget. Dependent 
variables used in the study included concern, practice frequency, intent to implement food 
security management plan, and importance perceptions.   
Results 
Response Rate 
From the 2,119 CMAA country club members invited to complete the survey, a total of 
392 people responded to the survey invitations. Of these 392 responses, 261 were usable, for a 
response rate of 12.32%. Only 22 e-mails (out of 2,119 sent) were returned as undeliverable. A 
reliability check was performed upon the collected data using Cronbach’s alpha (α = .95), which 
satisfied the desired value of α ≥ .90 for reliability (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). 
Demographics 
Demographic characteristics of club professionals responding to the survey and their 
respective club operations are detailed in Table 4. Of the 261 respondents, 87% were male and 
51.3% held bachelor’s degrees. Ages ranged from 22 years to 68 years of age. The majority of 
respondents were between 40 – 59 years of age (67.8%). The majority of respondents’ reported 
position titles were “Club Manager” (64%), “Clubhouse Manager” (12.3%), and “Food and 
Beverage Director” (6.5%). Other titles included Assistant General Manager (5.7%) and 
Executive Chef (3.8%). All respondents occupied a managerial position in the clubs where they 
were employed, thus satisfying the requirement of being a club professional. Over half of 
respondents (55.6%) had been employed in their current position for 5 years or less. However, 
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50.9% of club professionals indicated they had worked in club management for over 20 years. In 
addition, 61.6% of respondents stated that they had over 20 years of experience in foodservice. 
An annual foodservice operating budget of under $2,000,000 was reported for 49.4% of 
clubs, with 41.8% reporting an annual budget of $2,000,000 - $5,000,000 and 5.0% of clubs 
reporting an annual budget of over $5,000,000. A one-way ANOVA was used to test for 
differences in practice frequencies among annual budgets. Practice frequencies differed 
significantly across the three budget size ranges, F (3, 255) = 3.79, p = .011. Tukey post-hoc 
comparisons of the three groups indicate that clubs with operating budgets greater than 
$5,000,000 annually (M = 4.46, 95% CI [4.22, 4.70]) performed preventive practices 
significantly more frequently than clubs with budgets of less than $2,000,000 annually (M = 
3.88, 95% CI [3.78, 3.97]), p = .005. Clubs with operating budgets greater than $5,000,000 
annually (M = 4.46, 95% CI [4.22, 4.70]) performed preventive practices more frequently than 
clubs with budgets of $2,000,000 - $5,000,000 annually (M = 3.96, 95% CI [3.83, 4.08]), p = 
.022. Comparisons between clubs with budgets of $2,000,000 - $5,000,000 annually (M = 3.96, 
95% CI [3.83, 4.08]) and clubs with budgets of less than $2,000,000 annually (M = 3.88, 95% CI 
[3.78, 3.97]) were not statistically significant at p ≤ .05. Respondents were asked, “How many 
total club memberships does your club have?” This referred to the person, family, or business 
holding the membership and not the total number of people that each membership covered. One 
third of all clubs (34.1%) had 501 – 750 memberships; 29.1% of clubs reported 251 – 500 
memberships. Larger clubs (30.2%) reported memberships from 751 – 5,000 members, while 
only 5.4% of clubs had 250 memberships or less. One-way ANOVA was conducted to determine 
if there were differences between size of clubs (i.e. number of memberships) in relation to 
practice frequency. No significant differences were found. 
Demographic questions regarding human resources focused upon number of workers 
(full-time, part-time, temporary, and average number working per shift) employed at each 
respondent’s respective country club. A total of 35.3% of clubs employed 11 – 25 full-time 
workers, followed by 26 – 50 full time employees (28%), and 0 – 10 full time employees 
(25.7%). The remaining 10.2% of clubs employed from 51 – 150 full time workers. 
Table 5 shows that 38.7% of clubs employed 11 – 25 part-time workers (as compared to 
35.3% for the same number/range of full-time employees). Clubs also employed more part-time 
workers at the 0 – 10 employee range (33.7%) than full-time employees (25.7%). The 51 – 125 
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employee range accounted for 7.3% of the part-time workers, which was at a lower level than the 
reported full-time workers (10.2%). Part-time workers in the 26 – 50 employee range (19.2%) 
were also lower than full-time numbers (28%). 
Respondents also were asked how many temporary foodservice employees were on their 
payroll during peak periods. The question requested the number of additional employees needed 
to help cover the summer season (June – August) and the traditional winter holiday season (mid-
November through New Year’s Eve), both busy time periods during annual club operations. 
Table 5 shows that over half of the clubs (56.3%) only hired 0 – 10 temporary employees. This 
percentage descended as the range of employees hired increased, suggesting that clubs with more 
employees need less temporary workers. 
Respondents were queried of the average number of foodservice employees working per 
shift in their club operations. Clubs employing up to 25 workers per shift accounted for 81.6% of 
the respondents. Only 12.6% of clubs hired 26 – 50 employees per shift and only 1.2% reported 
that they hired more than 50 workers per shift. Although 36.4% of clubs hired 0 – 10 employees 
per shift, the majority reported an average of 11 – 25 employees per shift (45.2%), reinforcing 
the importance of foodservice labor in club operations. 
No significant differences existed in managers’ length of employment in foodservice, 
length of employment in club management, or highest level of education completed when each 
was compared with concern, self-efficacy, barriers, importance perceptions, and practice 
frequencies. Additional tables are provided in Appendix F. 
Opinions 
Club managers’ opinions regarding food biosecurity were used to test propositions 1, 3, 
4, 5, and 6 (n = 261). Ratings for all opinion items are shown in Appendix F. 
Concern 
Club managers’ (n =  261) perceived level of concern regarding food biosecurity was 
used to test proposition 1. Aggregated ratings for eight opinion items indicated a higher than 
average (3.00) level of concern for food biosecurity (M = 3.77, SD = 1.16).  
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Table 6: Country Club Manager’s Importance Perceptions, Practice Frequencies and Gap Analysis Related to Food 
Biosecuritya  
 
 
 
 
 
Importance Perception a 
 
 
 
Practice Frequency b
 
 
 
Gap c 
 
 
Chemical Use and Storage 
 
4.52 ±0.89 4.35±0.94 0.17 
Utility Security 
 
4.38±0.86 3.89±1.28 0.49 
Employee Management 
 
4.28±0.89 3.90±1.19 0.38 
Facility Security 
 
4.26±0.90 3.68±1.23 0.58 
Food Handling  
 
4.20±1.04 3.98±1.22 0.22 
Overall Average 
 
4.33±0.92 3.96±1.17 0.37 
a Scale: 1= very unimportant to 5 = very important  
b Scale: 1 = never to 5 = all the time 
c Gap score = (Importance score – Practice score) 
(n=261) 
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Table 7: Comparison between Perceived Importance and Frequency of Food Security Practicesa 
 
Mean ± Standard Deviation 
Chemical Practices 
Perceived Importance 
(n=261) 
Practice Frequency 
(n=261) 
Training employees to use chemicals properly to prevent accidental food 
contamination and human exposure. 4.70±.078 4.36±0.86 
Obtaining Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) for hazardous chemicals 
from our suppliers. 4.59±0.87 4.59±0.79 
Making MSDS sheets readily available to foodservice staff who follow 
manufacturer’s instructions for storage and use of hazardous chemicals. 4.54±0.89 4.49±0.90 
Storing hazardous chemicals in a locked storage area. 4.48±0.93 4.23±1.02 
Maintaining accurate inventories of all foods and chemicals so we can 
detect and investigate unexplained additions to or withdrawals from 
stock. 
4.20±0.98 4.06±1.05 
Utility Security Practices  
Protecting computer data systems with passwords, network firewalls, 
and effective virus detection systems. 4.64±0.71 4.71±0.60 
Installing and using backflow prevention devices on all water supply 
equipment and beverage dispensers. 4.57±0.74 4.41±0.98 
Having procedures to follow if the management team suspects the 
airflow or water source has been contaminated with biological or other 
contaminants. 
4.26±0.90 3.22±1.42 
Securing outside access to all ice-making equipment to prevent 
unauthorized access. 4.23±0.90 3.57±1.29 
Securing outside access to all water supply equipment to prevent 
unauthorized access. 4.20±0.94 3.55±1.29 
Scale values range from Very unimportant (1) to Very important (5) for Perceived Importance Items and Never (1) to All the 
time (5) for Practice Frequency Items.  
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Table 7: Comparison between Perceived Importance and Frequency of Food Security Practices (ctd)a 
 
Mean ± Standard Deviation 
Employee Management Practices 
Perceived Importance 
(n=261) 
Practice Frequency 
(n=261) 
Maintaining a current contact list of local authorities such as the police 
and fire departments, who should be notified in case of a security 
incident and distributes the list to the foodservice staff. 
4.64±0.74 4.48±0.88 
Providing employee training on identifying packaging that is acceptable 
and not acceptable. 4.49±0.73 4.05±1.00 
Accounting for all keys, uniforms, and identification badges provided to 
current and former employees. 4.32±0.87 4.18±0.92 
Training employees about a food security management plan. 4.28±0.81 3.46±1.25 
Enforcing policies that define the personal items foodservice employees 
may and may not have in the food production or service areas. 4.25±0.82 3.86±1.11 
Requiring all job candidates to pass background security checks beyond 
reference checks prior to hiring. 4.01±1.05 3.61±1.46 
Using a system that ensures clear identification of foodservice personnel 
and their specific functions within the country club. 3.95±0.97 3.67±1.27 
Facility Security Practices  
 Securing all outside refrigeration / storage units at all times. 4.52±0.81 4.15±1.10 
Controlling, monitoring, and securing all access points into all storage 
areas. 4.46±0.77 3.95±1.06 
Having procedures in place for monitoring foodservice equipment to 
prevent someone from intentionally contaminating food during 
preparation. 
4.37±0.89 3.72±1.19 
Controlling, monitoring, and securing all access points into the 
foodservice facility. 4.34±0.88 3.78±1.15 
Scale values range from Very unimportant (1) to Very important (5) for Perceived Importance Items and Never (1) to All the 
time (5) for Practice Frequency Items. 
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Table 7: Comparison between Perceived Importance and Frequency of Food Security Practices (ctd)a 
 
Mean ± Standard Deviation 
Facility Security Practices (ctd) 
Perceived Importance 
(n=261) 
Practice Frequency 
(n=261) 
Controlling access of all visitors and unauthorized persons to food 
production areas. 4.32±0.85 3.80±1.15 
Securing all doors, windows, roof openings, and vent openings at all 
times. 4.09±0.95 3.63±1.23 
Inspecting security in all storage facilities regularly and maintaining a 
log of the results. 4.09±0.89 3.33±1.36 
Meeting with local vendors to increase awareness about food security 
issues. 3.88±0.99 3.10±1.32 
Food Handling Practices  
Purchasing all food ingredients, food products, packaging materials, and 
other foodservice supplies only from reputable suppliers who have 
appropriate permits, licenses, or insurance. 
4.71±0.81 4.82±0.45 
Storing all leftover food items in tightly sealed, clearly labeled, and 
dated containers. 4.60±0.85 4.61±0.69 
Inspecting ingredient packages prior to use for evidence of tampering. 
(Examples of evidence are a broken seal or discoloration of food inside 
package). 
4.58±0.82 4.48±0.80 
Having procedures for safe handling and disposal of contaminated 
products. 4.55±0.84 4.10±1.03 
Assigning an authorized person to verify and receive shipments both 
during business hours and after business hours. 4.35±0.93 4.22±0.93 
Scale values range from Very unimportant (1) to Very important (5) for Perceived Importance Items and Never (1) to All the 
time (5) for Practice Frequency Items.  
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Table 7: Comparison between Perceived Importance and Frequency of Food Security Practices (ctd)a 
 
Mean ± Standard Deviation 
Food Handling Practices (ctd) 
Perceived Importance 
(n=261) 
Practice Frequency 
(n=261) 
Verifying deliveries against a roster of scheduled deliveries and 
approved suppliers. 4.10±1.04 3.68±1.30 
Requiring all food suppliers to use sealed packaging on foods delivered 
to our facility. 4.08±1.01 4.02±0.98 
Requiring suppliers to provide advance notification for off-hour 
deliveries. 4.08±1.06 3.84±1.22 
Using sealed packaging for food sent to satellite foodservice areas in our 
country club. 3.76±1.07 3.82±1.08 
Having a policy that all delivery trucks on the premises be locked when 
not being loaded or unloaded. 3.17±1.07 2.22±1.26 
Scale values range from Very unimportant (1) to Very important (5) for Perceived Importance Items and Never (1) to All the 
time (5) for Practice Frequency Items.  
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Self-Efficacy 
Club managers’ perceived level of self-efficacy regarding food biosecurity was used to 
test propositions 3 and 4. Aggregated ratings for seven opinion items associated with self-
efficacy indicated a higher than average (3.00) level of self-efficacy for food biosecurity (M = 
3.55, SD = 1.04). Of 261 respondents, 87 were placed in a low self-efficacy group (M = 2.78, SD 
= 0.91) and 174 were placed in a high self-efficacy group (M = 3.92, SD = 0.88). 
Barriers 
Club managers’ perceived level of barriers regarding food biosecurity was used to test 
propositions 5 and 6. Aggregated ratings for four opinion items indicated a lower than average 
(3.00) level of barriers for food biosecurity (M = 2.40, SD = 1.01). Of 261 respondents, 186 were 
placed in the low barriers group (M = 2.03, SD = 0.82) and 75 were placed in the high barriers 
group (M = 3.33, SD = 0.81). 
Importance perceptions 
Club managers’ perceived level of importance regarding food biosecurity was used to test 
propositions 1 and 2 (n = 261). Aggregated ratings for 35 items comprising five importance 
factors are shown in Table 6. Scores for all 35 items are shown in Table 7. Club managers 
reported high overall levels of importance for food biosecurity (M = 4.33, SD = 0.92). Chemical 
use and storage rated highest in importance (M = 4.52, SD = 0.89), followed by utility security 
(M = 4.38, SD = 0.86). Food handling rated lowest in importance (M = 4.20, SD = 1.04), with 
facility security rating slightly higher (M = 4.26, SD = 0.90). All importance perceptions were 
rated between “4 – somewhat important” and “5 – very important”, which indicated that club 
managers took the importance of these practices seriously.    
Practice Frequencies 
Club managers’ perceived level of practice frequency regarding food biosecurity was 
used to test propositions 2, 4, and 6 (n = 261). Aggregated ratings for 35 items comprising five 
practice frequency factors are shown in Table 6. Ratings for all 35 items are shown in Table 7. 
Overall, club managers reported moderately high levels of practice frequency for food 
biosecurity (M = 3.96, SD = 1.17). Club managers reported mid to high levels of practice 
frequency for food biosecurity (M = 3.96, SD = 1.17). Chemical use and storage rated highest in 
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practice frequency (M = 4.35, SD = 0.94), followed by food handling (M = 3.98, SD = 1.22). 
Facility security rated lowest in practice frequency (M = 3.68, SD = 1.23), with utility security 
rating slightly higher (M = 3.89, SD = 1.28). All importance perceptions were rated between “3- 
neither unimportant nor important” and “5 – very important”, which indicated that club managers 
took the importance of these practices somewhat seriously. 
Gap Scores 
Gaps scores used to test propositions 1 and 2 were calculated by subtracting aggregated 
practice frequency factor scores from corresponding aggregated importance perception factor 
scores. Specific details regarding mean gap scores for each factor are shown in Table 6. All 
factors’ importance perception scores were greater than practice frequency scores, and the 
average gap score was positive (M = 0.37). Chemical use and storage had the smallest gap 
between importance perception and practice frequency (0.17), followed by food handling (0.22). 
Facility security had the largest gap (0.58), with utility security rating slightly smaller (0.49). 
Crisis Management and Food Security 
Respondents were asked about responsibilities for crisis management in their clubs. 
Specifically, they were asked “Does your country club have a crisis management plan?” Only 
20.7% of club managers indicated that their club had a formal crisis management plan that is 
under the stewardship of a club employee. Approximately 45% reported having an informal 
crisis management plan and 30.3% do not have one at all. Crisis management plans can be 
adapted to include food security items and having an existing one that is formalized in place is a 
prerequisite to implementing an effective food security management plan. A one-way ANOVA 
was used to assess if there were differences in importance practices among reported levels of 
crisis management plans in clubs. Importance practices differed significantly across the 
respondents, F (3, 255) = 3.28, p = .022. Tukey post-hoc comparisons of the three groups 
indicated that respondents whose club had a formal crisis management plan in place (M = 4.50, 
95% CI [4.36, 4.64]) rated importance perceptions significantly higher than those respondents 
who did not have a formal crisis management plan (M = 4.19, 95% CI [4.04, 4.33]), p = .016. 
Comparisons between clubs who had an informal crisis management plan (M = 4.30, 95% CI 
[4.20, 4.40]) and the other two groups were not statistically significant at p ≤ .05.  
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Table 8: Comparison of Club Managers’ Perceived Self-Efficacy and Their Intention to Implement a Food Security 
Management Plana 
 
Response 
 
 
High Self-Efficacy b Low Self-Efficacy c 
 
 
No, and we do not plan to develop  
one in the near future 
 
54 (33.3%) 46 (57.5%)  
Yes, but we have not determined 
a specific timeline 
 
79 (82.1%) 29 (93.8%)  
Yes, we plan to develop one within  
the next 12 months 
 
8 (87.0%) 0 (93.8%)  
Yes, we plan to develop one within  
the next 6 months 
 
6 (90.7%) 3 (98.0%)  
Yes, we plan to develop one within  
the next 3 months 
 
15 (100.0%) 2 (100.0%)  
Total 162  80   
 
 
a Question(s) asked of respondents (used to test Proposition 3 of the survey):  
“Does your country club plan to develop and implement a food security management plan?” 
b c Values reported in cumulative percentages. 
χ2(4, N = 242) = 16.88, p = .002 
 
 
 101
Table 9: Comparison of Club Managers’ Perceived Barriers and Their Intention to Implement a Food Security Management 
Plana 
 
Response 
 
 
High Barriers b Low Barriers c 
 
No, and we do not plan to develop  
one in the near future 
 
41 (59.4%) 59 (34.1%)  
Yes, but we have not determined 
a specific timeline 
 
22 (31.9%) 86 (49.7%)  
Yes, we plan to develop one within  
the next 12 months 
 
1 (1.4%) 7 (4.0%)  
Yes, we plan to develop one within  
the next 6 months 
 
3 (4.3%) 6 (3.5%)  
Yes, we plan to develop one within  
the next 3 months 
 
2 (2.9%) 15 (8.7%)  
Total 69  173   
 
 
a Question(s) asked of respondents (used to test Proposition 5 of the survey):  
 “Does your country club plan to develop and implement a food security management plan?” 
b c Values reported in cumulative percentages. 
χ2(4, N = 242) = 14.61, p = .006 
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Over half of club professionals (53.5%) somewhat agreed (25.8%) or strongly 
agreed (27.7%) with the statement “our country club is well-secured against any type of 
food hazard/threat”. Of the remaining club professionals, 21.9% were neutral, 16.2% 
somewhat disagreed and 8.5% disagreed.  
Club professionals were asked “if the board of directors of my country club 
suggests implementing a food security management plan, then my country club will 
develop one.” The majority (83.4%) either somewhat agreed (33.8%) or strongly agreed 
(49.6%); this result provides insight on the importance of engaging the board of directors 
to convince them of the importance of implementing food security management plans in 
country clubs. In comparison, club managers were asked the same question but instead 
with CMAA as the entity suggesting the food security management plan. In this instance, 
only 28.4% agreed, with 44.6% neutral and 26.8% disagreeing. This suggests that the 
motivation to implement a food security management plan would less likely come from 
an external organization (such as CMAA), and more likely from internal management 
and stakeholders in the club (i.e. board of directors).   
Club professionals were asked, “Does your country club have one or more 
employee(s) whose responsibility is implementing and monitoring food security?” Of the 
261 respondents, almost two-thirds of them (63.6%) indicated that they did. Those that 
answered “yes” were asked to identify who was responsible for implementing and 
monitoring food security. Multiple responses were allowed in case more than one person 
was responsible in the club. The Executive Chef was identified as the primary individual 
in charge of monitoring food security (34.7%), followed by the General Manager 
(15.9%), and the Sous Chef (15.7%). The Clubhouse Manager (13.8%) and the Food and 
Beverage Director (13.4%) were also identified to be responsible for food security. This 
suggests that perhaps food security is a team effort. 
Club professionals were finally asked if they planned to develop and implement a 
food security management plan. Many respondents (38.7%) indicated that they were not 
planning to implement one. Of those that responded “yes”, only 15.5% stated that they 
had any sort of deadline for completing a food security management plan, while the 
majority (41.4%) of respondents indicated “yes”, but did not have a specific timeline. 
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Proposition testing 
Gap Analyses 
Proposition 1 (club professionals with smaller gaps [M = 3.78, SD = 0.61] 
between importance perception and practice frequency are more concerned about food 
terrorism and biosecurity than operators with larger gaps [M = 3.75, SD = 0.61]) was not 
supported. T-test results were not significant (t = .29, p = .770). 
 
Proposition 2 (club professionals with smaller gaps [M = 4.16, SD = 0.52] 
between importance perception and practice frequency implement preventive practices 
more frequently than operators with larger gaps [M = 3.50, SD = 0.53]) was supported. T-
test results were significant (t = 9.61, p = .000). 
Self-Efficacy 
Proposition 3 (club professionals with higher levels of perceived self-efficacy are 
more motivated to develop a food defense management plan in their country clubs than 
club professionals with lower levels of perceived self-efficacy) was supported. χ2 (4, N = 
242) = 16.88, p = .002. See Table 8 for specific results. 
 
Proposition 4 (club professionals with higher levels of perceived self-efficacy [M 
= 3.95, SD = 0.75] implement preventive practices more frequently than club 
professionals with lower levels of perceived self-efficacy [M = 3.59, SD = 0.64]) was 
supported. T-test results were significant (t = 3.82, p = .000). 
Barriers 
Proposition 5 (club professionals with higher numbers of perceived barriers are 
less motivated to develop a food defense management plan in their country clubs than 
club professionals with lower numbers of perceived barriers) was supported. χ2(4, N = 
242) = 14.61, p = .006. See Table 9 for specific results. 
 
Proposition 6 (club professionals with higher numbers of perceived barriers [M = 
3.57, SD = 0.69] implement preventive practices less frequently than club professionals 
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with lower numbers of perceived barriers [M = 3.93, SD = 0.73]) was supported. T-test 
results were significant (t = 3.70, p = .000). 
Discussion  
The findings of this study revealed that club managers with smaller gaps between 
importance and practice frequency were not significantly more concerned about food 
terrorism than club managers with larger gaps. Club managers with smaller perceived 
gaps and clubs with larger operating budgets implemented preventive practices more 
frequently. In addition, club managers with higher levels of self-efficacy were 
significantly more motivated to develop a food defense management plan and performed 
preventive practices more frequently than club managers with lower levels of perceived 
self efficacy. This supported the proposition that club managers who think they are 
capable of implementing a food defense management plan will act upon their self-
determination and do what is necessary to make their clubs secure. Club managers who 
had higher numbers of perceived barriers were significantly less motivated to develop a 
food defense management plan and performed preventive practices less frequently than 
club managers with lower numbers of perceived barriers. This supported the proposition 
that club managers who are overwhelmed with obstacles will be less motivated to protect 
their club against a possible bioterrorist act.  
Data were compared with results from Yoon and Shanklin’s food bioterrorism 
research conducted in U.S. school and hospital foodservice operations (Yoon & Shanklin, 
2007a; Yoon & Shanklin, 2007b; Yoon & Shanklin, 2007c). Chemical use and storage 
also had the smallest gaps in both studies. This finding suggests that foodservice 
operators in school, hospital, and country club operations share similar views that 
chemicals are important potential dangers and should be monitored closely. Food 
handling, which was rated as the second highest most frequently implemented practice in 
schools and hospitals shared the same ranking as private clubs. Respondents in both 
studies also rated facility security and utility security as the two areas with the largest 
gaps between importance and practice frequency. This may show that schools, hospitals, 
and country clubs need to take steps to better secure outside access to their building and 
the access points to utility controls. Of particular interest are the comparisons of gap size 
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between the two studies. Both studies shared the same gap rankings, with chemical use 
and storage having the smallest gap, followed by (in increasing gap size) food handling, 
employee management, utility security, and facility security with the largest gap. 
Comparisons of gap values and rankings are shown in Appendix F, Table 20. 
Club professionals were concerned about food biosecurity in their operations. The 
statement, “implementing preventive measures will decrease the risk of tampering or 
other malicious, criminal or terrorist actions in my country club” was rated the highest (M 
= 4.04, SD = 1.00) among concern items. This shows that club professionals agree that 
preventative practices can be implemented to counter the risk of food bioterrorism in 
their club.  
Employees were perceived to be capable of implementing a food defense 
management plan (M = 3.78, SD = 0.95), rating slightly higher than club professionals’ 
own view of their capabilities to do the same (M = 3.59, SD = 1.00). This suggests that 
club professionals’ belief in their employees self-efficacy matches or exceeds their own 
perceived capabilities to plan to counter food terrorism. However, respondents indicated 
that club professionals were not as capable of knowing how to exactly respond to a food 
security threat (M = 2.99, SD = 1.18). Perhaps this could be related to the availability of a 
crisis management plan. For example, 30.3% of clubs did not have a crisis management 
plan, and 44.4% only had informal crisis management plans. The lack of formal policies 
and procedures likely contributes to a lack of confidence or capability to correctly 
respond to crises such as a viable food security threat. 
Barriers to implementing a food security management plan included employee 
indifference (M = 2.55, SD = 1.04), cost (M = 2.40, SD = 0.93), time (M = 2.36, SD = 
1.00), and club resources (M = 2.27, SD = 1.05). It is interesting that respondents 
indicated employees were capable of implementing a food defense management plan. 
However, respondents indicated that they may be indifferent or apathetic towards actually 
doing so. Cost barriers could be addressed by implementing practices that give a large 
return for a modest investment. These could include installing locks on exterior doors and 
securing food and chemicals within an operation. 
Of particular interest is the importance of respondents’ opinions of the board of 
directors and CMAA in determining whether or not to implement a food defense 
 106
management plan. Respondents indicated they would be more likely to implement a food 
defense management plan when suggested by the board of directors (M = 4.24, SD = 
0.96) than by CMAA (M = 3.02, SD = 0.98). Thus, the support of the board of directors is 
crucial for those clubs serious about implementing food defense.   
Almost two-thirds of respondents (63.6%) indicated that they had one or more 
employees whose responsibility was implementing and monitoring food security in their 
club. Executive chefs were the most often identified employee (34.7%) responsible for 
implementing and monitoring food security. It would have been interesting to see if there 
were significant differences in responses between executive chefs and other club 
professionals. However, no executive chefs were identified among the respondents in this 
study. 
Food handling practices needing attention include keeping delivery vehicles 
locked when not being loaded or unloaded. This rated the lowest for both importance (M 
= 3.17, SD = 1.07) and practice frequency (M = 2.22, SD = 1.26). Although this can be a 
challenge to address, keeping delivery vehicles secured is beneficial for both the club and 
delivery personnel. Besides reducing the opportunity for intentional tampering of food 
supplies, securing delivery vehicles may help reduce the chance of accidental 
contamination of food product. Eliminating the opportunity for pilferage is another 
benefit that helps protect the trust and integrity between the club and its delivery 
professionals. 
It is recommended that club managers meet with local vendors to discuss the 
importance of food security issues and practices their clubs will be implementing. 
Meeting with local vendors to increase awareness about food security issues was the 
facility security practice identified as having both the lowest importance (M = 3.88, SD = 
0.99) and practice frequency (M = 3.10, SD = 1.32) ratings, thus suggesting an area that 
needs improvement. Although cost and value issues generally take priority during 
interactions with vendors, club professionals should take the time to convey their 
concerns about securing food within their facilities. Vendors interested in a club’s 
business should acknowledge club professionals’ food security concerns and become 
more knowledgeable about food security.   
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Securing access to ice-making equipment was identified as an important utility 
security practice (M = 4.23, SD = 0.90) performed infrequently (M = 3.57, SD = 1.29). A 
disgruntled employee or an outsider with uncontrolled access to an ice-maker could 
contaminate a club’s ice supply with chemicals already available onsite. This action 
would affect all who dine in a club, including employees. Therefore, it is recommended 
that ice-making equipment be secured from outside access and located in areas that are 
constantly monitored by club professionals. 
Overall, chemical practices rated highest for both importance (M = 4.52, SD = 
0.89) and practice frequency (M = 4.35, SD = 0.94). However, keeping chemicals in a 
locked storage area was the second lowest rated practice frequency (M = 4.23, SD = 
1.02). Securing chemicals should be a high priority of club professionals and needs to be 
taken seriously. Thus, access to chemicals must be controlled and only granted to 
authorized individuals. Additional benefits of securing chemicals are reducing accidental 
or improper use of chemicals and reducing pilferage.  
Limitations of the Study 
Perceived difficulties in data collection and analysis included:  
1.) Club professionals are typically very busy and it may have been time-prohibitive 
for them to have taken time to complete surveys or participate in lengthy 
interviews. 
2.) Online surveys typically have a low response rate. Efforts to increase participation 
were employed, but the sample size and response rate were less than expected. 
3.) Data collection can present challenges if the club professionals are too busy to 
complete surveys or schedule interviews. Following Memorial Day, persuading 
club managers to participate in data collection was challenging due to increased 
summer activities (pool, tennis, golf, etc.). 
4.) Surveys that are self-administered have limitations. Club professionals who chose 
not to complete the survey may or may not have had significant differences than 
club professionals who did choose to complete the survey. 
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5.) Although this study added to the existing body of literature on bioterrorism in 
foodservice operations, results cannot be generalized and applied to settings other 
than country clubs. 
6.) Due to the serious nature of the research topic, club professionals may have been 
resistant or reluctant to share weaknesses of their club’s readiness to protect their 
members from harm.  
7.) This study only focused upon country clubs whose managers were members of 
Club Managers Association of America (CMAA). It is unclear if there would be 
any significant differences with clubs whose managers were not CMAA 
members. 
8.) Observations and interviews took place primarily in the off-season. It is unknown 
if there would be any significant differences between seasonal changes in club 
activity. 
9.) The online survey system had limitations which increased the perceived length of 
the survey. This may have contributed to respondents quitting the survey early or 
not being willing to participate. 
Conclusions and Recommendations for Future Study 
There is a lack of research on food defense practices in retail foodservice, 
including private country clubs. This study was the first attempt to identify country club 
professionals’ opinions, importance perceptions, and operational practices pertaining to 
biosecurity. Recommendations for managers of country clubs are based on the results of 
the data collection.  
Club managers’ mean importance ratings for chemical use, employee 
management, facility security, food handling, and utility security were 4.20 or higher on a 
5 point Likert scale. This means that club managers thought that protecting their club 
against bioterrorism is worthwhile. No mean practice frequency ratings were lower than 
3.89 on a 5 point scale, which is still higher than average and is to be commended. These 
results suggest that on average, club managers are addressing some issues associated with 
food defense, either directly or indirectly.  
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It is interesting that there was no difference in concern between club professionals 
with smaller gaps than larger gaps. This suggests that like importance, club managers are 
concerned about protecting their clubs, even though they may not be putting their concern 
into practice. Exactly why that is so could be part of a future research study. 
Club managers’ self-efficacy affected their motivation to implement a food 
defense management plan and implement preventive practices. In other words, those 
individuals who believed in their own capabilities to take action were more likely to do 
so. Closely related with this observation were barriers. Club managers who felt that there 
were many barriers in their way were less motivated to put procedures in place to secure 
their clubs against bioterrorism.   
Future research recommendations are to study what factors could increase club 
professionals’ self-efficacy to make them more confident about addressing serious 
security issues such as food defense in their club. It would be interesting to see if the 
same preventive food security factors would have achieved higher scores if they were 
framed in the context of overall club security and controlling pilferage instead of food 
bioterrorism. 
Other club segments could also be explored to see if there were any differences 
between city clubs and country clubs and to gather initial data in segments other than 
country clubs. Public clubs could also be studied to determine if the threat of bioterrorism 
was perceived differently than in comparison to private clubs. 
Furthermore, researching what specific barriers need to be removed in order to 
secure one’s country club against food terrorism could be efficacious. As this topic has 
now been studied in hospitals, schools and country clubs, further research in independent 
or chain restaurants could also be useful. This study concludes with the observation that 
raising the importance and awareness of food security issues and implementing 
preventive practices can help a country club become more secure against food terrorism. 
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CHAPTER 5 - Manuscript 2 
FOOD DEFENSE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN PRIVATE COUNTRY 
CLUBS – A CASE ANALYSIS 
Abstract 
This field study investigated food security practices in private country clubs. 
Country clubs in the Midwestern United States whose managers were members of Club 
Managers Association of America (CMAA) comprised the convenience sample. 
Interviews with managers of country clubs and observations of actual operational 
practices were conducted to identify areas in country clubs that could be at potential risk 
of a bioterrorist attack. Most club managers indicated that their clubs were not at risk of a 
bioterrorist attack on their foodservice operations. Cost and lack of need were identified 
as barriers to implementing a food defense management plan. Club employees were 
identified as more likely to initiate a bioterrorism attack against country clubs than non-
employees. Background checks and good employment practices were perceived as 
effective in increasing food security in clubs. Most country clubs did not monitor visitors’ 
arrivals or departures and over half did not secure their chemicals. Recommendations to 
improve food security in country clubs included installing video surveillance, conducting 
background checks for all employees, securing access to chemicals, appointing a 
dedicated purchasing/receiving agent, issuing identification badges to all employees, and 
developing an overall disaster management plan that includes food defense. 
Introduction 
Food Security 
Safety and security is a major concern of country club managers, including the 
security of the food prepared for club members. The terrorism attacks on New York City 
and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, closely followed by anthrax attacks on 
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governmental officials and members of the media, forever changed public perceptions of 
safety and security in the United States (U.S.). Following these incidents, increased 
priority was placed upon the safety and security of the food supply (Rasco & Bledsoe, 
2005). Bioterrorism is defined as the “intentional use of biological or chemical agents for 
the purpose of causing harm” (United States Department of Agriculture Food and 
Nutrition Service, 2004). The USDA defines Food biosecurity as the “protection of food 
from bioterrorism” (United States Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service, 
2004). “Food biosecurity” is also referred to as “food security” (United States 
Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service, 2004). The National Restaurant 
Association (NRA) defines Food security (also known as food defense) as “preventing or 
eliminating the deliberate contamination of food” (National Restaurant Association 
Educational Foundation, 2003). In addition, it is important to note the differences 
between food safety and food security. Food safety pertains to the accidental 
contamination of food, while food security (or food defense) refers to intentionally 
contaminating food with the goal of harming people and disrupting society (National 
Restaurant Association Educational Foundation, 2003).  
The food supply chain, from production to consumption of food, is commonly 
called “farm to fork” or “farm to table” (Dictionary.com's 21st Century Lexicon, 2010). 
Threats to food security may occur in any portion of the food supply chain (National 
Restaurant Association Educational Foundation, 2003). For the purpose of this study, 
individuals or groups who intentionally contaminate or harm food products will be 
referred to as food terrorists, bioterrorists, or simply terrorists. A food terrorist is any 
individual who intentionally contaminates food including business competitors, people 
posing as customers, employees, vendors, and anyone with an agenda or cause (National 
Restaurant Association Educational Foundation, 2003). Bioterrorists may be motivated 
by attention/publicity, financial benefit, thrill-seeking, revenge/retribution, humor/prank, 
notoriety, creating chaos, obtaining a competitive advantage, and political/ideological 
differences (AIB International, 2006).  
Although no publically documented incidents of food terrorism have occurred in 
country clubs, former incidents of food bioterrorism demonstrate the necessity of food 
defense practices. The Rajneeshee religious cult contaminated an Oregon restaurant’s 
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salad bar with Salmonella Typhimurium in 1984, affecting an estimated 751 people. The 
cult’s motivation was to try to influence the outcome of a local election (AIB 
International, 2006). Ground beef purchased in a Michigan supermarket in 2003 was 
responsible for making 148 individuals ill. It was later discovered that 200 pounds of 
ground beef had been purposefully contaminated with insecticide by a disgruntled 
employee of the supermarket (CDC, 2003). Methomyl, a highly-toxic pesticide, was used 
to intentionally contaminate salsa served at a Mexican restaurant in Lenexa, Kansas in 
2009. Two employees of the restaurant were charged, both who were relatives of the 
restaurant owner. Revenge was identified as the motivational factor to poison the 
restaurant’s salsa that resulted in 48 customers becoming seriously ill (United States 
Department of Justice, 2010).    
Country club managers should be aware of the dangers posed by bioterrorism 
because they oversee the final step of the food supply chain, where food is prepared and 
served to members. Creating a food defense management plan that outlines preventive 
practices to be implemented within a foodservice operation should be the most effective 
method to decrease the threat of bioterrorism (Bledsoe & Rasco, 2002; United States 
Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service, 2004).  
Terrorism 
Historically, the roots of terrorism are believed to have started about 2,000 years 
ago. Religion was the primary driver of early terrorist activities, which originated in the 
first century A.D. and has continued somewhat into the modern day (Center for Defense 
Information, 2003).  “Terrorism” came from the French word “terrorisme” coined during 
the Reign of Terror (regime de la terreur) in the French Revolution from 1793-1794 
(Center for Defense Information, 2003; Harper, November, 2001). In the United States, 
terrorist-like activities were conducted during the Civil War. Further terrorist activity in 
the U.S. was documented during the 1880s and persisted into the 1900s in groups such as 
the Ku Klux Klan (Center for Defense Information, 2003; Harper, November, 2001). 
From 1968 to 2004, 86,568 casualties and 25,408 deaths were attributed to 19,828 
documented terrorist events and 7,401 adverse events. These numbers are expected to 
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increase in the future, with greater numbers of projected terrorist events, injuries, and 
deaths (Bogen & Jones, 2006). 
The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 showed a 
worldwide audience how terrorism could create chaos and strike fear within society. The 
combined attacks of September 11th caused 3,056 deaths (Bogen & Jones, 2006). In the 
weeks after September 11th, two U.S. Senators and members of the media received letters 
that contained anthrax spores, resulting in 17 people becoming ill and five deaths. This 
was regarded as the worst case of biological terrorism in U.S. history (FBI, 2008). 
Although the anthrax-laced letters were mailed to only a few individuals, many U.S. 
citizens were understandably concerned about opening their mail, a potentially lethal 
activity (Hall et al., 2003).  
Governmental agencies and international organizations have increased their 
efforts to counter bioterrorism since 2001. No longer can governments, businesses, and 
institutions (including country clubs) dismiss the possibility of intentional biological 
attacks upon their organizations. Taking precautions, effective monitoring, and response 
capability are vital to managing bioterrorism and food safety emergencies (WHO, 2002). 
Previous Bioterrorism Research Conducted in Foodservice  
Country club foodservice operations are one of the endpoints of the food chain 
(the “fork”) where final food preparation occurs before service to customers. Prior 
research was conducted in school and hospital foodservice operations in the U.S. 
regarding food bioterrorism (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007a; Yoon & Shanklin, 2007b; Yoon 
& Shanklin, 2007c). Yoon and Shanklin (2007) researched foodservice operators’ 
importance perceptions, implementation frequency of preventive practices, and self-
efficacy measures in the development of a food defense management plan. Operators 
who were more concerned and cautious of threats of food bioterrorism performed 
preventive practices more often than foodservice operators who were less concerned and 
less cautious of food bioterrorism (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007c). Foodservice operators 
identified chemical use and storage practices as the largest concern in protecting their 
operations from bioterrorism; these were the most frequently implemented practices in 
their operation (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007a). Yoon and Shanklin’s research concluded that 
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greater awareness of foodservice operators and the implementation of preventive 
practices in foodservice operations can enhance levels of food defense against 
bioterrorism (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007b). It is not unreasonable to suggest that Yoon and 
Shanklin’s conclusions could be applied to foodservice operations outside of hospitals 
and schools. For this study, private country club foodservice operations were identified to 
continue Yoon and Shanklin’s research in food bioterrorism. 
Summary 
Food security threats are predicted to be likely in the future and are relatively 
simple to execute. Regardless of the motivations or types of food terrorists, the ultimate 
outcome is purposefully harming humans using food intentionally contaminated with 
biological, chemical, or physical agents.  Almost all country clubs provide foodservice 
and beverage service for their members. Foodservice is an integral part of daily life, 
where half of the retail food sold has been prepared by someone other than the purchaser. 
The employee turnover rate in club foodservice operations may exceed 300% and 
background checks of line-level employees may not always be conducted. Temporary 
foodservice employees may be utilized to provide additional labor during busy times in 
club operations (e.g. summer and holiday seasons), meaning that workers come and go 
year-round. Most country clubs are private and serve affluent individuals, and could 
potentially be selected as a target by bioterrorists. Many biological agents and readily 
available chemicals can be used to intentionally contaminate food. Minimum research has 
been conducted regarding bioterrorism in retail foodservice and no bioterrorism research 
has been conducted in private clubs. Governmental agencies recommend implementing a 
food defense management plan to manage the risk of bioterrorism. Prior research has 
concluded that increasing awareness of foodservice operators and implementing 
preventive practices to address bioterrorism can increase levels of food defense in 
foodservice operations. 
Statement of Problem 
Foodservice professionals should be knowledgeable of the risks of food 
bioterrorism as they are responsible for supervising the endpoint of the food supply chain 
- the preparation and service of wholesome food to the public. Some foodservice 
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operations have implemented crisis management plans to address events such as 
workplace emergencies and natural disasters. However, crisis management plans do not 
adequately deal with intentional contamination of food or an operation’s water supply. 
Foodservice operations are advised to protect their food supplies against bioterrorism, 
especially those operations that serve individuals at greater risk, such as seniors and 
children (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007c). Foodservice operators should revise their crisis 
management plans in order to secure their operation against food bioterrorism (Bledsoe & 
Rasco, 2002; Bruemmer, 2003; United States Department of Agriculture Food and 
Nutrition Service, 2004; Yoon & Shanklin, 2007a)  
Past research has focused upon foodservice operator’s importance perceptions of 
bioterrorism and preventative practices implemented in hospital and school foodservice 
operations to protect food from intentional contamination (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007a; 
Yoon & Shanklin, 2007b; Yoon & Shanklin, 2007c). However, to the best of our 
knowledge, there has been no research in country club foodservice operations that has 
studied club professionals’ importance perceptions and preventative practices regarding 
food bioterrorism.  
Purpose of Study 
This operational research involved conducting interviews with managers of 
country clubs and observations of actual operational practices. The purpose of the study 
was to identify operation areas that could be at potential risk of a bioterrorist attack due to 
current operational practices. Based on results of the interviews and observations, 
recommendations for managers of country clubs were identified and are presented. 
Methodology 
Population and Sample 
The population used for this study was country clubs within a 500-mile radius of 
Manhattan, Kansas whose managers were members of Club Managers Association of 
America (CMAA). The CMAA member directory was used with permission to identify 
country club professionals to contact for the field study. Twenty-five private country 
clubs were included in the field study. Country clubs in the Midwest including clubs in 
 121
Kansas (14), Iowa (5), Nebraska (4), and Missouri (2) comprised the convenience sample 
and were selected given their close proximity to Kansas State University. Country clubs 
were visited during regular business hours. Visits to country clubs were scheduled during 
key production times at lunch or dinner from February 2, 2010 through June 25, 2010. 
The summer season for country clubs generally begins around Memorial Day weekend 
and is typically a busy time of the year. Thus, access to club managers’ time (i.e. agreeing 
to a visit) became increasingly difficult following Memorial Day weekend (May 31, 
2010). Country club managers were contacted via telephone; after explaining the purpose 
and goals of the study, they were asked to participate in a personal interview and to allow 
the researcher to observe their respective country club’s premises (i.e. the field study). Of 
33 club managers contacted, only two declined to participate in the field study. One 
manager who declined indicated that the field study would touch upon sensitive issues in 
their club and another manager simply refused, citing no reasons. A total of 31 clubs 
were visited during the course of the field study.  Clubs not used in the final data 
collection included one club selected for the pilot study, two clubs in which the club 
managers were not available at the time of the scheduled visit even though they had 
indicated they would be available at the designated time, and three clubs in which access 
to observations of the clubs’ foodservice operations was restricted during the visit. A total 
of 25 clubs composed the final sample for the field study. 
Development of Field Study Instruments 
Open-ended interview questions were developed from the literature review and 
ideas generated in an elicitation study that identified items to use in a separate survey 
research project. Interview questions were used to further explore club professionals’ 
perceptions regarding food defense in their operation. The interview questions included 
knowledge of food security resources, resources needed for food defense, training needs, 
and policies and procedures in club operations. The interview questions are summarized 
in Appendix D.  
Observation instruments were adapted from the literature review and existing 
observation instruments that were developed to conduct food defense and bioterrorism 
research in school foodservice. The observation instrument’s initial framework was 
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modified with ideas discussed in the separate survey elicitation study in order to 
adequately measure preventative practices used to counter bioterrorism in country clubs. 
The instrument included a place to record observations for the following locations: areas 
outside each country club, clubhouse receiving areas, clubhouse storage areas, clubhouse 
foodservice / food preparation areas, chemical storage areas, foodservice equipment, 
foodservice personnel, utility security, and general clubhouse security items. The 
observation instrument is presented in Appendix E.  
Pilot Study and Refinement 
 Field study instruments (interview guide and observation form) were pilot tested 
in one country club in Kansas. Feedback from the club manager during the pilot test 
helped to establish the interview format and how to ask the questions clearly and 
concisely. Changes made to the observation instrument included omitting the “n/a” (not 
applicable) column from the “observed” category to avoid confusion with “yes/no” 
columns (and instead recording “n/a” in a blank space used for comments next to each 
item). Cash handling was also omitted as private clubs typically operate with minimal 
cash exchange between staff and club members.    
Data Collection 
The field data was collected in 25 country clubs. The purpose of the field study 
was to understand club managers’ opinions and thoughts about food security (via 
interviews) and by observing country clubs’ operational practices. Both items were used 
to gather baseline data and to help make determinations of country clubs’ readiness to 
secure their operations against food bioterrorism.  
Club managers were interviewed in all 25 country clubs included in the data 
analysis. Prior to visiting each club, the investigator sent club managers an e-mail 
containing a set of Internet links (URLs) to background literature regarding food security. 
This provided club managers with some background information about food security and 
was intended to help facilitate discussion. However, upon visiting the clubs it became 
clear that the majority of club managers had not reviewed the material in advance. Only 
two out of 25 club managers interviewed were aware of the National Restaurant 
Association’s publication “Food Security – An Introduction”. One club manager was 
 123
aware of other resources pertaining to food security. Six club managers had heard about 
the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (the 
Bioterrorism Act), but did not know how it affected them.  
In four of the 25 interviews, additional club professionals were invited to 
participate (per the club manager’s discretion in all interviews). This included executive 
chefs, food and beverage directors, and assistant club managers. Probing, open-ended 
exploratory questions were used to obtain data related to club managers/professionals’ 
perceptions of bioterrorism. Interviews ranged in length from 20 minutes to one hour and 
all interviews followed the same set of probing open-ended questions. Interview data 
were coded to remove links to those being interviewed to ensure anonymity of responses 
and to maintain confidentiality of participants and their operations. Following the 
completion of the study, a debriefing form containing a summary of the major findings of 
the research study and confirmation of confidentiality of responses was offered to all 
study participants. Country club professionals interviewed were also offered a list of 
resources to address concerns shared during interviews. 
The observations of food security practices focused on the clubhouse or wherever 
the majority of food production occurred in all clubs. Observations focused on food 
defense practices, not individuals being observed; no individuals were identified when 
recording observation data. Data were aggregated so that specific locations observed 
remained anonymous. Any observations that revealed risks to an operation (such as a 
breach in food safety, an operational problem, or a food security risk) were 
communicated to the club professional during the on-site observation.  
Data Analysis 
Interview data were compiled and sorted by categories per the interview question. 
Data were also sorted by themes; factors included importance perceptions, perceived self-
efficacy, barriers, and attitudes. Observation items were recorded as “yes”, “no”, or “not 
applicable”. Observation data were analyzed with the Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS) version 17.0 (SPSS Inc., 2008). Frequencies and percentages were 
calculated for observation items. 
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Results 
Interviews 
All club managers were asked if they thought that their country club was at risk 
for an intentional attack on their food production systems. Four club managers answered 
“yes” while the remaining 21 managers answered “no”. Six club managers indicated that 
it was possible but not probable that an attack could occur and three club managers stated 
that the risk was lower in a private club setting than in a public setting. Nine club 
managers indicated that if someone really wanted to contaminate food that it would more 
likely be a disgruntled employee that did so (rather than a non-employee). Conversely, 
two club managers stated that it would be more likely that an outsider would contaminate 
food rather than a disgruntled employee. 
Club managers were asked to identify areas of the club that were the most 
vulnerable to intentional attack from outsiders (non-employees). Fourteen managers 
indicated that vendors and/or delivery people would be able to exploit vulnerabilities in a 
club’s food security due to the direct access they had to foodservice preparation areas in 
their club. These areas include the delivery dock and anywhere food was stored 
(storerooms, coolers, etc.). Since these areas are generally located in proximity to food 
production areas, the potential that a club’s food production system would be vulnerable 
to delivery personnel is high. Six club managers stated that vendors could also potentially 
tamper with food before delivery. However, three club managers indicated that they 
trusted their vendors and that intentional contamination of food would not occur by the 
actions of a vendor or a delivery person. Six club managers stated that buffets, beverage 
service, condiment dispensers, and food served at wedding receptions, poolside areas, 
and corporate events could be vulnerable to contamination from other individuals granted 
public access to club premises.  This included members, their guests (including former 
members and former club employees), and contractors. 
Club managers also were asked to identify areas of the club that were the most 
vulnerable to intentional attack from insiders (employees). Sensitive areas of 
vulnerability identified where food was stored, produced, or served including: the main 
kitchen, coolers, snack bar, buffet, at a wedding reception or corporate event, condiment 
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dispensers, areas where only one person is working in the kitchen, service staff areas, 
food warmers/holding ovens, satellite kitchens, mixers, kettles, storerooms, produce 
storage areas, and the pantry.    
Club managers were asked to identify resources such as facility, employee, and 
security needs to implement a food defense plan in their operations. For facility needs, 
fencing, more secure club design, and pass gates were the most commonly cited 
examples of improvements to a club’s overall security. However, one manager indicated 
that while effective, installing pass gates would be problematic for club traffic. Other 
responses included locks on coolers and storage units, and a dedicated secure receiving 
area for all deliveries.  
For employee needs, 16 club managers identified good employment practices 
(including background checks of all new potential employees) were needed to increase 
food defense. Regular staff meetings and training to increase awareness of overall club 
security (including food) was also mentioned. Seven managers stated the method used for 
training employees about food security should avoid presenting information that could 
result in negative behavior. Creating an environment of trust and identifying employees 
that are problematic, unhappy, or exhibiting unusual behaviors also are important. Fair 
and dignified progressive disciplinary procedures were mentioned as a way to curtail 
disgruntled employees. Hiring a dedicated purchasing agent who oversees the 
procurement and inspection of all goods also was identified as an effective employment 
strategy to increase food defense. Six managers recommended having and enforcing an 
operational policy that required at least two people to be in food production areas at all 
times (to keep an eye on one another). 
For security needs, club managers were supportive of having video surveillance 
installed and monitored. Eleven clubs already had video cameras installed, but their value 
as a deterrent was questioned. Five club managers indicated that someone committed to 
intentionally contaminating a club’s food supply would do so regardless of video cameras 
being in place. In addition, an employee would be needed to observe the security tapes, 
this practice was viewed by managers as not being cost-effective. Finally, 15 club 
managers stated that for video surveillance to truly be effective, it would need to be club-
 126
wide. Given that, the feasibility of installing video cameras in coolers, locker rooms, and 
seldom-trafficked areas (in addition to club member acceptance) was also questioned.   
When asked about perceived barriers to implementing a food defense plan, 16 
club managers stated that the cost was the biggest issue. Six club managers were not 
convinced of a sufficient enough threat to their country club to warrant the expense of 
implementing food defense strategies. The time required to implement a food security 
management plan or to continually train employees also was identified as a barrier by six 
club managers. Apathy, lack of need, and staff resistance were mentioned as potential 
barriers. Low motivation to implement new changes (unless a food security issue arose) 
was identified as a barrier. Suggestions to improve motivation were to issue CMAA 
education credits to club managers who implemented food security management plans or 
to require (by law) that clubs have such plans in place. Board approval and the quality of 
member/employee life (e.g. excessive surveillance) also were identified as barriers to 
implementing a food security management plan. 
Training programs already in place pertaining to club security included 
procurement procedures, pilferage and inventory control, food safety/sanitation training, 
chemical handling, grounds security training, and CPR/defibrillator training. Training 
needs identified as essential to club operations to increase food security included the 
following topics: financial implementation of food defense plans, specific training on the 
topic for management staff, service employees, vendors, training employees to use an 
anonymous hotline (whistleblower) and OSHA compliance. Further recommendations 
include awareness training, having written training materials in place, and training to 
prevent anything else that has the potential to harm a club member. 
Club managers were asked to what extent they already had policies and 
procedures developed that would overlap with or indirectly address food security issues. 
Fifteen club managers indicated they had no disaster management plan (DMP) in place. 
Twelve club managers stated that they had some policies and procedures in place, such as 
CPR training, chemical handling procedures, and informal disaster management 
procedures (e.g. calling 911). Only four club managers had formal disaster management 
plans in place which detailed specific actions to take in the event of an emergency in their 
club.  
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Themes Identified in Interviews 
Club managers’ input was valuable in identifying themes regarding food defense 
from their perspective. During the interviews, managers freely offered their opinions of 
food security issues in country clubs. At the close of each interview, club managers’ were 
explicitly asked if they had any additional information to provide, including any 
constructive criticism or their “gut feelings” about the subject matter.  What follows is a 
compilation of club managers’ responses (in their own words) grouped into common 
themes. Responses from interviews were also organized into theme diagrams and are 
presented in Appendix G. 
Importance Perceptions 
Importance perceptions regarding food security included responses such as “this 
is a very important topic”, “this is a very serious issue”, and “it should be a higher 
priority than it currently is”. Other responses were “you should not be naïve about food 
security – it should be on a club manager’s radar”, “this is relevant to today’s 
operations”, and “if implementing food security management procedures prevents even 
one incident from happening, then it’s worth the investment”. Some club managers did 
not perceive food security to be as important as others did. Comments included “this is 
not as important as other areas to focus your resources”, “this is not practical”, and “you 
shouldn’t make a mountain out of a molehill if you don’t have to”. 
Perceived Self-Efficacy 
Club professionals’ perceived self-efficacy is their belief in their own capabilities 
to plan and implement necessary actions to effectively deal with events in their country 
club. Club managers’ responses showed varying degrees of self-efficacy while describing 
food terrorism issues. Responses of lower self-efficacy levels included “if it’s going to 
happen, then it’s going to happen”, “unless you catch them red-handed, they will be hard 
to catch”, “a crook is a crook”, and “if someone wanted to do it, they could”. Conversely, 
responses indicating higher levels of self-efficacy were “it is better to be proactive than 
reactive”, “if this ever became a true issue in my club, I would eliminate food and 
beverage service altogether”, and “I could do this. If I told the board (that we should 
create a food defense management plan) they would say it was a good idea”.  
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Barriers 
Club managers also described potential barriers that could either impede 
implementing food biosecurity in country clubs or affect club operations in general. 
These included “wouldn’t this (food defense) get in the way of employees doing their 
job”, “the lack of need (of food defense management) would be the biggest barrier”, and 
“new initiatives take twice as long to initiate in private clubs than elsewhere due to board 
and member approval, plus the lack of available funds to do so”. Some club managers 
indicated that there were factors in their clubs that could possibly reduce barriers to food 
security issues. Comments included “every item purchased by our club comes through 
one door and is inspected by one person – our purchasing agent”, “besides the local 
hospital, we have the highest concentration of doctors under one roof in town”, and “the 
fire department is next door – they can be here in two or three minutes”.  
Attitudes 
Club managers’ attitudes varied regarding food security. Attitudes supportive of 
food security included “the benefits of training outweigh the risks – it is incumbent of 
managers to take steps to maintain security and act upon the risks and take precautions”, 
“you need to offer your staff an enjoyable, nurturing work environment so they don’t get 
disgruntled”, and “there should be mandatory (food defense) certification and it should be 
posted on the front door”. Attitudes less supportive of food security were “if you were to 
try to address this issue, you would risk someone copycatting or mimicking it – it would 
appear as if you were ‘professing’ food terrorism”, “in my 25 years as a club manager, 
I’ve only heard of two incidents of intentional food contamination, and neither of them 
occurred in a club”, and “this doesn’t happen in country clubs”.  
Observations 
Following interviews, observations were conducted at each private country club 
visited. For items that were directly observable (e.g. if entrance guidelines were posted by 
the employee entrance), the researcher recorded the results. For items that were not 
directly observable (e.g. if a key log was readily available), the researcher queried club 
professionals for the answer. The observation results are presented in Appendix E. 
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Exterior Premises 
Upon arrival at each country club, the researcher examined the exterior of the 
country club. Nineteen country clubs observed did not have a dedicated front gate to limit 
vehicle access into the country club.  Security patrols were present in only seven clubs 
visited. The majority (19) of clubs did not have signs that helped maintain control of the 
premises. Access was limited to outside controls for utilities, including airflow (18), 
water (20), and electricity (18). All but one club had a dedicated public entrance to the 
clubhouse and 22 clubs had a dedicated employee entrance. However, only one employee 
entrance had formal entrance/exit guidelines posted and only four were considered 
secure. Most clubs had an authorized person assigned to receive shipments during regular 
business hours (23), however, docks doors in 16 clubs were usually not closed and locked 
when not in use.  
Storage Areas 
All 25 clubs indicated that they could take accurate inventory anytime. Storage 
doors were tamper proof in 20 clubs. However, 10 clubs stated that access to food 
product was not secured and 12 clubs indicated that access to chemicals was also not 
secure.   
Foodservice / Food Preparation Areas 
Only three clubs restricted access to foodservice areas via signage and only five 
had doors secured at all times. All but four clubs had at least one authorized employee in 
the foodservice area at all times and 20 restricted access to foodservice areas to only 
designated employees. However, only five clubs indicated that they possessed 
documentation describing where ingredients and foods were stored and prepared in their 
country club. 
Hazardous Chemicals 
Chemicals were stored outside of food preparation areas in all but one of the clubs 
observed but less than half (12) of the chemical storage areas were secured. Only one 
club took a daily inventory of chemicals and all but two clubs labeled their chemicals 
(e.g. spray bottles filled from bulk containers).  
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Foodservice Equipment 
Access to foodservice equipment was secured in 22 clubs, with only designated 
employees allowed to operate and/or clean equipment. There was a lack of signs or 
instructions posted to increase safety with potentially dangerous equipment in the 
majority of clubs (18). Supervisors indicated that the operation of equipment was a part 
of an employee’s training. 
Foodservice Personnel 
An updated shift roster was available in all but one club, however, employees 
were not clearly identifiable in 18 clubs (no identification badge or nameplate). In 
addition, only 10 clubs stated that they clearly identified temporary workers.  
Water and Ice Supply 
As required by law, backflow devices were observed in all club’s water-supply 
equipment. The water supply was considered safe in 21 of the clubs. Ice machines were 
secure in only 17 clubs.   
Clubhouse General Security 
The majority of clubs kept their firewalls and virus detection systems up to date 
(24), and backed up system files regularly (20). No club issued identification badges to 
visitors and only seven had sign in desks (7) for visitors. 
Discussion 
Suggestions for Improving Food Defense in Country Clubs 
Only four club managers thought that their country club was at risk for an 
intentional attack on their food production systems. Sixteen club managers indicated that 
cost was the primary barrier to implementing a food defense management plan. 
Furthermore, 15 clubs had no disaster management plan in place. Given the low 
perceived risk of food security, the high perceived cost, and the lack of formal disaster 
management plans in place at the majority of country clubs visited, it is recommended to 
implement economical improvements to overall club security that overlap with food 
security issues. This could include securing exterior doors that are used infrequently and 
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installing locks on all storage areas. A key log program could be implemented that 
specifies how keys are issued, revoked, and under what circumstances keys and lock 
should be changed. A calling tree specifying who to call could help expedite emergency 
response to club disasters. Criminal background checks are relatively low-cost insurance 
to screen applicants before hiring. Establishing a “backdoor” policy specifying how 
deliveries are handled and access is granted into sensitive club areas could also improve 
overall club security. 
Sixteen club managers indicated background checks of all new employees were 
important to increasing food defense. Several club managers stated that a disgruntled 
employee would be more likely to intentionally contaminate food than a non-employee. 
Therefore, it is specifically recommended for country clubs to conduct background 
checks on all employees. 
Fifteen club managers recommended club-wide video surveillance as an effective 
security measure. Although cost could be an issue, video cameras could be installed as a 
general security procedure (including food security) and as a deterrent against pilferage. 
If cost was truly an issue, then “dummy” video cameras are available for approximately 
$10.00 each. Dummy cameras could serve as an inexpensive alternative to functioning 
video cameras and as a psychological deterrent even though images were not actually 
being recorded. Of course, resistance from club members could be an issue when 
installing video surveillance (real or not), especially in sensitive areas such as locker 
rooms. However, given the fact that 21 clubs could be entered through doors other than 
the dedicated public entrances, video surveillance is highly recommended for country 
clubs. 
Access to chemicals was not secured in 12 clubs. Chemicals are of primary 
concern in food defense management, thus it is recommended that all clubs secure their 
chemical storage areas. Chemicals are also costly, so securing access to them could 
reduce pilferage, while increasing food security. 
An authorized person was assigned to receive shipments in 23 clubs visited. This 
meant that for every delivery, someone authorized accepted delivery. However, only one 
club visited had a dedicated purchasing agent that was solely responsible for inspecting 
all deliveries to a main delivery area. The researcher recommends that the club appoint a 
 132
dedicated purchasing agent and to route deliveries to a primary delivery area in the club. 
Access granted to areas past the delivery area (such as coolers and storage areas) should 
be regulated and granted only to trusted delivery personnel. In addition, club access 
should also be monitored for anyone else who is not a member or an employee of the 
club (e.g. contractors). The perceived cost of hiring a purchasing agent could be justified 
by lower pilferage, spoilage, and savings from improved purchasing practices, while 
improving food defense practices. 
Eighteen clubs did not clearly identify their employees using nameplates or 
identification badges. Clear identification of all club employees is recommended. This 
includes temporary workers and back-of-the-house workers who do not normally come 
into contact with members. A timely issuance of identification badges or nameplates 
would ensure that workers are always identified, even on their first day of employment. If 
the employee terminates his position, he/she should be required to return the 
identification before receiving his/her last check. In addition, 18 clubs did not have sign-
in desks and were easily entered unnoticed through the front entrance. It is recommended 
to have a dedicated greeter/sign-in desk at the front entrance of clubs to welcome every 
visitor that enters. 
Fifteen clubs had no disaster management plan in place. Disaster management 
plans help prepare clubs for disasters before they occur, detail the responses to take in the 
event of a disaster, and help support rebuilding after a disaster occurs. It is strongly 
recommended that clubs develop formal written procedures to deal with issues such as 
fire, flood, lightning, evacuation and food defense procedures.  
Limitations of the Study 
The field study conducted observations and interviews in 25 clubs over a four 
month time period. During the course of the data collection, potential limitations in data 
collection and analysis were identified. These included:  
1.) The researcher’s observations focused primarily on the main clubhouse, or 
wherever the majority of food production occurred. Even though the country club 
segment was selected to help standardize observations and interviews, country 
club facilities varied slightly from club to club. 
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2.) Of the 25 club managers interviewed, 24 were male and one was female. This 
may or may not have contributed to sex bias in the interviews. 
3.) Data collection can present challenges if the club professionals are too busy to 
complete surveys or schedule interviews. Following Memorial Day, persuading 
club managers to participate in data collection was challenging due to increased 
summer activities (pool, tennis, golf, etc.). 
4.) Although this study added to the existing body of literature on bioterrorism in 
foodservice operations, results cannot be generalized and applied to settings other 
than country clubs. 
5.) Due to the serious nature of the research topic, club professionals may have been 
resistant or reluctant to share weaknesses of their club’s readiness to protect their 
members from harm.  
6.) Due to time and cost considerations, only 25 country clubs were visited. Only 
clubs in the Midwestern region of the United States were visited, limiting the 
ability to generalize results to the U.S. or beyond.  
7.) This study only focused upon country clubs whose managers were members of 
Club Managers Association of America (CMAA). It is unclear if there would be 
any significant differences with clubs whose managers were not CMAA 
members. 
8.) Observations and interviews took place primarily in the off-season. The time the 
data were collected could have influenced the outcome or access to several clubs 
managers and their clubs. 
Conclusions and Future Research Directions 
Within the hospitality foodservice literature, there is a dearth of research on food 
defense practices. This study attempted to identify country club operation areas that could 
be at potential risk of a bioterrorist attack due to current operational practices. 
Recommendations for managers of country clubs were identified and were based on 
results of the interviews and observations.  
Club managers were initially unfamiliar with the topic of bioterrorism and few 
were convinced that their clubs were at risk for an intentional attack on their foodservice 
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operations. Most country clubs were easily entered with little or no questioning from staff 
of the purpose of the investigator’s visit. This suggests that better monitoring of club 
visitors is needed. Barriers identified by club managers in implementing improvements to 
food security were mainly cost/benefit related. As most club managers did not perceive 
themselves to be at risk, they felt that the cost to implement food defense practices 
outweighed the benefits.  
Future research recommendations are to gather more baseline data from club 
managers across the United States. This could include studying if there were any 
differences between club managers who were members of CMAA and those who were 
not. It would be interesting to assess if the same preventive food security practices would 
be more accepted if they were framed in the context of overall club security and 
controlling pilferage. As this topic has now been studied in hospitals, schools and country 
clubs, further research in independent or chain restaurants could be useful.  
Risk perceptions also could be explored in future research. Although the 
perceptions in this study were that the risk of food bioterrorism in country clubs is low, 
having a formal food defense management plan in place is better than assuming no one 
will commit a bioterrorist attack on your club’s foodservice operation. 
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CHAPTER 6 - Conclusions / 
Recommendations 
Summary 
Within the hospitality foodservice literature, there is a dearth of research on food 
defense practices. This research study was the first to investigate country club 
professional’s opinions, importance perceptions, and operational practices pertaining to 
biosecurity and food defense. In addition, the study conducted the first interviews and 
onsite observations designed to explore food defense practices in country clubs. 
Recommendations for managers of country clubs are based on the results of the data 
collection.  
The survey research showed that club managers’ mean importance scores were 
4.20 or higher on a 5 point scale. The three highest importance scores were chemical use 
and storage (4.52), utility security (4.38), and employee management (4.28).  Facility 
security (4.26) and Food handling (4.20) were the two lowest importance scores. Thus, 
club managers thought that protecting their club against bioterrorism was worthwhile. No 
mean practice frequency scores were lower than 3.68 on a 5 point scale, which was still 
higher than average and is commendable. The three highest practice frequency scores 
were chemical use and storage (4.35), food handling (3.98) and employee management 
(3.90). Utility security (3.89) and facility security (3.68) were the two lowest scores. 
These results suggest that on average, club managers are addressing some issues 
associated with food defense, either directly or indirectly.  
Gap analysis was conducted to determine the difference between importance 
perceptions and frequency of practice. No differences were found in the level of concern 
between club professionals with smaller importance/practice gaps than those with larger 
gaps. This suggests that club managers are concerned about protecting their clubs even 
though they may not be putting their concern into practice.  
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A club manager’s self-efficacy affected their motivation to implement a food 
defense management plan and implement preventive practices. Club managers who 
believed in their own capabilities to take action were more likely to do so. Closely related 
with this observation were barriers identified. Club managers who thought there were 
many barriers in their way were less motivated to implement practices to secure their 
clubs against bioterrorism.   
The field study identified areas in country clubs that could be at potential risk of a 
bioterrorist attack due to current operational practices. Recommendations for managers of 
country clubs were based on results of the interviews and observations.  
Club managers were initially unfamiliar with the topic of bioterrorism and few 
were convinced that their clubs were at risk for an intentional attack on their foodservice 
operations. Most country clubs were easily entered with little or no questioning from staff 
of the purpose of the investigator’s visit. This suggests that better monitoring of club 
visitors is needed. Barriers identified by club managers in implementing improvements to 
food security were mainly cost/benefit related. As most club managers did not perceive 
themselves to be at risk, they felt that the cost to implement food defense practices 
outweighed the benefits.  
Major Findings of the Study 
This study’s propositions were tested by conducting food bioterrorism research 
study in private country clubs. The findings of this study revealed that club managers 
with smaller gaps between importance and practice frequency were not significantly 
more concerned about food terrorism than club managers with larger gaps. Club 
managers with a smaller perceived gaps and clubs with larger operating budgets 
implemented preventive practices more frequently. In addition, club managers with 
higher levels of self-efficacy were significantly more motivated to develop a food defense 
management plan and performed preventive practices more frequently than club 
managers with lower levels of perceived self efficacy. This supported the proposition that 
club managers who think they are capable of implementing a food defense management 
plan will act upon their self-determination and do what is necessary to make their clubs 
secure. Club managers who had higher numbers of perceived barriers were significantly 
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less motivated to develop a food defense management plan and performed preventive 
practices less frequently than club managers with lower numbers of perceived barriers. 
This supported the proposition that club managers who are overwhelmed with obstacles 
will be less motivated to protect their club against a possible bioterrorist act.  
The majority of club managers indicated that they did not think their country club 
was at risk for an intentional attack on their food production systems. Club managers 
indicated that disgruntled employees would be more likely to contaminate food than an 
outsider to the club. However, club managers thought that vendors or delivery people 
would be able to exploit vulnerabilities in security due to their access to food production 
areas. 
Club managers identified fencing and more secure club design as improvements 
to facility security needs. For employee needs, good employment practices were 
identified, including conducting background checks for all employees. Video surveillance 
was identified as efffective to help improve food security in private clubs.   
When asked about perceived barriers to implementing a food defense plan, the 
majority of club managers stated that the cost was the biggest issue. Apathy, lack of need, 
and staff resistance were also mentioned as potential barriers. Most clubs indicated that 
they had no disaster management plan (DMP) in place and few had formal disaster 
management plans in place which detailed specific actions to take in the event of an 
emergency in their club.  
Most country clubs observed did not have a dedicated front gate to limit vehicle 
access into the country club. Most clubs had an authorized person assigned to receive 
shipments during regular business hours, but docks doors were usually not closed and 
locked when not in use. Nearly half of clubs observed stated that access to food product 
and chemicals was not secure. 
Most clubs lacked signage restricting or regulating access to club premises. Most 
clubs had at least one authorized employee in the foodservice area at all times and 
restricted access to foodservice areas to only designated employees. Employees were not 
clearly identifiable in most clubs (no identification badge or nameplate). No club issued 
identification badges to visitors and few had sign in desks for visitors. 
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Limitations of the Study 
During the course of the data collection, potential limitations in data collection 
and analysis were identified. These included: 
1.)  Online surveys typically have a low response rate. Efforts to increase 
participation were employed, but the sample size and response rate were less than 
expected. 
2.)  Surveys that are self-administered have limitations. Club professionals who chose 
not to complete the survey may or may not have had significant differences than 
club professionals who did choose to complete the survey. 
3.)  Although this study added to the existing body of literature on bioterrorism in 
foodservice operations, results cannot be generalized and applied to settings other 
than country clubs. 
4.)  Due to the serious nature of the research topic, club professionals may have been 
resistant or reluctant to share weaknesses of their club’s readiness to protect their 
members from harm.  
5.)  This study only focused upon country clubs whose managers were members of 
Club Managers Association of America (CMAA). It is unclear if there would be 
any significant differences with clubs whose managers were not CMAA 
members. 
6.)  Observations and interviews took place primarily during the off-season. It is 
unknown if there would be any significant differences between seasonal changes 
in club activity. 
7.)  The online survey system had limitations which increased the perceived length of 
the survey. This may have contributed to respondents quitting the survey early or 
not being willing to participate. 
8.)  The investigator focused observations primarily upon the main clubhouse, or 
wherever the majority of food production occurred. Even though the country club 
segment was selected to help standardize data collection, country club facilities 
varied slightly from club to club. 
9.)  Of the 25 club managers interviewed, 24 were male and one was female. This 
may or may not have contributed to bias of data collected during interviews. 
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10.)  Data collection can present challenges if the club professionals are too busy to 
complete surveys or schedule interviews. Following Memorial Day, persuading 
club managers to participate in data collection was challenging due to the 
increased summer activities (pool, tennis, golf, etc.). 
11.)  Due to time and cost considerations, only 25 country clubs were visited. Only 
clubs in the Midwestern region of the United States were visited, limiting the 
ability to generalize results to the rest of the country.  
Implications / Applications of Results 
Few club managers thought that their country club was at risk for an intentional 
attack on their food production systems and most indicated that cost was the primary 
barrier to implementing a food defense management plan. Most clubs had no disaster 
management plan in place. However, club managers indicated that if their board of 
directors suggested implementing a food security management plan, then they would do 
so. It is recommended to suggest implementing cost-effective improvements to overall 
club security that overlap with food security issues. This could be proposed to both the 
club manager and the club’s board of directors. Securing exterior doors and installing 
locks on key storage areas could be an inexpensive first start toward strengthening food 
security in private clubs. Another suggestion is for clubs to develop procedures that 
specify how keys are issued, revoked, and under what circumstances keys and lock 
should be changed. In addition, establishing a policy detailing how access is granted to 
visitors in sensitive club areas could improve club security. 
Background checks are relatively inexpensive in comparison to unknowingly 
hiring an individual with prior criminal activity. Given that most club managers stated 
that a disgruntled employee would be more likely to intentionally contaminate food than 
a non-employee, it is specifically recommended for country clubs to conduct background 
checks on all employees. 
Club managers identified video surveillance as an effective security measure. 
Video cameras could be installed as a general security procedure and as a pilferage 
deterrent. Dummy cameras could be installed as an inexpensive alternative to functioning 
video cameras if cost were an issue. Given that most clubs could be entered through 
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doors other than the dedicated public entrances, video surveillance is highly 
recommended for country clubs. 
Chemicals are of major concern in food defense management, thus it is 
recommended that all clubs secure their chemical storage areas. Chemicals are also 
costly, so securing access to them could reduce pilferage, while increasing food security. 
Most clubs did not have a dedicated purchasing agent that was solely responsible 
for inspecting all deliveries to a main delivery area. The researcher recommends that the 
club appoint a dedicated purchasing agent and to traffic club deliveries to a primary 
delivery area. Access granted to areas past the delivery area (such as coolers and storage 
areas) should be regulated and granted only to trusted delivery personnel. The perceived 
cost of hiring a purchasing agent could be offset by lower pilferage, spoilage, and savings 
from improved purchasing practices, while improving food defense practices. 
Most clubs did not clearly identify their employees using nameplates or 
identification badges. Clear identification of all club employees is recommended. Most 
clubs did not have sign-in desks and were easily entered unnoticed through the front 
entrance. It is recommended to have a dedicated greeter/sign-in desk at the front entrance 
of clubs to welcome every visitor that enters. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
  
Future research recommendations include studying factors that could increase a 
club professional’s self-efficacy to enable greater confidence in addressing serious 
security issues such as food defense in their club. Identifying specific barriers to be 
removed in order to secure one’s country club against food terrorism could be 
efficacious. Other club segments could also be explored to see if there were any 
differences between city clubs and country clubs. Public club professionals could be 
surveyed to determine if food defense was perceived differently and the frequency of 
operational practices were implemented at a different rate in comparison to private clubs. 
Further research should be conducted in other sectors of the food chain including 
independent or chain restaurants. Results would be beneficial to the foodservice industry 
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in identifying targeted areas for greater emphasis that need to be implemented to protect 
consumers from food bioterrorism in this important industry. 
Other research recommendations include gathering more baseline data from club 
managers across the United States. One possibility is to determine if there were any 
differences between responses of club managers who were members of CMAA and those 
who were not. It would also be interesting to assess if the same preventive food security 
practices (such as keeping chemicals under lock and key) would be more accepted if they 
were framed in the context of overall club security and controlling pilferage.  
Risk perceptions could be explored in future research. The odds of becoming the 
victim of a terrorist attack are about the same as being hit by lightning, yet formal safety 
procedures regarding lightning strikes are in place in most swimming pools and golf 
courses (including private clubs). Although the risk of food bioterrorism in country clubs 
was perceived to be low, having a formal food defense management plan in place is 
better than assuming no one will commit a bioterrorist attack on a club’s foodservice 
operation. This study concludes with the observation that raising the importance and 
awareness of food security issues and implementing preventive practices can help a 
country club become more secure against food terrorism.
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Appendix C - Survey Instrument 
Food Security in Country Clubs
Survey Description
You will be asked to respond to questions about food security in country clubs. Please carefully read each question and do
not leave any items blank. Your participation in this research study is completely voluntary and you may refuse to participate
in the study at anytime without penalty. By completing this survey, you indicate to the researcher your willingness to
participate in this research. Your responses are completely anonymous.
Please be assured that your responses will be confidential and all data will be reported as aggregated (group) data. For
further information about this study, contact Dr. Carol W. Shanklin, 785-532-7927, or shanklin@ksu.edu. If you have
questions about Kansas State University's policies regarding this research, please contact the University Research
Compliance Office (URCO), 203 Fairchild Hall, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 66506, 785-532-3224, or
comply@ksu.edu
If you wish to be sent information of the survey results upon completion of this study, then please send an e-mail to
daveolds@ksu.edu
Opening Instructions
When you are ready to begin, click "next" at the bottom of this page.
Page 1
Question 1
YOUR OPINIONS ABOUT FOOD SECURITY
INSTRUCTIONS: The following set of statements asks for your opinions regarding
food security in your country club. Using the scale below, please indicate the
extent to which you agree with the following statements as it pertains to your
country club. Feel free to honestly express your opinion. Your responses are
totally confidential.
*For the purpose of this study, Food Security is defined as the protection of food from intentional contamination
from chemical, biological, radiological, or physical agents. A Food Security Management Plan is defined as a
written document that describes policies and procedures that minimize the risk of intentional contamination of
food and reduce the risk of illness or death in your club. For expanded information about food security please go
to http://www.box.net/shared/h1j0prn71h
1 - Strongly disagree  |  2 - Somewhat disagree  |  3 - Neutral
4 - Somewhat agree  |  5 - Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5
1.1 I am concerned about food security in my country club.
1.2 Our country club is well-secured against any type of food security
hazard/threat.
1.3 Promoting food security awareness among employees is not a club
professional’s responsibility.
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1.4 Training all foodservice employees about food security is a priority for our
country club.
1.5 Implementing preventive measures will decrease the risk of tampering or
other malicious, criminal or terrorist actions in my country club.
1.6 Informing our members that food security is one of our primary concerns
is not an important responsibility of club management.
1.7 Developing and initiating a food security management plan is a priority
even if it increases our country club’s operating costs.
1.8 Club professionals know exactly what to do if our country club receives a
food security threat.
1.9 Our country club does not need a food security management plan
because the country club is not at risk for tampering or other malicious,
criminal or terrorist actions.
1.10 I am capable of implementing a food security management plan in my
country club.
1.11 Implementing a food security management plan in my country club would
be difficult for me.
Page 2
Question 2
YOUR OPINIONS ABOUT FOOD SECURITY (Continued)
1 - Strongly disagree  |  2 - Somewhat disagree  |  3 - Neutral
4 - Somewhat agree  |  5 - Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5
2.1 If the Board of Directors of my country club suggests implementing a food
security management plan, then my country club will develop one.
2.2 Implementing a food security management plan in my country club would
be complicated for my employees.
2.3 Management does not care about implementing a food security
management plan.
2.4 Implementing a food security management plan in my country club would
be too time-consuming.
2.5 If CMAA headquarters suggests implementing a food security
management plan, then my country club will develop one.
2.6 Implementing a food security management plan in my country club would
be difficult for my employees.
2.7 Employees in my country club are capable of implementing a food security
management plan.
2.8 Implementing a food security management plan in my country club would
be complicated for me.
2.9 My country club does not have the resources available to implement a
food security management plan.
2.10 Implementing a food security management plan in my country club would
be too costly.
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2.11 Employees do not care about implementing a food security management
plan.
Page 3
Question 3
IMPORTANCE OF FOOD SECURITY PRACTICES
INSTRUCTIONS: Using the following scale below, please rate how important each
practice is in protecting your country club from food security threats.
*For the purpose of this study, Food Security is defined as the protection of food from intentional contamination
from chemical, biological, radiological, or physical agents. A Food Security Management Plan is defined as a
written document that describes policies and procedures that minimize the risk of intentional contamination of
food and reduce the risk of illness or death in your club. For expanded information about food security please go
to http://www.box.net/shared/h1j0prn71h
1 - Very unimportant  |  2 - Somewhat unimportant
3 - Neither unimportant nor important  |  4 - Somewhat important  |  5 - Very important
1 2 3 4 5
3.1 Purchasing all food ingredients, food products, packaging materials, and
other foodservice supplies only from reputable suppliers who have
appropriate permits, licenses, or insurance.
3.2 Requiring all food suppliers to use sealed packaging on foods delivered to
our facility.
3.3 Using sealed packaging for food sent to satellite foodservice areas in our
country club.
3.4 Inspecting ingredient packages prior to use for evidence of tampering.
(Examples of evidence are a broken seal or discoloration of food inside
package).
3.5 Requiring suppliers to provide advance notification for off-hour deliveries.
3.6 Assigning an authorized person to verify and receive shipments both
during business hours and after business hours.
3.7 Verifying deliveries against a roster of scheduled deliveries and approved
suppliers.
3.8 Having a policy that all delivery trucks on the premises be locked when not
being loaded or unloaded.
3.9 Maintaining accurate inventories of all foods and chemicals so we can
detect and investigate unexplained additions to or withdrawals from stock.
3.10 Storing all leftover food items in tightly sealed, clearly labeled, and dated
containers.
3.11 Obtaining Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) for hazardous chemicals
from our suppliers.
3.12 Making MSDS sheets readily available to foodservice staff who follow
manufacturer’s instructions for storage and use of hazardous chemicals.
3.13 Storing hazardous chemicals in a locked storage area.
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3.14 Training employees to use chemicals properly to prevent accidental food
contamination and human exposure.
3.15 Having procedures in place for monitoring foodservice equipment to
prevent someone from intentionally contaminating food during preparation.
3.16 Having procedures for safe handling and disposal of contaminated
products.
3.17 Requiring all job candidates to pass background security checks beyond
reference checks prior to hiring.
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Question 4
IMPORTANCE OF FOOD SECURITY PRACTICES (Continued)
1 - Very unimportant  |  2 - Somewhat unimportant
3 - Neither unimportant nor important  |  4 - Somewhat important  |  5 - Very important
1 2 3 4 5
4.1 Using a system that ensures clear identification of foodservice personnel
and their specific functions within the country club.
4.2 Enforcing policies that define the personal items foodservice employees
may and may not have in the food production or service areas.
4.3 Accounting for all keys, uniforms, and identification badges provided to
current and former employees.
4.4 Protecting computer data systems with passwords, network firewalls, and
effective virus detection systems.
4.5 Training employees about a food security management plan.
4.6 Providing employee training on identifying packaging that is acceptable
and not acceptable.
4.7 Controlling, monitoring, and securing all access points into the foodservice
facility.
4.8 Controlling, monitoring, and securing all access points into all storage
areas.
4.9 Securing all doors, windows, roof openings, and vent openings at all times.
4.10 Securing all outside refrigeration / storage units at all times.
4.11 Inspecting security in all storage facilities regularly and maintaining a log
of the results.
4.12 Controlling access of all visitors and unauthorized persons to food
production areas.
4.13 Having procedures to follow if the management team suspects the airflow
or water source has been contaminated with biological or other contaminants.
4.14 Securing outside access to all ice-making equipment to prevent
unauthorized access.
4.15 Securing outside access to all water supply equipment to prevent
unauthorized access.
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4.16 Installing and using backflow prevention devices on all water supply
equipment and beverage dispensers.
4.17 Maintaining a current contact list of local authorities such as the police
and fire departments, who should be notified in case of a security incident and
distributes the list to the foodservice staff
4.18 Meeting with local vendors to increase awareness about food security
issues.
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Question 5
FREQUENCY OF FOOD SECURITY PRACTICES
INSTRUCTIONS: Using the following scale below, please rate how how frequently
each practice is currently implemented in your country club.
*For the purpose of this study, Food Security is defined as the protection of food from intentional contamination
from chemical, biological, radiological, or physical agents. A Food Security Management Plan is defined as a
written document that describes policies and procedures that minimize the risk of intentional contamination of
food and reduce the risk of illness or death in your club. For expanded information about food security please go
to http://www.box.net/shared/h1j0prn71h
1 - Never  |  2 - Seldom  |  3 - Some of the time
4 - Most of the time  |  5 - All of the time
1 2 3 4 5
5.1 Our country club purchases all food ingredients, food products, packaging
materials, and other foodservice supplies only from reputable suppliers who
have appropriate permits, licenses, or insurance.
5.2 Our country club requires all food suppliers to use sealed packaging on
foods delivered to our facility.
5.3 Our main kitchen uses sealed packaging for food sent to satellite
foodservice areas in our country club.
5.4 Our country club inspects ingredient packages prior to use for evidence of
tampering. (Examples of evidence are a broken seal or discoloration of food
inside package).
5.5 Our country club requires suppliers to provide advance notification for
off-hour deliveries.
5.6 Our country club assigns an authorized person to verify and receive
shipments both during business hours and after business hours.
5.7 Our country club verifies deliveries against a roster of scheduled deliveries
and approved suppliers.
5.8 Our country club has a policy that all delivery trucks on the premises be
locked when not being loaded or unloaded.
5.9 Our country club maintains accurate inventories of all foods and chemicals
so we can detect and investigate unexplained additions to or withdrawals from
stock.
5.10 Our country club stores all leftover food items in tightly sealed, clearly
labeled, and dated containers.
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5.11 Our country club obtains Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) for
hazardous chemicals from our suppliers.
5.12 Our country club makes MSDS sheets readily available to foodservice
staff who follow manufacturer’s instructions for storage and use of hazardous
chemicals.
5.13 Our country club stores hazardous chemicals in a locked storage area.
5.14 Our country club trains employees to use chemicals properly to prevent
accidental food contamination and human exposure.
5.15 Our country club has procedures in place for monitoring foodservice
equipment to prevent someone from intentionally contaminating food during
preparation.
5.16 Our country club has procedures for safe handling and disposal of
contaminated products.
5.17 Our country club requires all job candidates to pass background security
checks beyond reference checks prior to hiring.
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Question 6
FREQUENCY OF FOOD SECURITY PRACTICES (Continued)
1 - Never  |  2 - Seldom  |  3 - Some of the time
4 - Most of the time  |  5 - All of the time
1 2 3 4 5
6.1 Our country club uses a system that ensures clear identification of
foodservice personnel and their specific functions within the country club.
6.2 Our country club enforces policies that define the personal items
foodservice employees may and may not have in the food production or
service areas.
6.3 Our country club accounts for all keys, uniforms, and identification badges
provided to current and former employees.
6.4 Our country club protects computer data systems with passwords, network
firewalls, and effective virus detection systems.
6.5 Our country club trains employees about a food security management
plan.
6.6 Our country club provides employee training on identifying packaging that
is acceptable and not acceptable.
6.7 Our country club controls, monitors, and secures all access points into the
foodservice facility.
6.8 Our country club controls, monitors, and secures all access points into all
storage areas.
6.9 Our country club secures all doors, windows, roof openings, and vent
openings at all times.
6.10 Our country club secures all outside refrigeration/storage units at all
times.
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6.11 Our country club inspects security in all storage facilities regularly and
maintains a log of the results.
6.12 Our country club controls access of all visitors and unauthorized persons
to food production areas.
6.13 Our country club has procedures to follow if the management team
suspects the airflow or water source has been contaminated with biological or
other contaminants.
6.14 Our country club secures outside access to all ice-making equipment to
prevent unauthorized access.
6.15 Our country club secures outside access to all water supply equipment to
prevent unauthorized access.
6.16 Our country club installs and uses backflow prevention devices on all
water supply equipment and beverage dispensers.
6.17 Our country club maintains a current contact list of local authorities such
as the police and fire departments, who should be notified in case of a security
incident and distributes the list to the foodservice staff.
6.18 Our country club meets with local vendors to increase awareness about
food security issues.
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CLUB OPERATIONS
INSTRUCTIONS: The following set of questions asks you about your club
memberships and foodservice employees.
Question 7
How many total club memberships does your club have?
Characters Remaining: 200
Question 8
How many full-time foodservice employees are on your payroll?
Characters Remaining: 200
Question 9
How many part-time foodservice employees are on your payroll?
Characters Remaining: 200
Question 10
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How many temporary foodservice employees are on your payroll during peak periods (e.g. summer and the
winter holiday season)?
Characters Remaining: 200
Question 11
What is the average number of foodservice employees working per shift?
Characters Remaining: 200
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FOOD SAFETY, CRISIS MANAGEMENT, FOOD SECURITY
INSTRUCTIONS: The following set of questions asks you about responsibilities for
crisis management and food security in your club.
Question 12
Does your country club have a crisis management plan?
No, we don’t have one.
Yes, we have one and it is rather informal.
Yes, we have one and it is formal. (i.e. having a person who holds primary responsibility about it)
I don’t know.
Question 13 ** required **
Does your country club have one or more employee(s) whose responsibility is implementing and monitoring food
security?
Yes
No
Page 9
Fill out this page only if you answered:
Yes on question 13. Does your country club have one or.. on page 8 .
FOOD SECURITY MANAGEMENT TEAM
INSTRUCTIONS: The following set of questions asks you about your club's food
security management team.
Question 14
Which of the following individuals are responsible for implementing and monitoring food security in your country
club?
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General Manager
Clubhouse Manager
Director of Security
Food and Beverage Director
Executive Chef
Sous Chef
 Other: 
Page 10
Fill out this page only if you answered:
No OR Yes on question 13. Does your country club have one or.. on page 8 .
Question 15
INTENTION TO DEVELOP A FOOD SECURITY MANAGEMENT PLAN
Does your country club plan to develop and implement a food security management plan?
No, and we do not plan to develop one in the near future.
Yes, but we have not determined a specific timeline.
Yes, we plan to develop one within the next 3 months.
Yes, we plan to develop one within the next 6 months.
Yes, we plan to develop one within the next 12 months.
Further comments about your response:
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DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS
Question 16
What is your gender?
Male
Female
Question 17
What is your position title?
Characters Remaining: 200
Question 18
How long have you held your current position?
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0 - 5 years
6 - 10 years
11 - 15 years
16 - 20 years
21 - 25 years
26 - 30 years
Greater than 30 years
Question 19
How many years have you been employed in foodservice?
0 - 5 years
6 - 10 years
11 - 15 years
16 - 20 years
21 - 25 years
26 - 30 years
Greater than 30 years
Question 20
How many years have you been employed in club management?
0 - 5 years
6 - 10 years
11 - 15 years
16 - 20 years
21 - 25 years
26 - 30 years
Greater than 30 years
Question 21
What is your current age?
Characters Remaining: 2
Question 22
What is your highest level of education completed?
High school
Some college
Associate, 2-year, or Vocational Degree
Bachelor’s degree
Graduate degree (e.g. Master’s, Doctoral)
Question 23
What is your annual foodservice operating budget (including food and labor)?
Less than $2,000,000 per year.
$2,000,000 - $5,000,000 per year.
Greater than $5,000,000 per year.
Don't know or prefer not to respond.
Further comments about your response:
Axio Survey file:///C:/Documents and Settings/daveolds/Desktop/MASTER FILES D...
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THANK YOU!
Question 24
Thank you for your participation in this study!
Resources that can help you to further understand food security are easily obtainable from governmental
websites such as the Food and Drug Administration:
http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodDefense/Training/default.htm
The National Restaurant Association also has specific information about food security in retail foodservice:
http://www.servsafe.com/catalog/productDetail.aspx?ID=1401
If you wish to be sent information of the survey results upon completion of this study, then please send an
e-mail to daveolds@ksu.edu
If you are interested in being entered in a drawing for a $100 gift certificate redeemable at CMAA's
Marketplace, then please send an e-mail to daveolds@ksu.edu and indicate that you wish to be
entered in the drawing.
Please use the box below to share any comments, concerns, or feedback regarding this survey.
When you click "done" below, the survey will be completed.
Characters Remaining: 1000
Closing Message
Thank you for your participation in this study!
- End of Survey -
© 2010 Axio Learning. All Rights Reserved.
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Appendix D - Interview Questions 
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Private Club Biosecurity – Club Manager Interview Form (Estimated time for interview: 20 minutes) 
 
Section A: Knowledge of National Restaurant Association (NRA) and Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) Resources 
The following set of interview questions pertain to your knowledge of NRA and FDA resources pertaining to Food Biosecurity 
Defense.  
 
 
1. Are you aware of the NRA publication “Food Security – An Introduction”?  
2. If so, then how did you first become aware of this resource? 
 
3. Are you familiar with the FDA’s responsibilities in enforcing the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response 
Act of 2002 (the Bioterrorism Act)? 
4. If so, then how did you first become aware of the NRA publication “Food Security – An Introduction”? 
 
5. Are you aware of any other resources on food biosecurity applicable to country clubs or private clubs? 
If yes, please specify:  
6. Do you feel that your country club is at risk for an intentional attack on your food production systems? (yes/no) 
7. What areas of your operation do you think are the most vulnerable to an intentional attack from outsiders (non-employees)? 
 
 
8. What areas of your operation do you think are the most vulnerable to an intentional attack from insiders (employees)? 
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Section B: Resources Needed for Food Biosecurity Defense 
The following set of interview questions are designed to measure needed resources: 
 
 
1. What resources are needed to implement a Food Biosecurity Defense Plan in your club? 
 
 
2. Facilities needs (i.e. storage, utility updates, equipment upgrades, grounds or building improvements)? 
 
 
3. Employee needs (i.e. training, screening)? 
4. 
. 
Security needs (i.e. security devices, alarms, etc)? 
 
 
 
5. Please explain some perceived barriers to implementing a Food Biosecurity Defense Plan in your operation: 
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Section C: Training Needs Related for Food Biosecurity Defense 
The following set of interview questions are designed to measure your Training Needs for Food Biosecurity Defense. Please indicate 
the amount of training that is currently given in the following areas using this scale: 
 
 
1. What type of training programs have you implemented in your club related to Food Biosecurity? (Start with broad based, probing 
questions. Broad categories would be: facility security, utility security, employee management, communication, food handling, chemical 
use and storage.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. What types of training needs would be essential in your club related to Food Biosecurity? (Begin to narrow focus – asking more specific 
questions). 
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Section D: Policies and Procedures 
The following set of interview questions are designed to measure policies and procedures: 
 
1. 
 
To what extent do you already have policies and procedures developed that would overlap with/indirectly address food biosecurity 
issues in your club (Crisis Management Plan, Disaster Management Plan)? 
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Appendix E - Observation Instrument 
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Table 10: Observed / Reported Food Security Items During Onsite Visit to Country Club Properties (n=25)     
FOOD SECURITY ITEMS 
 
OBSERVED / REPORTED 
 Yes No N/A 
Exterior Premises & Outside Exits/Entrances of Country Club     
Parking lot for visitors & guests are at safe distance from CC. 17 8  
Outside lighting is adequate to detect unusual activities. 24 1  
Video surveillance monitoring is used. 11 14  
Gates/security checkpoints used to restrict access to club premises 6 19  
Fencing or other deterrents are used around sensitive areas (i.e. non-public perimeter and/or storage 
lockers, air intakes, etc.) 18 7  
Security patrols are present. 7 18  
Access limited to outside controls for airflow. 18 7  
Access limited to outside controls for water. 20 5  
Access limited to outside controls for electricity. 18 7  
Access limited to outside controls for refrigeration. 16 7 2 
External facility signs are up-to-date and useful in maintaining control of premises. 6 19  
Dedicated public entrance(s) to clubhouse exists. 24 1  
Dedicated employee entrance(s) to clubhouse exists. 22 3  
All other non-dedicated clubhouse exits/entrances secured. 4 21  
Dedicated employee entrance to facility secured. 5 20  
Employee entrance has policy posted for entrance/exit guidelines. 1 24  
Outer doors are sturdy / reinforced (i.e. metal frame or equivalent). 25 0  
An authorized person is assigned to receive shipments during regular business hours. 23 2  
An authorized person is assigned to receive shipments after regular business hours. 5 20  
Daily schedule of deliveries is posted/available. 4 21  
List of approved suppliers is posted/available. 14 11  
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 Observed / Reported Food Security Items During Onsite Visit to Country Club Properties (n=25) (Cont.) 
FOOD SECURITY ITEMS 
 
OBSERVED / REPORTED 
 Yes No N/A 
Exterior Premises & Outside Exits/Entrances of Country Club (Cont.)    
Receiving logs are used and up-to-date. 4 21  
Receiving policies/procedures for food deliveries are posted/available. 13 12  
Receiving policies/procedures for chemical deliveries are posted/available. 13 12  
Receiving policies/procedures for MSDS sheets are posted/available. 20 5  
Guidelines for tamper-resistant verification are posted/available. 8 17  
Delivery trucks are kept locked when not being unloaded or loaded. 2 23  
Dedicated vehicles are secured at all times for transporting food produced in a centralized CC to satellite 
CC locations (pool/golf course). 12 10  
List of phone number of approved primary suppliers and alternative suppliers is posted/available. 22 3  
Dock doors are closed and locked when not in use. 9 16  
    
Clubhouse Storage Areas    
Access to all food product and food ingredients is secured. 15 10  
Access to chemical storage areas is secured. 14 11  
Only designated employees have access to storage rooms.  16 9  
Designated area for storing distressed, damaged, and returned products to ensure that they are not served 
or used in the operation. 19 6  
Accurate inventory of all supplies is readily available. 25 0  
Security alarm installed on storage room doors? 5 20  
Storage room doors reinforced and secure/tamper-proof? 20 5  
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 Observed / Reported Food Security Items During Onsite Visit to Country Club Properties (n=25) (Cont.)     
FOOD SECURITY ITEMS 
 
OBSERVED / REPORTED 
 Yes No N/A 
Clubhouse Foodservice / Food Preparation Areas    
Restricted foodservice areas are assigned and clearly marked with appropriate signs, including food and 
chemical storage areas. 3 22  
Leftover food items stored in sealed containers that are labeled/dated. 23 2  
Only designated employees have access to restricted foodservice areas.  20 5  
Key log is readily available and up-to-date to verify access to restricted foodservice areas. 12 12 1 
Access to airflow is restricted and accessible only by designated employees. 19 6  
Access to HVAC is restricted and accessible only by designated employees. 21 4  
Access to water system is restricted and accessible only by designated employees. 20 5  
Access to electricity is restricted and accessible only by designated employees. 18 7  
Access to gas is restricted and accessible only by designated employees. 21 4  
Emergency exits (alarmed) are present per local, state, fire/building codes. 17 7 1 
Self-locking doors (opened from the inside only) are present per local, state, fire/building codes. 17 7 1 
Doors are secured (lock, seal, sensor device) at all times. 5 20  
Windows are secured (lock, seal, sensor device) at all times. 15 9 1 
Roof openings are secured (lock, seal, sensor device) at all times. 16 6 3 
Vent openings are secured (lock, seal, sensor device) at all times. 16 6 3 
Outside refrigeration are secured (lock, seal, sensor device) at all times. 6 7 12 
Outside storage units are secured (lock, seal, sensor device) at all times. 4 7 14 
At least one authorized employee is present in the foodservice area at all times when the area is not 
secure. 21 4  
Alternative storage place (outside of foodservice areas) exists for employees to secure personal foods 
and medications. 18 6 1 
Documentation exists describing where ingredients and foods are stored and prepared in the CC. 5 20  
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 Observed / Reported Food Security Items During Onsite Visit to Country Club Properties (n=25) (Cont.)     
FOOD SECURITY ITEMS 
 
OBSERVED / REPORTED 
 Yes No N/A 
Clubhouse Foodservice / Food Preparation Areas (Cont.)    
Self-service foodservice areas are monitored. 17 5 3 
All leftover items are stored in sealed, labeled, and dated containers. 25 0  
Food or ingredients not properly sealed and labeled is discarded. 24 1  
Purchase records are available. 25 0  
Food production records are available. 7 18  
HACCP records are available (if applicable). 4 21  
Temperature logs are available. 11 14  
Map or diagram defining boundaries of all foodservice areas & locations of specific foodservice 
activities is available. 3 22  
    
Clubhouse Hazardous Chemicals    
Chemical storage area is outside of food preparation areas. 24 1  
Chemical storage area is secured. 12 13  
Chemical storage area is accessible only by designated employees. 15 10  
Manufacturer’s instructions for use of hazardous chemicals are available, including instructions for 
amounts of chemicals to use, personal protective equipment guidelines, and guidelines for optimal 
environmental conditions for use of chemicals. 
25 0  
Daily inventory of hazardous chemicals is available (should contain a chemical inventory and usage log). 1 24  
Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) for hazardous chemicals are readily available. 24 1  
Containers used to transport chemicals from the storage area to the work area are properly labeled. 22 2 1 
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 Observed / Reported Food Security Items During Onsite Visit to Country Club Properties (n=25) (Cont.)     
FOOD SECURITY ITEMS 
 
OBSERVED / REPORTED 
 Yes No N/A 
Clubhouse Foodservice Equipment    
Access to foodservice equipment is secured. Only designated employees are allowed to operate and 
maintain/clean equipment. 22 3  
Signs and/or instructions are posted to increase safety especially with potentially dangerous equipment 
(meat slicer, mixers, steamers). 7 18  
    
Clubhouse Foodservice Personnel    
Updated daily or shift roster of foodservice personnel is available to foodservice supervisors.  24 1  
Employees are easily identifiable (ID badge). 7 18  
Temporary workers, contractors, cleaning crews, construction workers, truck drivers, etc. are clearly 
identified. 10 14 1 
Only authorized individuals in restricted sections of foodservice area. 22 3  
    
Clubhouse Water and Ice Supply    
Water supply is secured against outside access. 21 4  
Ice-making equipment are secured against outside access. 17 8  
Backflow devices are in place on all water-supply equipment. 25 0  
    
Clubhouse General Security    
Computer systems have effective, up-to-date firewalls and virus detection systems.  24 1  
Computer systems files are backed up regularly. 20 5  
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 Observed / Reported Food Security Items During Onsite Visit to Country Club Properties (n=25) (Cont.)     
FOOD SECURITY ITEMS 
 
OBSERVED / REPORTED 
 Yes No N/A 
Clubhouse General Security (Cont.)    
Sign-in desk or other designated area for visitors and non-club employees to explain purpose of their 
visit.  7 18  
I.D. badges issued to visitors. 25 0  
Escort/Security personnel at public entrances. 5 20  
Written program in place specifying how access to keys, keycards, and number codes/PINs are granted 
and denied to employees. 7 18  
Adequate interior lighting. 25 0  
Adequate emergency lighting to facilitate detection of suspicious or unusual activity. 24 1  
Minimal number of places in non-public areas exist that an intruder could remain unseen after work 
hours (e.g. trash dumpster areas). 3 22  
Minimal number of places in non-public areas exist that could be used to temporarily hide intentional 
contaminants. 2 23  
Inspection of incoming and outgoing packages and briefcases. 2 23  
Duress alarms installed in refrigerators and freezers. 11 14  
Access to roof & roof equipment under control? 20 5  
Access to food product (i.e. to the interior) from roof under control? 20 5  
Employee lockers monitored/inspected? 3 18 4 
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Appendix F - Additional Survey Tables 
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Table 11: Club Managers Opinions of Food Security Factors 
 
Mean ± Standard Deviation
Concern Opinions Agree/Disagree (n=261) 
Implementing preventive measures will decrease the risk of tampering or other malicious, 
criminal or terrorist actions in my country club. 4.04±1.00 
Training all foodservice employees about food security is a priority. 3.80±1.18 
I am concerned about food security in my country club. 3.48±1.28 
Developing and initiating a food security management plan is a priority even if it increases 
our country club’s operating costs. 3.38±1.01 
Informing our members that food security is one of our primary concerns is not an important 
responsibility of club management. a 2.57±1.15 
Our country club does not need a food security management plan because the country club is 
not at risk for tampering or other malicious, criminal or terrorist actions.a 2.30±1.09 
Management does not care about implementing a food security management plan. a 2.10±0.99 
Promoting food security awareness among employees is not a club professional’s 
responsibility.a  1.62±1.18 
Self-Efficacy Opinions  
Employees in my country club are capable of implementing a food security management plan. 3.78±0.95 
I am capable of implementing a food security management plan in my country club. 3.59±1.00 
Club professionals know exactly what to do if our country club receives a food security threat. 2.99±1.18 
Implementing a food security management plan in my country club would be complicated for 
my employees.a 2.48±0.98 
Scale values range from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5).  
aReverse-coded. 
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Table 12: Club Managers Opinions of Food Security Factors 
 
Mean ± Standard Deviation
Self-Efficacy Opinions (ctd) Agree/Disagree (n=261) 
Implementing a food security management plan in my country club would be difficult for 
me.a 2.41±1.05 
Implementing a food security management plan in my country club would be difficult for my 
employees.a 2.34±0.94 
Implementing a food security management plan in my country club would be complicated for 
me.a 2.31±0.98 
Barriers Opinions  
Employees do not care about implementing a food security management plan. 2.55±1.04 
Implementing a food security management plan in my country club would be too costly. 2.40±0.93 
Implementing a food security management plan in my country club would be too time-
consuming. 2.36±1.00 
My country club does not have the resources available to implement a food security 
management plan. 2.27±1.05 
Independent Opinions  
If the Board of Directors of my country club suggests implementing a food security 
management plan, then my country club will develop one. 4.24±0.96 
Our country club is well-secured against any type of food security hazard/threat. 3.39±1.06 
If CMAA headquarters suggests implementing a food security management plan, then my 
country club will develop one. 3.02±0.98 
Scale values range from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5).  
aReverse-coded. 
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Table 13: Total Country Club Memberships a (n=261) 
 
Number of Memberships 
 
 
Number Percentage
0 – 250 memberships 14 5.4%
251 – 500 memberships 76 29.1%
501 – 750 memberships 90 34.5%
751 – 1000 memberships 34 13.0%
1001 – 2500 memberships 39 14.9%
2501 – 5000 memberships 5 1.9%
Over 5000 memberships 1 0.4%
No Response 2 0.8%
 
a Question asked of respondents was “How many total club memberships does your club have?”
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Table 14: Average Foodservice Employees working per shifta (n=261) 
 
Number of employees 
 
 
Number Percentage
0 – 10 employees per shift 95 36.4%
11 – 25 employees per shift 118 45.2%
26 – 50 employees per shift 33 12.6%
51 – 75 employees per shift 2 0.8%
76 – 100 employees per shift 1 0.4%
No Response 12 4.6%
  
a Question asked of respondents was “What is the average number of foodservice employees working 
per shift?” 
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Table 15: Country Clubs and Crisis Management Plans a (n=261) 
 
Response 
 
 
Number Percentage
No, we don’t have one. 79 30.3%
Yes, we have one and it is rather informal. 116 44.4%
Yes, we have one and it is formal (a person holds primary responsibility for it) 54 20.7%
I don’t know. 10 3.8%
No Response 2 0.8%
 
a Question asked of respondents was “Does your country club have a crisis management plan?” 
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Table 16: Country Clubs with Food Security Monitoring Employee a (n=261) 
 
Response 
 
 
Number Percentage
Yes 166 63.6%
No 94 36.0%
No Response 1 0.4%
  
a Question asked of respondents was “Does your country club have one or more employee(s) whose responsibility is implementing and 
monitoring food security?” 
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Table 17: Individuals Responsible for Implementing and Monitoring Food Securitya b (number of responses = 427) 
 
Position 
 
Number Percentage
Executive Chef 148 34.7%
General Manager 68 15.9%
Sous Chef 67 15.7%
Clubhouse Manager 59 13.8%
Food and Beverage Director 57 13.4%
Director of Security 13 3.0%
Purchasing Agent 12 2.8%
Assistant General Manager 3 0.7%
 
a Question asked of respondents was “Which individuals are responsible for implementing and monitoring food security in your 
country club?” 
b Note that the total number of responses (427) is greater than the number of respondents (261) because multiple answers were allowed 
in the case of more than one person being responsible. 
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Table 18: Intent to Develop and Implement a Food Security Management Plan.a b (n=261) 
 
Response 
 
Number Percentage
No, and we do not plan to develop one in the near future. 101 38.7%
Yes, but we have not determined a specific timeline. 108 41.4%
Yes, we plan to develop one within the next 12 months. 8 3.1%
Yes, we plan to develop one within the next 6 months. 9 3.4%
Yes, we plan to develop one within the next 3 months. 17 9.0%
No response 18 6.9%
 
a Question asked of respondents was “Does your country club plan to develop and implement a food security management plan?
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Table 19: Position Titles of Respondents asked in Food Security Surveya  (number of responses = 261)
 
Position 
 
Number Percentage
General Manager 167 64.0%
Clubhouse Manager 32 12.3%
Food and Beverage Director 17 6.5%
Assistant General Manager 15 5.7%
Assistant Clubhouse Manager 4 1.5%
Director of Operations 4 1.5%
Dining Room Manager 3 1.1%
Controller 2 0.8%
Membership Director 2 0.8%
Catering Manager 1 0.4%
No Response 4 1.5%
a Question asked of respondents was “What is your position title?” 
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Table 20: Comparisons of Gaps between Importance Perceptions and Practice Frequencies to Previous Study Using Gap 
Analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
Gap a 
 
 
 
Gap b
 
 
Chemical Use and Storage 
 
0.17 0.19 
Food Handling  
 
0.22 0.20 
Employee Management 
 
0.38 0.52 
Utility Security 
 
0.49 0.72 
Facility Security 
 
0.58 0.72 
Overall Average 
 
0.37 0.47 
a This study. 
b Previous study by Yoon and Shanklin (2007). 
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Appendix G - Interview Theme Diagrams 
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